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Abstract
Ad hoc wireless networking offers mobile computer users the prospect of trading
with others in their vicinity anywhere anytime. This thesis explores the potential
for developing such trading applications. A notable difficulty in designing their
security services is being unable to use trusted parties. No one can be guaranteed
present in each ad hoc wireless network session. A side benefit is that their costs
don’t have to be paid for.
A reference model is defined for ad hoc m-commerce and a threat model is for-
mulated of its security vulnerabilities. They are used to elicit security objectives
and requirements for such trading systems. Possible countermeasures to address
the threats are critically analysed and used to design security services to mitigate
them. They include a self-organised P2P identity support scheme using PGP cer-
tificates; a distributed reputation system backed by sanctions; a group membership
service based on membership vouchers, quorate decisions by some group members
and partial membership lists; and a security warning scheme.
Security analysis of the schemes shows that they can mitigate the threats to an
adequate degree to meet the trading system’s security objectives and requirements
if users take due care when trading within it. Formal verification of the system
shows that it satisfies certain safety properties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
Ad hoc wireless networking is a promising technology for future wireless commu-
nication applications that offers flexible, convenient to set up and inexpensive de-
ployment. It has already been in use since the 1970s, mainly for military operations
[173],[41],[107]. One example of the military systems that utilizes ad hoc wireless
networks is the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) [55],[52],[33],[149],[130] that
was created by the US Department of Defense (DoD) to provide a networked bat-
tlefield communications for warfighters to exchange data, voice and video across the
battlefield domains. However, due to the restructuring of its program that was re-
sponsible for the development of Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) in 2012,
JTRS is now called as the Joint Tactical Networking Center (JTNC) [19]. WNW
is a key component of JTRS that was developed to provide advanced wireless com-
munication waveform for land combat operations, which include communications
between dismounted soldiers, unmanned vehicles, sensors and so on.
In the past few years, with the advancement of mobile devices and rapid im-
provement in wireless communication technologies [103], there has been significant
progress in research and development in ad hoc wireless networks [122],[131],[97],[73],
including in areas outside military operations. With this development, it is likely
that ad hoc wireless networks will become more widely used in the near future,
especially in its present application domains such as battlefield areas, emergency
and rescue operations and with sensor networks. Also, there is a potential for ad
hoc wireless networks to be used for commercial purposes, such as to facilitate new
business opportunities for users with profitable commercial enterprises, enabling ad
hoc wireless network applications to move from military or emergency uses to com-
mercial ones. Although ad hoc wireless networks offer similar advantages for both
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military operations and commercial activities, such as quick and inexpensive deploy-
ment, no central point of control, self-configuring and so on, their implementation
has several fundamental differences which include the following:
Purpose of deployment - In military operations, ad hoc wireless networks are
used to establish a quick and reliable communication between soldiers, vehicles and
other military equipment in order to relay situational awareness information among
a group of soldiers, coordinate military objects, shutdown hostile devices and etc. In
contrast, in commercial or business activities, ad hoc wireless networks are used as
an alternative solution to enable a group of users or traders who are in the vicinity
of each other to exchange information and collaborate with each other to accomplish
a specific task or to carry out online trading.
Environment - In battlefield operations, ad hoc wireless networks may be deployed
in inhospitable terrains or hostile environments. On the other hand, in commercial
activities, ad hoc wireless networks are usually used in normal environments or when
the need for such activities arises.
Security - Another difference is that military operations require stricter security
requirements compared to the commercial activities due to the high mobility of the
network and harsh environment of the battlefield.
Table 1.1 below summarizes the fundamental differences between the utilization of
ad hoc wireless networks in military operations and commercial activities:
Military Operations Commercial Activities
Purpose of
Deployment
Communication between sol-
diers, vehicles and other mil-
itary equipment to relay sit-
uational awareness informa-
tion, coordinate military ob-
jects, shutdown hostile devices
and etc
Communication between a
group of users or traders to
exchange information and
collaborate with each other to
accomplish a specific task or to
carry out online trading
Environment Hostile Environment Normal Environment
Security Stricter security requirements
compared to commercial activ-
ities
Adequate Security
Table 1.1: Fundamental differences between the utilization of ad hoc wireless net-
works in military operations and commercial activities
Although there has been a growing interest in utilizing ad hoc wireless networks
for commercial or business activities in the recent years [71],[73], there is still little
effort geared towards exploring or investigating the viability of its implementation
in the real world. Thus, to facilitate research in the commercial area for ad hoc
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wireless networks, this thesis introduces a new concept termed ad hoc m-commerce,
where an ad hoc wireless network is used as the communication medium for traders
to carry out m-commerce transactions. Current implementations of m-commerce
only utilise network infrastructures provided by a network service provider.
This thesis uses the term ”ad hoc m-commerce trading system” to refer to a type
of local trading facility that is conducted online and wirelessly outside infrastruc-
ture supported computer networks [117]. It offers interesting opportunities for more
convenient and cost effective m-commerce transactions. It enables traders who are
equipped with mobile devices, suitable networking capability and appropriate soft-
ware applications to spontaneously organize themselves into a trading system [118]
and then engage in online trading when the need arises regardless of time or location
and without relying on any infrastructure support from a network service provider.
Members of a trading system will utilize their available computing resources and also
their neighbours to communicate and collaborate with each other in m-commerce
transactions and other activities of the trading system. However, the nature of
an ad hoc wireless network such as its lack of network infrastructures, having a dy-
namic network topology, using resource constrained mobile devices and so on, means
that performing m-commerce transactions over ad hoc wireless networks introduces
additional challenges as compared to infrastructure-supported m-commerce.
One of these issues that requires careful consideration when deploying an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system in the real-world is how it handles security which im-
pacts on whether users feel confident to use it. This is because this type of trading
system’s activities and communications among its members are carried out over
interceptible radio communication in an ad hoc wireless network and no network
service provider can be relied upon to be present to provide security services to its
participating parties. If the trading system lacks security mechanisms, it may not
only degrade users’ confidence to participate in its transactions, but its usage and
development will also be inhibited. Thus, it is important for this kind of trading
system to have security services that safeguard its operations to a sufficient degree
for traders to be prepared to engage in its transactions or activities. However, due
to the nature of an ad hoc wireless network and the characteristics of ad hoc m-
commerce, the design of security services for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
is challenging and complex. Most of the security schemes for wired networks, com-
putationally intensive processing and power hungry operating arrangements such as
the conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) seem unlikely to work well or to
be feasible for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system due to the infrastructure-less
nature and dynamic network topology of ad hoc wireless networks, as well as the
mobile devices’ energy constraints [11],[129],[113].
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1.2 Research Scope and Objectives
The scope of this research is to present a reference model for an ad hoc m-commerce
that articulates clearly the nature and requirements for performing wireless trading
outside infrastructure supported computer networks, as well as laying out the key
issues involved in performing such trading. The model establishes a taxonomy of
terminologies and definitions for describing the ad hoc m-commerce concept, identi-
fies all the functional elements in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and clarifies
dependencies among them. The model also identifies the issues that need to be ad-
dressed in order to realise such a system practically. With regard to this reference
model, this research is concerned with the security issues in particular, rather than
issues such as mobile device limitations, wireless network bandwidth, connectivity,
transaction management and etc. A threat model is defined to identify potential
threats and vulnerabilities that could subvert the functionality of the trading system,
as well as helping to elicit the key security requirements for a security and trust ser-
vice. The identified threats are classified into three main categories, namely identity-
related threats, information-related threats and misbehaviour-related threats. A
novel conceptual framework, a trading model and an abstract architecture of an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system are also proposed and used as a basis for designing
security schemes for a security and trust service in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system to address the identified threats. Figure 1.1 (page 5) illustrates the scope of
the research.
The objectives that guide the research are to:
I. Study, analyse and explore the potential of an ad hoc wireless network to be
utilized as an alternative way to facilitate m-commerce transactions.
II. Identify and classify potential threats and vulnerabilities that could subvert
the functionality of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system.
III. Identify key security requirements for the design of a security and trust service
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system.
IV. Study, analyse and classify possible countermeasures that can be used to ad-
dress or at least mitigate the identified threats and vulnerabilities, and suit the
nature, characteristics and security requirements of an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system.
V. Present a general framework for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system that
provides a foundation for application developers to organize the effective devel-
opment, maintenance and enhancement of such trading systems, and serves as
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Figure 1.1: Scope of the research
a basis for addressing the major security issues involved in ad hoc m-commerce
transactions.
VI. Design and analyse the security schemes in a security and trust service in an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system that addresses the identified threats and
vulnerabilities to an acceptable level.
VII. Verify that the processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system satisfy
certain safety properties.
1.3 Research Methodology and Approach
This research has been conducted using the following methodologies:
1. Information Gathering and Analysis
At an early stage of this research work, literature searches were carried out to develop
a thorough understanding of the background and complex issues at stake in the
area of ad hoc wireless networks and m-commerce. In this process, the nature of an
ad hoc wireless network, and the characteristics, main entities and key functional
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components of current implementations of m-commerce that utilize infrastructure-
based architectures were analysed, and their general requirements and issues were
outlined. The main entities, key components and target applications of ad hoc
m-commerce, as well as the potential and challenges of its implementation were
identified. The outcome of this phase is the ad hoc m-commerce reference model.
2. Threat Modeling
A threat model was developed to help formulate security objectives for ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems, and identify possible threats and vulnerabilities that
could subvert the functionality of such a trading system. Based on the threat model,
the key security requirements for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and possible
countermeasures to address or mitigate the identified threats and vulnerabilities were
identified.
3. Framework Formulation
An important part in this research was the formulation of a general framework for
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system that provides a novel paradigm for pure
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) m-commerce. It includes a trading model for such dealings, and
core services that are required to support its functionality and security.
4. Security Architecture Design
A security scheme for a trust and security service in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system was designed to provide security. The security scheme includes an identity
support scheme, a fully distributed reputation system and a group membership
service.
5. Security Analysis
A security analysis was carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
design of a security and trust service for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
to address or mitigate the vulnerabilities identified in the threat model. Security
was evaluated by critical analysis, where the means by which the proposed security
schemes might be compromised by ill-intentioned parties were highlighted and the
measures to address their threats were critically analysed and reviewed.
6. Formal Verification
A formal verification of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system was conducted using
the SPIN model checker to verify certain safety properties.
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1.4 Contributions to Knowledge
The following are the principal contributions to knowledge made by this thesis.
1) The novel ad hoc m-commerce reference model [117] establishes a taxonomy of
terminologies, concepts and definitions required for describing ad hoc m-commerce,
and identifies all the functional elements in ad hoc m-commerce systems. The model
also identifies issues that might restrain the development of such systems. It is
intended to allow future researchers to grasp the key issues involved in trading
wirelessly among computing nodes in the absence of a network service provider.
This reference model should also be useful in identifying and facilitating Research
and Development (R&D) for a wide range of ad hoc m-commerce applications.
(Chapter 2)
2) The novel threat model specifies the security objectives and key assets of an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system. The model also identifies and classifies the possible
threats and vulnerabilities that could subvert the functionality of such a trading sys-
tem. The identified threats are classified into three main categories, namely identity-
related threats, information-related threats and misbehaviour-related threats. (Chap-
ter 3)
3) Key security requirements are identified for an ad hoc m-commerce trading sys-
tem. The threat model specifies three main aspects that require careful consider-
ations when designing security services for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system,
namely constraining participation, sharing trading experience and sharing expres-
sions of trust among traders. Possible countermeasures that can be used to address
or at least mitigate each category of threats and vulnerabilities, and can be imple-
mented in a way that can suit with the security requirements, and the nature and
characteristics of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are identified, evaluated
and critically analysed. (Chapter 3)
4) The design of a novel ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework is proposed
that specifies a standard set of core services and functionalities for m-commerce
trading conducted online and wirelessly outside established computer infrastructure.
The framework also serves as a basis for addressing the major security issues involved
in trading wirelessly among computing nodes in a dynamic network and in the
absence of a network service provider. The framework also presents an abstract
architecture for an ad hoc m-commerce trading peer. (Chapter 4)
5) A trading model for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system was formulated. The
trading model presents the main steps and processes involved in a representative
kind of ad hoc m-commerce transaction. (Chapter 4)
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6) The design and security analysis of a novel identity support scheme for a security
and trust service in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems [119] that aims to protect
traders from identity-related threats and information-related threats. (Chapter 5)
7) The design and security analysis of a fully distributed reputation system that aims
to provide high availability, efficient retrieval and reliable reputation information for
traders in such a loose and dynamic trading community. (Chapter 6)
8) The design and security analysis of a novel group membership service [118] that
aims to constrain ad hoc m-commerce trading system participation to only traders
that are regarded as trustworthy by other traders in the trading system. (Chapter
7)
9) A security warning scheme that aims to improve the security of an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system by allowing traders to share their knowledge about sus-
pected misbehaviour or malpractice by other traders in the trading system. (Chapter
8)
10) A formal verification of ad hoc m-commerce trading system processes using the
SPIN model checker that aims to verify certain safety properties. (Chapter 9)
1.5 Thesis Outline
This chapter provides an introduction to the entire research. The remainder of this
thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of mobile commerce
over ad hoc wireless networks (ad hoc m-commerce), its characteristics, main en-
tities, functional components and target applications, as well as its potentials and
challenges. In order to facilitate discussion, a critical analysis of m-commerce and
ad hoc wireless networks is presented and their definitions are clarified. Also, their
characteristics, current implementation and functional elements are explained, and
their general requirements and issues are outlined.
Chapter 3 defines a threat model that specifies possible threats and vulnerabilities
that can subvert the functionality and dependability of an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system. Based on the threat model, three major security requirements for
securing an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are identified, namely constraining
participation to fit parties, sharing experience of trading by parties and sharing
expressions of trust in the tradeworthiness of parties.
Chapter 4 describes and presents a general conceptual framework that includes a
standard trading model and an abstract architecture for an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system.
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Chapter 5 presents the design of an identity support scheme for a security and trust
service for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and a security analysis of the
proposed identity support scheme.
Chapter 6 discusses three key issues in designing an effective reputation system
for ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, namely reputation information storage,
integrity maintenance and reliability assurance. The design of a fully distributed
reputation system that addresses the three key design issues and a security analysis
of the proposed reputation system are then presented.
Chapter 7 presents the detailed mechanisms for managing group membership in an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system. The design of such membership service is then
presented and analysed.
Chapter 8 discusses the importance of having a mechanism to allow traders to share
their knowledge about suspected misbehaviour or malpractice using warning or alert
messages. A detailed security warning scheme for an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system is then presented.
Chapter 9 presents the formal verification of ad hoc m-commerce trading system
processes using the SPIN (Simple Promela Interpreter) model checker.
Finally, Chapter 10 summarizes the presented work and concludes it by discussing
its limitations and outlining issues that remain open for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the concept of ad hoc m-commerce, its characteristics, main
entities, functional components and target applications, as well as its potential and
challenges. In order to facilitate discussion, a critical analysis of m-commerce and
ad hoc wireless networks is presented and their definitions are clarified. Also, their
characteristics and functional elements are explained, and their general requirements
and issues are outlined. Current implementations of m-commerce primarily utilize
infrastructure-based architectures [128], where users make use of a pre-established
network service infrastructure supported by a network service provider. Though
these kinds of architectures are relatively stable, straightforward to implement and
can be made secure, network connectivity cannot be guaranteed in some places
such as in rural areas and users often have to pay subscription fees in order to
get connected to the network. In contrast, ad hoc architectures seem to be more
attractive by providing a more convenient, flexible and low cost way of building
m-commerce systems. Several well-known application types have been identified as
suitable for ad hoc wireless networks, especially for emergency and rescue services
and military operations [150],[37],[14],[57],[81]. However, ad hoc m-commerce holds
promise as an emerging application area for ad hoc wireless networks. The last part
of this chapter summarizes the potential of ad hoc m-commerce as the motivation for
this PhD research, as well as identifying a number of challenges that implementation
of it must be overcome.
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2.2 Mobile Commerce (M-Commerce)
2.2.1 Definition
Various definitions of the term ”m-commerce” have been offered [90],[89],[108],[159].
Some of these definitions seem to restrict m-commerce to online transactions that are
conducted solely over a mobile telecommunication network and involve the transfer
of monetary values. However, m-commerce transactions do not necessarily involve
the transfer of money and can be conducted over other means of wireless commu-
nication. Furthermore, not all commercial transaction processes need to be carried
out electronically as some transactions may be initiated electronically but completed
off-line.
Therefore, in this thesis, m-commerce is taken to be a set of activities relating to the
exchange of information, services and goods for either money or other information,
services and goods, which is conducted fully or predominantly online over wireless
technology using mobile devices. In a fully online transaction, all transaction pro-
cesses, which include the advertising, negotiating, ordering, payment and delivery
processes, are conducted electronically. In a predominantly online transaction, most
transaction steps or the most parts of all steps like the advertising, negotiating and
ordering processes may be done online but other steps or parts of them like payment
and delivery processes may be done off-line.
2.2.2 Characteristics
M-commerce has several unique characteristics. Based upon different literatures
[167],[147],[162],[89],[25],[50], the distinguishing characteristics of m-commerce can
be summarized as follows:
Location and Motion Independence - The portability of mobile devices, the
pervasiveness of mobile network access and widespread m-commerce service avail-
ability makes m-commerce transactions possible irrespective of where the user is or
whether the user is moving.
Localizability - Technologies like Global Positioning System (GPS) enable users
and mobile network operators to locate each other and to tailor access to commerce
services specific to their location.
Personalisation - Mobile devices are normally not shared among users. This en-
ables users to customise these devices to their individual commerce service require-
ments.
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2.2.3 Requirements
Although different m-commerce applications have different requirements [164],[161],[30],
in general m-commerce applications have the following requirements:
• Adequate quality of service in the wireless network to avoid delays that may
affect the performance of m-commerce applications.
• Reliability in the wireless network so that users can access m-commerce appli-
cations, even under varying degrees of network failure.
• Ability to roam across multiple heterogeneous wireless networks so that users
can access m-commerce applications independent of their location.
• End-to-end security supported so that trading parties can trust the other trad-
ing parties to provide their service at an acceptable level of risk.
• Convenience and usability so that users can perform m-commerce transactions
easily and unproblematically.
2.2.4 Issues
Even though m-commerce has created a new way of conducting business and led to
the design and development of new services, there are still issues that need to be
taken into consideration for the success and further development of m-commerce.
The issues are listed below:
1. Mobile Devices
Mobile devices have limited battery lifetimes and thus there is a limited time during
which they can operate without recharging their energy resources. This limita-
tion may restrict mobile devices from performing some more complex and energy
intensive computations because such computations would require and consume sub-
stantial amounts of power and thus would drain the battery faster. Moreover, the
use of a wireless medium for data transmission can make the battery life shorter as
it consumes significant energy [153]. Therefore, mobile devices cannot be expected
to be always available in a network like stationary computing devices. Users may
cut their wireless connection to the network in order to reduce power consumption
or the battery of a mobile device could lose all its charge. The main exception to
mobile computers being seriously power constrained by their limited battery life-
times are mobile computers designed to be carried by vehicles with petrol or diesel
engines. However, their mobility is constrained by where these vehicles can travel
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and how far distant the nearest refueling station is. So they will be regarded as a
special case.
2. Wireless Networks
Wireless networks have some constraints that could limit the reliability and capa-
bility of m-commerce applications.
• Bandwidth
Wireless networks have limited bandwidth. Although they are expected to
come to have higher bit rates, the transmission rates in many wireless networks
such as in cellular or satellite networks are still low as compared to wired
networks [153]. This is partly because wireless communications are rather
more error prone and require much redundancy in the channel coding of the
payload.
• Connectivity
Wireless networks are less reliable because they are more prone to network
disconnections. Factors that can cause network disconnections include lack
of cellular or satellite network coverage, radio interference, changes in the
signal strength and the limited battery lifetime of mobile devices. In some
m-commerce applications such as mobile financial and mobile entertainment
software, continued network connectivity is one of the most important require-
ments as discontinued connections may affect the outcome of transactions.
• Variant tariffs
Different networks have different network access charges. In some networks,
network access is charged per connection-time for example in cellular telephone
services, while in some other networks, it is charged per message or per session
or per transaction and so on [153],[160].
• Asymmetric Communications
Channels in wireless networks may be asymmetric [159]. The bandwidth avail-
able for uploading data may be rather lower than the bandwidth available for
downloading data.
3. Security
There are at least three aspects of security that need to be considered: the security
of mobile devices, the radio communication channel and payment systems.
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• Mobile devices
Mobile devices, especially high mobility devices, are prone to be stolen, lost
or accidentally damaged due to their small size and portability. Since these
devices are highly personalized and are often used to store confidential user
information, it is important to protect not only the data that is transmitted
through the network but also the data that is stored on the device itself.
However, due to their limited computation capabilities and memory size, it is
demanding to employ high security schemes on those devices.
• Radio Communication Channel
Performing electronic transactions over wireless networks is inherently insecure
as compared to wired networks [165]. A radio communication poses additional
security vulnerabilities. Its broadcast nature makes it easier for attackers to
intercept and spoof on going traffic if no security mechanisms such as commu-
nication encryption are employed. There are three common types of attacks:
disclosure attacks, integrity attacks and denial of service attacks [9]. Disclo-
sure attacks are where the confidentiality of data transmitted over the network
is compromised by its contents being revealed to other parties that are not in-
volved in the communication by means such as eavesdropping, masquerading,
traffic analysis and so on. Integrity attacks are where the contents of a message
being transferred over the network are altered or deleted or reused without per-
mission. In a denial of service attack, access to the network is made impossible
by jamming the radio signal. In addition to security attacks, frequent handoffs
and disconnections due to path loss, fading and interference can degrade the
service levels of security services. Also, the mobility of mobile devices intro-
duces an additional difficulty in identifying and authenticating devices in the
network.
• Payment System
M-commerce applications, especially those involving mobile payments require
secure information exchange as well as safe electronic financial transactions.
Without a secure payment system, neither customers nor merchants may be
prepared to engage in monetary m-commerce transactions. For instance, both
parties that are involved in a financial transaction would want to authenticate
each other before committing to any payment. Also, they would want assur-
ance on the confidentiality and integrity of the sent payment information as
well as effective support for non-repudiation to prove that a transaction has
happened.
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4. Social, Ethical and Legal Issues
To avoid risks such as legal actions, brand damage and so on, parties that are in-
volved in m-commerce transactions need to ensure that all m-commerce activities
such as services, transactions, payments and so on, comply with government and in-
dustry regulations as well as their internal policies. Below are some of the regulatory
issues that need to be addressed:
• Data protection and data breaches
Regulations related to the protection of subscriber data, identity theft and the
reporting of data breaches.
• Digital rights
Digital content such as music, clip art, videos and so on are subject to Intel-
lectual Property (IP) constraints such as copyright, trademarks and so on.
• End-user privacy
Regulations related to consumer protection and privacy laws in order to ensure
consumer privacy is not violated.
• Child protection and legality
Regulations related to offering, accessing and purchasing of adult related con-
tent, products and services. For example, some adult content is illegal, or age
verification may be required before accessing or purchasing any adult related
content, products or services.
• Money laundering and gambling
Regulations related to electronic money transfers, money trafficking issues and
so on.
2.3 Infrastructure-Supported M-Commerce
2.3.1 Functional Components
M-commerce systems involve various disciplines and technologies, and can be divided
into six components [77], as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Mobile Commerce Applications - There are a wide variety of existing and po-
tential m-commerce applications [69],[166],[128],[18],[43]. These applications can be
classified into several classes as listed in Table 2.1 (page 17).
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Figure 2.1: Main functional components in an infrastructure-based mobile commerce
(Adopted from Hu, Lee and Yeh, 2008).
Mobile Devices - Mobile devices with sufficient memory, computing power, storage
and display capability, as well communications functionalities enable consumers to
engage in m-commerce transactions regardless of time or location. Mobile devices
such as smart phones, laptop computers, tablets and so on are now equipped with
communication interfaces that can support a variety of network communications
including Bluetooth, Wi-Fi and wireless WAN access [166]. These devices have also
been augmented with features like location and video streaming support, inbuilt
cameras, barcode reader software and so on to support a wide range of m-commerce
applications.
Mobile Middleware - Mobile middleware refers to an enabling layer of software
that joins together different mobile applications, networks and technologies via a
common set of interfaces [128],[101]. It enables m-commerce applications to function
with greater reliability and capability so as to provide a uniform and user-friendly
interface as well as better response times.
Wireless Networks - Networking support from wireless networks plays an im-
portant role in m-commerce systems as mobile users need to go through a wireless
network connection in order to perform m-commerce transactions via m-commerce
applications on their mobile devices. There is a broad range of wireless networking
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Class of Applications Examples
Information News and Weather
Maps and travel related information
Logistical information
Emerging service information
Entertainment Sports, Games and Gambling
e-Books, e-magazines
Movies, images and music
Streaming media
Commercial Banking
Mobile Auctions
Booking and Reservation
Online shopping and stock trading
Marketing and Advertising Mobile coupons and promotions
Table 2.1: Classes of m-commerce applications
technology that is available to provide networking support required by m-commerce
systems which includes operator-driven networks like General Packet Radio Service
(GPRS), Enhanced Data rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) and Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS), as well as wireless LAN (WLAN) via Wi-Fi
and wireless PAN via Bluetooth [82],[140],[18],[95]. Ka band satellite wireless is not
competitive with terrestrial wireless because of latency, speed, cost and energy us-
age disadvantages quite apart from deployment issues with satellite dishes to access
satellite wireless.
Wired Networks - Although a wired network is an optional component in m-
commerce systems, most computers or servers that are used to execute m-commerce
processes and store all the transaction related information usually reside on wired
networks [166].
Host Computers - Host computers are computers or servers such as web servers,
database servers and so on, that are used to process and store m-commerce trans-
action related information.
2.3.2 Main Entities
Generally, there are four main entities in m-commerce systems [13].
1. Customer
The person who is mainly mobile and makes use of the m-commerce system for
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the purpose of obtaining and paying for contents, products or services offered by
merchants or content/service providers.
2. Merchant or Service/Content Provider
The entity that provides the contents, products and services to customers either
directly or through a mobile network operator.
3. Mobile Network Operator
The entity that provides the network connectivity that links customers, merchants
and financial institutions.
4. Financial Institution
The entity that provides the payment mechanism such as Electronic Funds Transfer
at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) or Automated Teller Machine (ATM) service.
2.3.3 Entities Relationships in the M-Commerce Value Chain
Entity relationships in an m-commerce value chain can vary depending on the types
of transactions. For example, a relatively simple transaction such as buying a soft
drink from a vending machine would only involve a customer, mobile network opera-
tor and its vending machine that supplies soft drinks [77], as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
In this scenario, the customer has relationships with both the mobile network oper-
ator and the vending machine. The mobile network operator charges the customer
for using its service to purchase the soft drink by adding the cost of the soft drink
to the customer’s mobile phone bill.
Figure 2.2: Relationship involving customer, mobile network operator and vending
machine.
A more complex m-commerce transaction might involve a financial institution or
cryptocurrency ledger server [110]. In this scenario, the customer has a relationship
with the mobile network operator, the financial institution and also the merchant
[77], as shown in Figure 2.3. The mobile network operator enables the transaction
to take place by providing mobile services to the customer. To purchase products,
the customer needs a relationship with the financial institution that handles the
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transaction payments. The customer will also need a relationship with the merchant
for the goods purchased.
Figure 2.3: Relationship involving customer, mobile network operator, financial
institution and merchant
Another scenario is a relationship between a customer and mobile network operator
and also a relationship between a network operator and content provider [165], as
depicted in Figure 2.4. The customer obtains the content or service from its provider
through its mobile network operator and pays the operator who remunerates the
content or service provider in turn.
Figure 2.4: Relationship involving customer, mobile network operator and content
provider
2.4 Ad Hoc Wireless Networks
2.4.1 Definition
An ad hoc wireless network is a type of wireless network that does not rely on a
fixed infrastructure such as a base station, or centralized administration in order for
the nodes to form the network and communicate with each other [103],[131],[150].
It is formed when there is a need (impromptu) to accomplish a specific task among
nodes that are within direct or indirect communication range with each other, using
available resources on hand [28]. The nodes are responsible for discovering each
other and organizing themselves to create a virtual communications infrastructure
to route and disseminate data among them. Figure 2.5 shows the difference between
two wireless network architectures; infrastructure-based wireless networks and ad
hoc wireless networks (infrastructure-less).
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Figure 2.5: Infrastructured and infrastructure-less wireless networks
Nodes that form an ad hoc wireless network may be mobile or static. One type of
example of an ad hoc wireless network that consists of mobile nodes such as laptops,
smartphones or tablets is called a Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) [14],[32]. Sta-
tionary nodes are often found in Sensor Networks [37],[106], where sensors typically
do not move once deployed. For example, the deployment of specialized wireless
sensor nodes at selected high risk areas in a forest for early detection of fires. Sensor
networks can also be linked to the Internet to feed real-world information to Internet
of Things (IoT) applications. For example, sensors in the home will enable users
to interact with their smarthome applications to manage and control their home
security and appliances remotely using their mobile devices. More details about IoT
will be discussed in Section 2.4.4.1.
Ad hoc wireless networks can either be standalone networks or may also be connected
to a larger network such as the Internet via an Access Point (AP) [171],[88],[12]. In
ad hoc wireless networks, some or all nodes act as routers as well as being hosts [78].
The nodes perform the function of a host when transmitting and receiving data and
act as a router when routing data packets among other nodes in the network [109].
Nodes within ad hoc wireless networks can communicate directly with each other
if the destination node is within the sender’s transmission range. For instance, in
Figure 2.6, node B is within the node A’s transmission range. Therefore, node A
and node B can communicate directly with each other. However, if the destination
node is outside the sender’s communication radius, other nodes will need to be used
as intermediate hops to relay packets until the destination node is reached. Hence,
an ad hoc wireless network is sometimes called a multihop wireless network. For
example, node C in Figure 2.6 is out of node A’s transmission range; thus in order
for node A to communicate with node C, node B will need to act as a router to pass
on data packets so they can reach node C.
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Figure 2.6: Basic structure of an ad hoc wireless network
There are various wireless access standards that support the ad hoc networking
paradigm, which include the following [39]:
• IEEE 802.16 Standard, also known as WIMAX, refers to a series of speci-
fications developed by the IEEE to support high-speed wide range wireless
broadband or metropolitan area network (MANs).
• IEEE 802.11 Standard, also known as WiFi, refers to a group of specifications
developed by the IEEE for high-speed medium range MANET or wireless
LANs (WLANs).
• IEEE 802.15.1 Standard, also known as Bluetooth, is a wireless access spec-
ification for exchanging data over short distances and building personal area
networks (PANs).
• IEEE 802.15.4 Standard, also known as Zigbee, is a wireless access standard
that is designed for short-range low data rate networks. ZigBee has a defined
rate of 250 kbit/s, that makes it ideal for intermittent data transmissions from
a sensor or control device.
• WiFi Direct is a set of services for the use of WiFi that enables devices to
connect to each other without the use of an access point.
2.4.2 Characteristics
An ad hoc wireless network has certain characteristics that distinguish it from other
types of network. They include the following [32],[150],[70]:
Dynamic Network Topology - In an ad hoc wireless network, nodes can leave
or join the network freely and are often dynamically and arbitrarily located. Fur-
thermore, the topology of the network can change as nodes are free to move from
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one location to another. This can result in route breakages where an optimal com-
munication path at a given point in time cannot be maintained and might not be
available for use at another period of time [179].
Fluctuating Link Capacity - Wireless communication has a higher bit error rate
(BER) as compared to wired networks [109]. In ad hoc wireless networks, more
than one end-to-end path can use a given link which can cause several sessions to be
disrupted if the link breaks. In addition to that, the reliability of a wireless channel
is likely to be lower than wired ones because wireless channels suffer from path loss,
fading and also interference [133].
Self-Organization - The network can be created on the fly without the need for any
system administration [158]. Nodes are able to detect the presence of other devices
and perform the necessary handshaking to allow communication, dissemination of
information and also sharing of services among them. If one node moves in or
out their communication range, the other nodes in the network should be able to
re-configure the topology of the network.
Distributed Operations - Due to the dynamic topology and infrastructure-less
architecture of an ad hoc wireless network, the protocols and algorithms used for
routing are designed in a decentralized manner so that nodes are capable of config-
uring and organizing a network without any central administration or management.
Battery Powered - Nodes in ad hoc wireless networks such as laptops, smart
phones and tablets are often battery powered mobile devices. Therefore there is a
limited time during which they can operate without changing or recharging their
energy resources.
2.4.3 Applications
At present, there are a number of (potential) applications for ad hoc wireless net-
works, ranging from large scale and highly dynamic to small scale and static networks
[58],[103],[150],[62]. These kinds of applications as depicted in Table 2.2, are nor-
mally used in places that have little or no communication infrastructure available
such as in the battlefield areas, or in situations where the existing infrastructure
is costly, problematic or inconvenient to use, such as in disaster zones. They are
also suitable to be used in conditions where only a temporary network connection
is required to accomplish a specific task, for example to accomplish a spontaneous
collaborative task in a conference or campus setting. In other situations, for example
in metropolitan areas, they can be used to provide quick and easy wireless network
deployment or for network coverage extension.
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Class of Applications Examples
Military Operations Military communications
Automated battlefields
Emergency and Search and rescue operations
Rescue Services Disaster recovery
Policing and fire fighting
Car Networks Traffic or weather updates
Accidents or road conditions warnings
Taxi or car rental networks
Inter-vehicle networks
Conference or Virtual classrooms
Campus setting Information sharing among participants or students
Extension to a larger network, e.g. Internet
Sensor Networks Smart Home applications
Body Area Network (BAN)
Data tracking of animal movements
Environmental monitoring, e.g. bushfires detection
Natural disaster forecast, e.g. earthquake or tsunami
Table 2.2: Examples of ad hoc wireless networks applications
Although there is still no silver bullet application for ad hoc wireless networks [122],
ongoing research in ad hoc wireless networks is now maturing, especially within
the IETF’s MANET working group [80]. This will help to stimulate further achieve-
ments in this area as the research facilitates new applications to be created. Further-
more, as the trends are now moving towards ‘anytime, anywhere’ communication,
commercial applications such as mobile commerce will be intriguing future applica-
tions of ad hoc wireless networks.
2.4.4 The Future
Ad hoc wireless networks have been in use since the early seventies, mainly for mil-
itary operations [173],[41],[107]. Since then, a significant amount of research has
been done in this area and wider interest has continued to grow among the re-
search community over the past few years [122],[131],[97],[57]. Much of this research
[103],[57],[152],[60],[49] shows that an ad hoc wireless network is a promising tech-
nology for future wireless communication networks that offers a flexible, convenient,
easy to deploy and inexpensive solution.
With the current trend in communication networks of increasing demand for perva-
sive and ubiquitous computing, future living environments seem to require a com-
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munication network that is able to self-organize, as well as reconfigure itself to keep
people connected wherever they go or whenever the need arises. An ad hoc wireless
network, with its self-organization and self-configuration characteristics is able to
provide such a kind of network connectivity at any time or locations, even in un-
developed remote areas of the world. In addition to that, its inherence flexibility,
lack of infrastructure, low cost of implementation, as well as ease of deployment
and maintenance will make it an essential part of future wireless communication
networks, serving as a complement to existing infrastructure networks to provide
seamless access to information resources and services [173].
In the near future, it is likely that ad hoc wireless networks will be more widely used
in its present application domains such as battlefield areas, emergency operations or
sensor networks. This is due to the advancement of mobile devices that are getting
smaller, cheaper, with longer lasting batteries, more functions and more common-
place [103], as well as rapid improvement in wireless communication technologies
[103],[173]. For instance, many mobile devices today especially mobile phones are
already equipped with Wi-Fi or Wi-Fi Direct or Bluetooth capability, as well as
multimedia support. In addition to that, WiFi technologists are now working on
802.11ah (also called as Low-Power WiFi), a new revision of Wireless LAN (WLAN)
standard that will allow wireless access operating at sub 1 GHz license-exempt bands
[87],[151]. 802.11ah is intended to support large scale and cost-effective wireless net-
works, as well as the IoT. With 802.11ah, the WiFi transmission range can be
extended much longer than the current 802.11 WLAN standards, the throughput
can be significantly improved and the energy consumption of the battery-powered
devices can be reduced [151].
As a consequence, there is a potential for ad hoc wireless networks to be used
to facilitate new business opportunities for the users with profitable commercial
applications, enabling ad hoc wireless networks to move from military or emergency
contexts to the commercial world. It will be possible for ad hoc wireless networks to
create novel commercial application opportunities that will shape its future, like the
Internet that existed for more than 20 years before the World Wide Web came along
and has been very widely used ever since. However, the realization of this commercial
world still requires a number of issues related to mobile devices, protocols, trust and
security and also other important services to be addressed appropriately [103]. In
addition to that, appropriate business scenarios and their possible applications need
to be identified.
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2.4.4.1 Internet of Things
The Internet of Things, also known as IoT is an emerging technology that was first
identified some 15 years ago by Kevin Ashton, the cofounder and executive director
of Auto-ID Center at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) [20]. The term
IoT has been defined in many different ways [53],[87],[35],[169]. A common defini-
tion of IoT that has gained acceptance among experts is ”A dynamic global network
infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on standard and interopera-
ble communication protocols where physical and virtual ”things” have identities,
physical attributes and virtual personalities. These same things use intelligent in-
terfaces and are seamlessly integrated into the information network”, as defined by
the Internet of Things European Research Cluster (IECR) [169]. Although there are
numerous definitions of IoT, the role of the IoT remains the same, which is to enable
all things in the physical world with the power to communicate to be connected with
each other in a useful way anytime, anywhere, using any network or service.
From a technological perspective, IoT refers to the concept where all the physi-
cal things (objects) that utilize embedded technologies such as Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators and etc, can communicate and share
information with each other and also with the environment in a useful fashion and
make themselves recognizable, all via the Internet. The things, in the IoT scope can
be everyday objects such as home or electronic appliances, farming equipment, med-
ical instruments, cameras, vehicles, industrial equipment and many more. They can
also include living organisms such as people, plants, animals and so on. The enabling
technologies that will allow things to communicate with each other include various
types of wired and wireless connections such as RFID, WiFi, Zigbee, GSM, GPRS,
3G, 4G, and etc. With the IoT, the physical world will be integrated with the digital
or virtual world to produce one big information system. This kind of interconnection
will enable a new form of communication among things and people, among things
and the environments, or infrastructures and also among things themselves, which
will significantly change the way people interact with their surroundings and then
transform how they live and work.
The IoT is currently being deployed in a wide variety of areas, which include homes,
cities, businesses, healthcare, transport and agriculture. One example of the deploy-
ment of IoT applications in cities is the smart parking system, where sensors are
deployed in parking areas to enable users to check the availability of parking spaces
in the city. Another example is in dairy cattle farms, where sensors are implanted
in the ears of cattle to enable farmers to track the movement of their cows and also
to monitor their health in order to sustain their wellbeing. In 2013, around 9 billion
smart devices were connected via networks in the world [67] and it is predicted that
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there will be more than 50 billion connected devices by 2020 [53]. In line with this
progress, most of the governments in Europe, Asia and also the Americas are now
considering the IoT as an area of innovation and evolution [56]. It is expected that
this development will lead to a new revolution of applications that will generally
improve people’s lives and also create many new business opportunities.
2.5 Ad Hoc M-Commerce
2.5.1 Definition
Unlike infrastructure-supported m-commerce, ad hoc m-commerce takes place be-
tween 2 or more mobile devices that are in the vicinity of each other and use an
ad hoc wireless network as a communication medium. These devices are peers that
typically have similar capabilities. Trading can be initiated by any peer with net-
working capability and does not require any third party infrastructure to manage
it. Its participants communicate and cooperate by utilizing each other’s resources
without relying on any support provided by a network service provider in order
to accomplish the transaction or any other tasks. Thus, in this thesis, ad hoc m-
commerce is viewed as self-configured and self-organized m-commerce trading that
is conducted via ad hoc wireless networking.
2.5.2 Characteristics
Due to the unique characteristics of m-commerce and ad hoc wireless networks, ad
hoc m-commerce can be said to have the following characteristics [117]:
No network service provider - Because ad hoc wireless networks lack a network
service infrastructure and are self-organized, a network service provider cannot be
relied upon to be present to provide security or payment services whenever nodes
engage in m-commerce transactions. Unlike GPRS or EDGE or UMTS mobile
networking, there is no telecoms operator available to underpin m-commerce trans-
actions as a value added service to the basic communication service.
Limited communications scope - IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and Bluetooth have lim-
ited communication ranges. The effective range for Bluetooth is 10m although it
can extend to a 100m radius [24] while the transmission range for Wi-Fi is 100m in
buildings and can cover up to a 300m radius in open spaces [157]. Therefore, such
networks are suitable for short range node to node communication. While nodes
can bridge gaps by routing information over multiple hops via nodes in between
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themselves and so extend the range of such networks, those ad hoc connections via
intermediaries may not be long lasting and may not be available much of the time
due to the dynamic topology of the network and the limited willingness of nodes to
expend scarce energy resources to route communications for others. So, much of the
time it is not to be expected that there can be a suitable third party service available
that is trusted by communicating peers to support security and/or payment services
in real-time among the peers.
Limited time online - Due to limited battery lifetimes and the mobility of mobile
devices as well as frequent network disconnections, there is a limited time during
which these devices can be online, which restricts them from engaging in lengthy
and complex transaction processes. This means that transactions need to be com-
pleted in a fairly short period and only comprise a few simple stages if they are to
have a good chance of success. Therefore, realistic transactions must not involve
long sessions or complex processes. Since mobile devices are peers and these devices
themselves can become the service or information provider as well as the consumer,
the limited time online restricts a trusted service or information provider from pro-
viding ubiquitous services or information to other devices in the network. Moreover,
it is not realistic to have long-term third party security or payment services available
all the time in the network. However, it would be possible to have intermittently
available third party services although often not in real time.
Spontaneous decisions in Ad Hoc Settings - The self-organizing characteristic
of an ad hoc wireless network allows users that are equipped with mobile devices
and suitable software to spontaneously engage in m-commerce transactions when
the need arises while they are on the move. For example, passengers in two cars
near each other in slow traffic can establish an ad hoc wireless network connection
and carry out m-commerce transactions while within range of each other.
Low cost - An ad hoc wireless network provides a low cost wireless connection [57]
for users to engage in m-commerce transactions as it operates using a license free
frequency band. Buyers or traders can save on network access charges as there is no
subscription fee required to access the network. In addition to that, no additional
device is required to perform m-commerce over an ad hoc wireless network as mobile
devices that form the network will utilize their local resources and also resources on
other devices that are in their proximity in order to accomplish the transactions. The
overhead of purchasing or renting additional devices such as special server(s) that
are used to process the transaction as well as to store transaction related information
is eliminated.
Confidentiality - Because no third party needs to be involved to realise network
communication, the range of wireless communication is limited, and transactions
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may be conducted on the move, ad hoc m-commerce is suitable for confidential
commercial exchanges where the trading parties do not wish their exchange to be
known or guessed at by external parties. For example, two or more parties may
exchange their confidential corporate or business information such as business pro-
posals, marketing strategy information deals and so on while they merely pass close
by each other.
2.5.3 Functional Components
It seems that only the first four functional components in Figure 2.1 as discussed
in Section 2.3.1, are required to construct an ad hoc m-commerce system [117], as
shown in Figure 2.7. This is due to the fact that only an ad hoc wireless network is
used as a means of wireless communication to carry out m-commerce transactions
and such a network is often spontaneously and temporarily created when the need
arises among mobile devices that are in close proximity to each other without relying
on any infrastructures.
Figure 2.7: Four main functional components in an ad hoc m-commerce system
2.5.4 Main Entities
Since ad hoc m-commerce transactions involve only mobile devices that are peers
and have no guarantee of infrastructure support from a network service provider,
there are only two essential entities involved in the trading system.
1. Customer or Trader
The customer is the party who may be mainly mobile that makes use of ad hoc
wireless networks to buy digital contents, products or services offered by the seller
or to trade contents, products or services for others.
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2. Seller or Trader
The seller is the party that provides the digital contents, products or services di-
rectly to customers or buyers via ad hoc wireless networks for money or who trades
contents, products or services for others.
2.5.5 Entities Relationship in the Ad Hoc M-Commerce
Value Chain
As different type of transactions would have different entity relationships, there are
several possible essential entity relationships in the ad hoc m-commerce value chain.
Figure 2.8 illustrates a relatively simple transaction involving two mobile devices.
For example, two parties who are commuting in a train agree to exchange their
electronic resources such as e-books while they are within transmission range of
each other.
Figure 2.8: Transaction between two mobile devices
In a more complicated scenario where more than two mobile devices are involved in
a transaction such as mobile auction or entertainment, the entity relationship can
be illustrated as in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: Transaction involving more than two mobile devices
Another scenario involving the formation of an ad hoc trading consortium among
mobile users who are in the vicinity of each other and agree to band together for a
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specific purpose, for example to make a collective purchase or to engage in group
trading, the entity relationship can be illustrated as in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10: A group of individuals forming a consortium for trading
To represent different entity relationships in ad hoc m-commerce value chain, a
generic view of ad hoc m-commerce transactions [117] is illustrated as Figure 2.11:
Figure 2.11: A generic view of ad hoc m-commerce transactions. The ad hoc m-
commerce store will held certificates, attestations, offers, trading history and other
transaction related information
2.5.6 Potential Applications
There are several distinct types of m-commerce transactions that can be carried out
over ad hoc wireless networks:
Swapping of digital resources - Swapping of digital resources such as e-books,
videos, music files etc. For example, two amateur ornithologist collectors who meet
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by chance at an airport may agree to exchange some of their collectable bird song
recordings.
Mobile Auction - The process of buying or selling certain items could be realised
by an auction among a local group of people. An auction process can be created
anywhere as soon as a group of at least three persons with mobile devices and
appropriate software agree to participate. For instance, an auction could be created
at a stamp collectors fair to sell a scarce stamp. This type of activity is amenable to
short term participation by individuals and a rapid turnover in its membership as
long as enough are usually present to create a critical mass of bidders. Multicasting
among participants can disseminate bids and information about what is on offer.
Selling or Buying Items - A group of people in a neighboring area forms a trading
community among themselves, for example a trading forum for selling second hand
items. They can participate in the trading forum as either a seller or a buyer. The
sellers advertise their items or resources to other members of the trading forum.
They receive offers from potential buyers and answer the offer from potential buyers
that they want to trade with.
Mobile Entertainment - Interactive gaming and gambling among small groups
of people is another kind of application suited to ad hoc networking. Applications
running on mobile devices realise the game or gambling scenario, manage its com-
munications and handle the turnover in participants. For example, people on a train
may play blackjack on their mobile devices over an ad hoc wireless network.
Confidential Exchanges - Two or more parties who meet at a certain place or pass
in the vicinity of each other may agree to exchange their confidential information
resources or services for a specific purpose as mentioned in the example given in
section 2.5.2.
Transacting with Machines - Transactions that use mobile devices that are
preloaded with E-cash [139],[114] to make payment at a vending machine, point of
sales (POS), parking tolls and so on via technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
[127].
Consortium Trading - A group of individuals who are in the vicinity of each other
and equipped with mobile devices and appropriate software can spontaneously form
a consortium for a specific purpose. For example, a group of football fans at a
football ground, band together as a single buyer to purchase a discounted group
ticket in order to get a cheaper ticket for each of them to watch a match. Another
example would be a group of football fans who form a consortium during a football
match to engage in betting on the outcome with another group of football fans.
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2.6 The Potential and Challenges of Ad Hoc M-
Commerce
2.6.1 Potentials
With the following advantages of an ad hoc wireless network [28], it is likely that
the concept of ad hoc m-commerce will be accepted and widely used in the not too
distant future if it is designed carefully and all the issues are addressed appropriately
[28]:
Independence from Central Network Administration - This will enable the
participating parties that form the trading community to have full control on the
network administration as well as group management and this task is distributed
among them.
Self-configuring - This enables the traders to spontaneously engage in ad hoc
m-commerce transactions when the need arises regardless of time or location.
Self-healing through Continuous Re-configuration - Ad hoc networks enable
mobile devices to re-configure themselves to accommodate network disconnections
due to network topology change.
Scalable - The ability to accommodate the addition of more nodes that are in close
proximity with each other. This will enable a few or many traders to participate in
a particular trading forum at the same time.
Flexible - Traders that are within communication range with each other can initiate
or engage in ad hoc m-commerce transactions at any location or situation.
Cost Savings - This enables traders to engage in ad hoc m-commerce transac-
tion without the need to purchase or install any additional devices such as special
servers to support the trading process. Traders can also save a considerable amount
of money on access fee charges as an ad hoc wireless network is a free wireless
communication medium [103].
Rapid Setup Time - To form or join an ad hoc m-commerce trading commu-
nity only requires traders to have mobile devices that are equipped with suitable
networking capabilities such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth capability.
Also, in the near future, with continuing progress in networking, software, sensor
and other ICT technologies, as well as rapid advancement in devices’ computation,
processing power, storage and capabilities (particularly mobile devices), it is possible
to envisage that the IoT will enable people to be online pervasively everywhere
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by creating an environment of interconnected ”smart” things. This kind of smart
interconnection is expected to enable new ways of interacting, living and working,
which could be lead to a revolution of new applications and services, as well as new
business processes. Ad hoc m-commerce, with its low cost and self-organization
characteristics that embody important features of IoT, could be one of the enabling
technologies that will bring enhanced business opportunities to IoT markets.
Furthermore, there are a number of research studies that have been done to enable
efficient and reliable data transmission in dynamic and intermittently connected
networks, such as MANETs. These studies aimed to deal with issues related to fre-
quent and persistent network disconnections and disruptions in such networks due to
random node mobility, limited battery power and resources of mobile devices, short
radio communication range and so on, have led to the concepts of Delay Tolerant
Networking (DTN) and Opportunistic Networking [61],[175],[124],[112],[135]. These
concepts have received a lot of attention from the networking research community as
an evolution of MANETs [92], and are often interchangeably used by the researchers
to refer to a new communication paradigm for wireless networks, where mobile nodes
exploit any available resources in the network to enable them to communicate with
each other, even in the absence of end-to-end connectivity between the sender and
the receiver [29],[124]. In order to enable communication, a ’store-carry-and-forward’
approach is employed to route messages towards their destination. For example, in
a situation where a node has a message to be forwarded but a direct path towards
the destination is unavailable as there is no other node in its communication range
at that time, it will temporarily store the message and forward it later when an ap-
propriate communication opportunity arises. It seems that with the studies done in
the area of DTN and Opportunistic Networking, it is possible to deal with frequent
network disconnections in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, which could pave
the way for more effective and reliable ad hoc m-commerce applications.
In addition to the above, the availability of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Lite-
coin, Dogecoin etc. could serve as a good example of a pure P2P system with very
tough security requirements that have gained global interest and market traction
in recent years [146],[72],[23]. A cryptocurrency is a kind of digital currency that
uses specific cryptographic algorithms as a means of trade that allows transfer of
value without the use of real life currency or going through a financial institution
[110],[65],[72]. The first and most popular cryptocurrency is Bitcoin, which was
developed by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008. Bitcoin is a completely decentralized and
purely P2P currency system that allows online payment to be made directly be-
tween two willing parties without the need for a central authority such as a financial
institution [110]. Bitcoin users have full control of their transactions. They can
make transactions without any involvement of a trusted third party or the need to
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provide their real identity. However, they do need access to the distributed ledger
or block chain in order to register Bitcoin transfers. Although to participate in
its transactions does not require trust in anything other than the principles of the
Bitcoin system and in the software used accurately implementing them, Bitcoin has
gained large popularity and more real businesses are beginning to accept it. Studies
[146],[66],[23] show that although the number of consumers or merchants who accept
cryptocurrencies, particularly Bitcoins are still small, they have steadily increased.
Like other emerging technologies, cryptocurrencies still have several important issues
that require careful consideration before they can be widely accepted by consumers
for daily commercial use, such as data protection and privacy, security, legal and
government regulation issues [83],[66],[72]. Thus, there is a potential for ad hoc m-
commerce systems to be widely accepted as a reliable alternative for m-commerce
transactions if its trading software is designed carefully and its security issues are
properly addressed.
2.6.2 Challenges
Performing m-commerce transactions over ad hoc wireless networks introduces ad-
ditional issues and challenges. In addition to the issues discussed in section 2.2.4,
ad hoc m-commerce has specific issues that require careful consideration in order
to realize it in the real world. However, issues related to variant tariffs are not
applicable to this kind of m-commerce trading as it operates using ad hoc wireless
networks. Thus, no access fee is required to access the network. Other challenges
that might constrain the success of ad hoc m-commerce include the following:
Transaction Management - Due to its unique characteristics such as lack of in-
frastructure, having a dynamic network topology and using resource constrained
devices, it is a challenge to implement efficient transaction processing and updates
in purely ad hoc wireless networks. Most solutions used in infrastructure based m-
commerce depend on a client/server architecture [123],[76], where servers are used to
handle all transaction processes and also store its related information. These servers
usually are located within the wired network and configured with additional process-
ing power, memory and also storage capacity. Mobile devices act as clients accessing
the services provided by the servers [123],[76]. However, in ad hoc m-commerce, all
devices are peers and normally have similar constraints on their resources, which
will limit their capability to function properly as both servers and clients. The mo-
bility of mobile devices that provide services (servers) to other devices is another
important issue as the services are prone to becoming unavailable due to network
disconnections. Also, the atomicity of a transaction can be difficult to enforce as
network disconnections can cause a particular service in a transaction sequence to
34
fail and thus the transaction would be considered incomplete and be aborted [123].
Service Discovery and Delivery - A service discovery and delivery protocol en-
ables devices to advertise their services to other devices as well as to discover services
offered by other devices in the network. However, due to the unique characteristics
and complexities of an ad hoc wireless network, existing service discovery and deliv-
ery protocols do not seem to suit the needs of an ad hoc wireless network, making
them unsuitable for m-commerce oriented scenarios. Service advertisements and
deliveries may need to be disseminated by a mix of a store and forward strategy as
well as local multicasting to cope with intermittent online connectivity.
Gossip Protocols - A gossip protocol enables devices to periodically propagate
and disseminate messages or information with a number of peers that are selected
randomly from the available peers in the network [15],[26]. This type of protocol
seems to suit the style of an ad hoc wireless network well as it is independent of
network topology and allows messages to be propagated and disseminated slowly
through the network without congesting the wireless medium. It also can be used as
a kind of recovery strategy from message loss in multicast [26]. However, most gossip
protocols assume that each node has sufficient resources available to store all the
messages that it receives from its peers. This assumption may not be applicable to
ad hoc m-commerce as nodes in such trading systems usually have serious limitations
on their resources. Moreover, most gossip protocols require each node to know every
other node in the network [59] and this requires the nodes to store and maintain a
complete network membership table, which is not feasible in ad hoc m-commerce
due to its dynamic group membership, irregular participation by trading parties and
limited direct communication range.
Trust - Trust is essential in any online transaction as it helps the participating
parties to feel confident to engage in such transactions by mitigating uncertainty
and risks involved in the transactions, such as uncertainty about trading partners
behaviour in fulfilling their transaction agreements [121]. However, as ad hoc m-
commerce cannot rely on a network service provider to provide security services
such as a Kerberos Authentication Server that can help to establish trust among
trading parties in the network, traders have to rely on their peers in the network to
provide trust evidence in order to evaluate other parties’ trustworthiness. Yet, the
nature of an ad hoc wireless network such as lack of infrastructure services, having
a dynamic network topology, using resources constrained devices and so on, makes
trust establishment in this network difficult to achieve.
Table 2.3 summarizes the potential of ad hoc m-commerce, and the challenges that
must be overcome in its implementation in order to realize it in the real world.
35
No Potential Challenges
1. With the advantages of an ad hoc
wireless network such as indepen-
dence of central network admin-
istration, self-configuring, flexible,
cost saving and so on, it is likely
that ad hoc m-commerce will be ac-
cepted and widely used if it is de-
signed carefully, and all the issues
are addressed appropriately.
Transaction Management - most
solutions used in infrastructure
based m-commerce depend on a
client/server architecture, which is
impractical in ad hoc m-commerce
due to the nature of an ad hoc
wireless network such as lack of in-
frastructure, having a dynamic net-
work topology and so on.
2. With continuing progress in net-
working, software, sensor and other
ICT technologies, as well as rapid
enhancement in mobile devices’
computation, processing power and
capabilities, it is possible to envis-
age that the IoT will be widely de-
ployed in the near future. Ad hoc
m-commerce, with its characteris-
tics that embody important fea-
tures of IoT, could be one of the en-
abling technologies that will bring
enhanced business opportunities to
IoT markets.
Service discovery and delivery pro-
tocols - due to the unique charac-
teristics and complexities of an ad
hoc wireless network, existing ser-
vice discovery and delivery proto-
cols do not seem to suit the require-
ments of an ad hoc wireless net-
work, making them unsuitable for
ad hoc m-commerce oriented sce-
narios.
3. Research studies in the area of
DTN and Opportunistic Network-
ing [29],[124] shows that it is possi-
ble to deal with frequent network
disconnections in ad hoc wireless
networks, which could pave the way
for more effective and reliable ad
hoc m-commerce applications.
Gossip protocols - most gossip pro-
tocols require each node to know
every other node in the network
and have sufficient resources to
store all the messages that it re-
ceives from its peers, which is not
feasible in ad hoc m-commerce due
to its dynamic group membership,
irregular participation by trading
parties and so on.
4. The availability of cryptocurrencies
such as Bitcoin, Litecoin etc is a
good example of a pure P2P system
with very tough security require-
ments that have gained global in-
terest and market traction. Hence,
there is a potential for ad hoc m-
commerce systems to be widely ac-
cepted as reliable alternative for
m-commerce trading if its applica-
tions are designed carefully and its
security issues are addressed prop-
erly.
Trust - due to the characteristics
of ad hoc m-commerce that cannot
rely on a network service provider
to provide its security services, and
the nature of an ad hoc wireless
network such as lack of infrastruc-
tures, having a dynamic network
topology and so on, it is difficult to
establish trust among traders in ad
hoc m-commerce trading systems.
Traders have to rely on each other’s
resources in order to make trust de-
cisions.
Table 2.3: The potential and challenges of ad hoc m-commerce
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Chapter 3
Security in Ad Hoc M-commerce
Trading Systems
3.1 Introduction
Ad hoc m-commerce is an emerging way of conducting m-commerce transactions
within infrastructure-less and dynamic network communities. However, since its
trading activities are carried out over ad hoc wireless networks and as no network
service provider can be relied upon to provide security services, this type of trading
system is vulnerable to various types of attacks that can undermine its functionality
and dependability. These include identity spoofing, Sybil attacks, man-in-the-middle
attacks, unfair evaluations, collusions, misleading trade descriptions and so on.
To realize ad hoc m-commerce requires its security issues be properly understood and
addressed to create sufficient confidence among traders to engage in such activity. A
sufficiently trusted and secure trading environment will create a significant impact
on traders’ acceptance of ad hoc m-commerce applications. However, to design a
security and trust service for ad hoc m-commerce trading systems is a challenging
task due to its unique characteristics and also the nature of an ad hoc wireless
network. Thus, it is important to understand and analyze the possible threats and
vulnerabilities that could be present in such trading systems before designing or
implementing any solutions in order to ensure the effectiveness of the solutions in
addressing its security issues.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the role of
security in online trading. Section 3.3 defines a threat model that specifies possible
threats and vulnerabilities in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. This section
also discusses possible countermeasures that can be used to mitigate the threats.
Section 3.4 determines three major security requirements for an ad hoc m-commerce
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trading system, namely constraining participation, sharing trading experience and
sharing expressions of trust. This chapter is concluded by Section 3.5.
3.2 The Role of Security in Online Trading
Security is vital in commercial transactions and more so in online transactions due
to their virtual nature. Traders in popular online trading environments such as eBay
or Amazon often have little information about the identity and behavior of the other
parties involved in their transactions and about the quality of the goods or services
at stake. This is partly due to the fact that they do not physically meet during
these transactions, which usually take place between parties that do not know each
other or have never met before. They also do not have the chance to see or try the
products or services in advance before they purchase them. This makes the traders
not only vulnerable to security attacks related to their online identity with respect
to information being exchanged among them, but also to subversive behavior by
their trading partners such as being given bogus or misleading information, which
could subsequently expose them to transaction risks such as not getting what they
have paid for or being cheated through non-payment. In the case of ad hoc m-
commerce, the vulnerabilities are more crucial because the transactions are carried
out over insecure ad hoc wireless networks and no network service provider can be
relied upon to act as a trusted third party that provides security services.
Without adequate security, it is unlikely that traders will have the confidence to
participate in online trading and thus, may refrain from participating in such trans-
actions. One academic study found that 40% of Internet users provide incorrect
information when they participate in online activities because they do not trust the
security of the Internet [44]. Another academic study [132] based on a survey of
US online shoppers found that security plays a major role in influencing customer’s
intentions to purchase online. Users are concerned about online security [63] and
will only participate in online transactions if they can be assured that their trans-
actions are low risk, the medium used to carry out the transaction is secure and
reliable, and they will be able to validate the identity of the parties that they are
going to deal with and gauge their trustworthiness, as well as verify the authenticity,
integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of important information about their
transactions.
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3.3 The Threat Model
To create an environment that is secure and trusted to a sufficient degree to per-
suade traders to trade within ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, it is necessary to
understand and analyze the threats and vulnerabilities present in such trading sys-
tems before designing or implementing any solutions because the threats determine
the security measures. Thus, this section defines a threat model that specifies a set
of possible threats and vulnerabilities in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, in
order to identify its security requirements and enable appropriate security measures
to be deployed to address or at least mitigate those threats and vulnerabilities.
3.3.1 Security objectives
To be able to determine the most relevant and critical threats in an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system and plan appropriate countermeasures for those threats
in an effective way, this section specifies several key security objectives for such
trading system, which include the following:
• Ensure tamper proof, non-interceptable and non-repudiatable messaging among
traders with proof of authorship or origin.
• Keep transaction risks low which relate to misbehaviour of a trading party by
provision of trustable identity support, reputation system and group member-
ship schemes.
• Ensure the integrity and confidentiality of data stored in traders’ local repos-
itories.
• Support non-spoofable digital identities with digital certificates that enable
authentication of a trader’s credentials to be conducted and their identity
verified.
3.3.2 Overview of Assets and Possible Threats
This section determines the key assets and possible threats in an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system. Assets are the valuable resources of a system which can be tangible
or abstract, while threats represent the potential violation of the security of a system
that may cause some negative impact to the interests of users of that system that
relate to those assets.
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3.3.2.1 Assets
Assets and threats are closely correlated. It is unlikely for a threat to exist in a
system if there is no target asset, because there would otherwise be nothing for a
threat to target. To prevent a threat requires some sort of protection of assets. Thus,
this section determines the key assets in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system that
need to be protected to achieve its security objectives, as mentioned in Section 3.3.1
above. The assets are categorized as follows:
Trader’s data which might be tampered with or disclosed to unauthorised parties.
Thus, the integrity and confidentiality of a trader’s data such as identity credentials,
reputation reports, membership data, transaction contracts, testimonials and so on
need to be assured at all times. In addition to integrity and confidentiality, the
origin of data being exchanged among traders also need to be assured, so that no
party can credibly deny having sent that data.
Trader’s digital identity which might be spoofed by ill-intentioned parties. Thus,
a trader’s identity credentials in a digital certificate and crypto keys need to be
protected from being stolen or compromised.
Trader’s reputation which might be damaged due to identity spoofing, tam-
pering, collusions, slandering, overstating and etc. Thus, such threats need to be
mitigated to help traders to establish sufficient trust among themselves to give them
confidence to participate in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems.
Mobile device’s physical security which might be compromised or the device
itself stolen by criminals and thieves. Compromised devices could allow attackers
to exercise the owner’s privileges and get direct access to all resources available on
those devices. On the other hand, loss of mobile devices might prevent their owners
from being able to get necessary information about their transactions, which could
subsequently lead to incomplete transactions and lost opportunities to trade.
Application code which might be modified or tampered with, as ad hoc m-
commerce applications could well be implemented on open-source developer sites.
Thus, it is important to ensure that the traders use a legitimate ad hoc m-commerce
application from the beginning and get its valid updates in a reasonably timely way.
3.3.2.2 Possible Threats
There are many possible threats to an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, which
can exist in a variety of ways. However, with respect to the security objectives of
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, this thesis only focuses on the most relevant
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threats in such a trading system. To keep the list of identified threats restricted
to only the most relevant threats in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, it is
assumed that:
• Traders obtain ad hoc m-commerce applications and their updates, which
might be developed on open source community development lines from a
trusted source or recognized outlet.
• Traders maintain the physical security of their mobile device and its local
repository.
• Hard to defend against attacks on network communications such as traffic
analysis and jamming attacks are likely to be a rare occurrence.
Thus, threats arising in relation to the physical security of mobile devices or the
perversion of the code of ad hoc m-commerce specific applications or platforms will
be out of the scope of this thesis. Under these provisos the most salient threats that
exist within an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are:
Spoofing - Whenever traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system communi-
cate with each other through an insecure ad hoc wireless network communication
channel, there is a threat of spoofing identity or authorship. Targets for spoofing
are the online identity of the traders and integrity or authorship of messages being
exchanged among them.
Tampering - Tampering can be done while data is on the communication channel
or while data resides on traders’ mobile devices. Targets for tampering are the
identity credentials in a digital certificate, reputation reports, membership data,
transaction contracts, testimonials and so on.
Unchallengeable Repudiation - Repudiation can occur whenever any trader
denies that he has performed a specific action or transaction that it seems he has
done but evidence is lacking to prove otherwise. It matters when such repudiation
risks loss to another party but the target of the action has no way to demonstrate
that the repudiator is not being truthful.
Information Disclosure - Information can be leaked during communication or
while being stored on traders’ mobile devices. Similar to tampering threats, targets
for information disclosure are the identity credentials, reputation reports, member-
ship data, transaction contracts, testimonials and so on.
Collusion - Collusion can occur whenever two or more traders conspire to per-
form specific actions in order to cause unfair damage to other parties’ reputation or
reasonable trading prospects.
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3.3.3 Types of Threats
Based on the discussion and assumptions made in Section 3.3.2 above , assets within
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system can be viewed from three different aspects;
traders’ online identity, data or information stored on their mobile devices or being
exchanged among them and also their reputation which is influenced by their be-
haviour in performing transactions and other related activities within the trading
community. Each of these aspects poses threats to the trading system, and thus, in
this thesis, the threats are categorized as follows:
3.3.3.1 Identity-related Threat
Traders in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems are represented by their online iden-
tity via their trading pseudonym. Using pseudonyms to participate in online trans-
actions in such a loose ad hoc community exposes them to security attacks such as
identity spoofing, Sybil attacks and also whitewashing.
Identity spoofing (masquerade) - Identity spoofing is where an ill intentioned
trader tries to pass himself off as someone else. The prime risk is that he may
use that spoofed identity to defraud other traders. Possible scenarios of identity
spoofing in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems include the following:-
• An ill-intentioned trading party uses the trading pseudonym of a reputable
trading party in order to claim the reputation of that trading party to induce
other traders to transact with him and then defrauds them. In doing this, the
reputation of that reputable trading party is likely to be damaged.
• An ill-intentioned trading party uses an honest trading party’s trading pseudonym
to disguise their role in attesting ill-intentioned associates’ false identities, rep-
utation reports, membership data and so on.
Sybil Attacks - Sybil attack is where an ill intentioned trader creates multiple
trading pseudonyms to cheat collective decision making processes and aggregations
of multiple people’s judgments to subvert the trading system. In ad hoc m-commerce
trading systems, an ill-intentioned trading party may use multiple identities to do
the following:-
• To create bogus transactions with some of these identities and then publish
ill-founded positive evaluations of those transactions with others of them in
order to increase these identities’ reputations.
• To collude to give unfair negative evaluations to an honest trading party in
order to damage that party’s reputation.
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• To manipulate the attestation process for example to attest false identities or
membership data or support unfounded reputation reports of his ill-intentioned
associates.
Whitewashing - A whitewasher is a trader that leaves a particular trading forum
and then re-enters with a new identity to hide his bad reputation or misbehaviour.
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, a trading party may use whitewashing to
escape his bad reputation recorded in previous deal evaluations.
3.3.3.2 Information-related Threat
As communications and activities related to the exchange of information in ad hoc
m-commerce trading systems are conducted solely over an insecure ad hoc wireless
network and may involve routing via intermediary peers, participating parties in
such trading systems are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Information or
data stored on traders’ mobile devices is also subject to tampering and disclosure
to unauthorised parties. The owner or a third party might attempt to tamper with
the data or disclose it without permission. The tampering might be achieved by
simply editing the data or adding more data or deleting some parts of the data or
the whole data either where it is stored or while it is in transit.
Man-in-the-middle-attacks - A man-in-the-middle attack is where an ill inten-
tioned trading party covertly intercepts communications between two parties. The
ill intentioned trading party can then control the communication and tamper with or
omit messages being transferred without the knowledge of either the original sender
or the recipient of his intervention. Some possible scenarios of man-in-the-middle
attacks in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems include the following:
• An ill intentioned trading party intercepts communications between two par-
ties who exchange their deal evaluations after the completion of a transaction
and alters the deal evaluations without their knowledge.
• Trading parties that act as intermediaries manipulate information that is being
transferred via them to other parties. For example, an intermediary peer
discards a propagated unfavorable deal evaluation that is being transmitted
via his node without being detected by the two end parties.
3.3.3.3 Misbehaviour-related Threat
With dynamic participations in an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum [118], it is to
be expected that traders will often engage in a transaction with parties that they
do not have any prior experience of or have never met before. This will make them
susceptible to subversive behaviour by their trading counterparties, such as being
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given misleading trade descriptions or unfair deal evaluations or being subject to
repudiation misbehaviour and collusions.
Trade Misdescriptions - An ill-intentioned trader may cheat other members of
a trading forum by offering fake items as real or by trading items that are not as
described in the offer.
Unfair Deal Evaluations - In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, traders might
be expected to evaluate each other after the completion of each transaction by
generating a deal evaluation. Infrastructure supported trading systems over the
Internet like eBay have established this as a norm. This deal evaluation can be used
to assess each trader’s reputation. If a transaction concludes positively, traders
would be expected to express their satisfaction about the transaction in their deal
evaluations, digitally sign them and then send them to their trading counterparts.
Otherwise, they can share their bad evaluation of their trading counterpart with
other traders in the trading forum to make them aware of that party’s negative
behavior. However, an ill-intentioned trader may manipulate the reputation of other
traders by giving unfair evaluations of transactions. There are at least two types
of unfair evaluations; overstating (unfair positive) and slandering (unfair negative).
Overstating is where a trader inaccurately evaluates a bad or mediocre transaction as
good. This may be poor judgment or done to boost the reputation of an associate.
Slandering is where a trader inaccurately gives a negative evaluation to a good
transaction. Again this may be poor judgment or done maliciously to lower the
reputation of a reputable trader.
Repudiation Misbehaviour - Repudiation misbehaviour occurs when a trader
performs a particular action and then denies having performed it. There are at
least two significant types of repudiation misbehaviour; data repudiation and con-
tract repudiation. Data repudiation occurs when a trader sends a particular message
or document and then denies having sent that message or document. For example,
an ill-intentioned trading party sends a bogus transaction contract without digitally
signing it and then denies having sent that contract. In this case, its trading counter-
party will not be able to prove that the contract has been sent by that ill-intentioned
trading party. Contract repudiation occurs in a situation where one party initiates a
transaction or has agreed on a transaction contract and then denies having initiated
the transaction or having agreed on the contract.
Collusions - Collusion is where multiple ill-intentioned traders conspire to influence
their own reputation or other traders’ reputation, group decision making processes,
attestation processes and so on. For a reputation system, there are at least two types
of collusions; hyping and bad mouthing. In hyping, a trader colludes with associates
to give inauthentically good evaluations or testimonials to increase his reputation
44
beyond what it should be. He can then try to use his bogus good reputation for
fraudulent purposes. Bad mouthing is where a group of traders conspire to harm
the good reputation of a trader by each giving unfair negative evaluations to that
trader.
3.3.4 Possible Countermeasures
Similar to infrastructure-based networks, one of the most common security mecha-
nisms that can be used to protect traders of ad hoc m-commerce against security
attacks aimed at identity disguise is public key cryptography. It provides a variety
of techniques for online identification, including use of digital certificates. It also
can be used to protect traders’ data or messages from being tampered or disclosed,
using digital signatures and encryption.
For misbehaviour-related threats, one way to mitigate those threats is by having a
means to establish trust among traders. A reputation system can be an effective
means to do this as it provides a collaborative method for traders to assess the
trustworthiness as well as predict the future behavior of other traders based on
sharing their past trading history and testimonials of tradeworthiness. In addition
to that, it helps traders choose reputable parties to trade with and avoid dealing
with dubious ones.
A third effective measure that is widely used in trading communities is to restrict
trading to recognized parties in good standing and to put in place a validation
scheme to control admission to only those who can be adequately vouched for and
to exclude those who are recognized by other members as not behaving properly.
All three measures rely on some trading parties attesting, vouching for or approving
the behaviour of other parties. These relationships are also themselves a useful
resource in mapping patterns of association among parties.
3.3.4.1 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography provides a means for establishing secure communication
between two parties over a nonsecure communication channel. It can be used to
provide security services for data authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation, as well as identity authentication. This cryptographic approach uses
two different keys and employs asymmetric key algorithms [47]. One of these keys is
kept private and the other is published or made publicly available. These algorithms
can be used not only for encryption of messages, but also to implement digital
signature schemes. Encryption of messages will ensure that messages or documents
sent across the network are unreadable by any third parties other than the authorized
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recipients, such as eavesdroppers or peers that act as intermediaries. Messages can
be encrypted with the public key of the recipient and/or signed by the private key
of the sender and then decrypted with the other key. Digital signatures ensure
the authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of the data transmitted over the
communication channel.
Digital Signatures - A digital signature is an electronic signature that functions
like a traditional handwritten signature in many aspects. It is created when a digest
of the message or document to be transmitted is enciphered using a private key.
The use of a private key to encipher the digest of the message or document helps to
authenticate the identity of the sender of the message or document, as it could only
have been enciphered using the private key of the sender. The recipients can verify
the signature by deciphering it using the public key of the sender. This will ensure
that the sender of the message or document cannot credibly deny having signed
or sent the message or document. A digitally signed document or message is also
unalterable by third parties after the signature without this being detectable, which
will give assurance to the recipients that the original content of the transmitted
message or document was not altered in transit. Digital signatures are based on
digital certificates.
Digital Certificates - A digital certificate is an electronic document that provides
a testable warrant that the public key in it is the public key of the identity enclosed
within it. It furnishes a means to establish the identity of an individual or organi-
sation in online environments, particularly in electronic transactions [168]. It uses
digital signatures by third parties to bind the public key of the certificate owner
to his identity information such as name, address and so on. A digital certificate
normally contains at least the following information:
• A public key of the owner
• Identity Information such as owner’s name or alias or pseudonym, address and
so on.
• Expiration date of the certificate
• One or more digital signatures of its issuers
In the case of electronic transactions, digital certificates together with encryption
provide a security solution to assuring the identity of all parties involved in a trans-
action. A digital certificate makes it possible for the participating parties to verify
the identity of the party that they are dealing with is whom he or she claim to be
and thus, prevents others from impersonating that particular identity.
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However, to guarantee the validity of the information in the certificate, it needs
to be issued and signed by independent and recognized trusted third parties that
warrant its validity. Relying parties can check on that warrant by verifying the
digital signature of the certificate’s issuer, which can only have been created using
that issuer’s private key. The degree of confidence in the validity of the certificate
will depend on the level of trust that the relying parties have in its issuers. There
are two approaches commonly used to get this trust. One approach is typically used
in a public key infrastructure (PKI) scheme [38],[145],[143], where the certificates
are issued and signed by an authority, referred to as a certification authority (CA).
Another approach is the web of trust scheme [184],[185] that uses certificates signed
by multiple parties.
PKI Scheme - In the PKI scheme, the CA is a primary component that functions
as a trusted third party that manages the digital certificate life cycle, from issuance
through revocation or suspension of certificates until their expiry. The CA is trusted
by both the owners of certificates and the parties that rely upon the certificates.
A CA is a person, department, company or other organisation that issues digital
certificates to its users. CAs can either be public and commercial or private. Public
commercial CAs such as VeriSign, Entrust and DigiCert are often trusted by a large
number of users and charge their users subscription fees in order to issue certificates.
Private CAs are normally operated by large organizations or government entities for
their internal usage. There are also some network service providers that act as a
CA issuing digital certificates to their subscribers at no cost. To enable the relying
parties to obtain other users’ certificates, the CA may post the certificates that it
has issued to a central repository which is available online and accessible to the
relying parties.
In a PKI scheme, users are required to provide some personal information that will
verify their identity in order to request a digital certificate from the CA. Some CAs
may only require users to provide a little information, such as their real name, home
address and e-mail address. Others may require more information and stricter proof
of that identifying information such as a passport, birth certificate, driving licence,
bank statement and so on before issuing a certificate.
The users of PKI will accept the identity credentials in a digital certificate as valid if
they trust the CA to have verified the identity and public key as belonging together
and can verify the CA’s signature. They place their trust in the CA based on several
trust models, which include the following:
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1) Single CA Model - This is the most basic model where there is only one CA
that provides PKI services like issuing, signing and revoking digital certificates and
so on [138], as shown in Figure 3.1. Each certification path starts with the public
key of this CA only.
Figure 3.1: Single CA Model
2) Hierarchical Model - In this model, there is more than one CA, where the
most trustworthy CA will be the root CA (RCA) [138], as shown in Figure 3.2.
The trust relationship is specified in only one direction where the RCA only issues
certificates to its subordinate CAs and those CAs may then issue certificates to their
subordinate CAs or users and so on. The certification path starts with the RCA’s
public key and thus, all users need to know the public key of the RCA.
Figure 3.2: Hierarchical Model
3) Mesh Model - This model is also known as a crosscertificate architecture
[99],[138]. In this model, all the CAs are independent and any CA can perform
peer-to-peer cross certification with other CAs as shown in Figure 3.3 [138], except
if there is any constraint or limitation specified in the certificates. Users may choose
to trust any CA in the architecture but the trust anchor of a user will be its local
CA. The certification path begins with the local CA certificate.
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Figure 3.3: Mesh Model
4) Bridge CA Model - This model is based on a central CA that acts as a hub or
bridge to cross-certify with other CAs [38], as shown in Figure 3.4. It combines the
concepts of both the root CA and crosscertificate. Polk and Hastings in [125] use
this model to establish a peer-to-peer trust relationship among various communities
of users.
Figure 3.4: Bridge Model
However, although a PKI scheme enables secure, reliable and efficient digital cer-
tificate and key management facilities, it does not seem to be suitable for deploy-
ment with ad hoc m-commerce. This is because this kind of scheme requires a pre-
established network infrastructure for communications between the users and CAs,
which is unlikely to happen in ad hoc wireless networks because it is infrastructure-
less. In addition to that, the dynamic topology of ad hoc wireless networks makes
it impossible for the users of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system to rely on a
communal CA to provide such services, such as in the single CA model, or in the
hierarchical model that relies on a RCA. Topology changes in the network may re-
sult in frequent network disconnections, which subsequently may cause the CA to
be unavailable to provide required services such as checking a certificate’s revocation
status.
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Furthermore, it seems unlikely that traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
would be willing to pay any subscription fee in order to obtain a digital certificate
from a well recognized CA such as Verisign just to participate in informal and low
value trading. Although there are some network service providers that provide CA
services for free, none of them can be relied upon to provide such services to ad
hoc m-commerce traders due to the infrastructure-less nature of an ad hoc wireless
network. Traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system may also not want to go
through the bother of having to supply their personal information to the CA and
satisfy some background checks just to obtain a digital certificate to participate in
such informal and low value trading.
It also cannot be expected that all participating parties of an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system will obtain their digital certificates from the same CA. This can be an
issue as relying parties may have difficulties or may not be able to verify the digital
signature on a certificate issued by a different CA. Another issue with a CA is that
if the CA’s private key is compromised, then the security of the entire system is lost
for each user whose certificate is issued by the CA. This will require re-issuance of
some or all of the previously issued certificates in the system.
From the discussion above, it seems that a PKI scheme is not suitable for an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system due to its characteristics and the infrastructure-
less nature of an ad hoc wireless network. Ad hoc m-commerce requires a scheme
that is self-organized, P2P, where the function of a trusted signer of certificates is
distributed over all users [183] and involves no cost.
Web of Trust Scheme - A web of trust is a concept used in Pretty Good Pri-
vacy (PGP), which was first introduced by Phil Zimmermann in [184],[185]. Abdul
Rahman [7] then used this concept in his PGP Trust Model. In this scheme, there
is no central authority that can be relied upon to provide digital certificates or key
management facilities. Certificates are issued by the users themselves. Any users
in the network can act as a certifying authority that signs and validates other users
certificates. These signatures gradually form a set of interconnected associations of
individual public keys or ”Web of Trust” as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: A Web of Trust Model
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The users of this scheme place their trust in the certificate’s issuer and attestors
based on their personal experience or knowledge or recommendations by other known
and trusted parties. Such trust in other party’s signature to attest a PGP certifcate
is placed based on the following three levels of trust:
• Complete trust: A user is fully trusted to validate others’ public key and
identity credentials binding.
• Marginal trust: A user is marginally trusted to validate others’ public key and
identity credentials binding.
• No trust (or Untrusted): A user is not trusted to validate others’ public key
and identity credentials binding.
The validity of the PGP certificates will only be accepted if the relying party recog-
nizes one or more parties who have attested relevant certificates as trusted parties.
A PGP certificate is considered as valid if it is signed by one fully trusted party or
two marginally trusted parties.
This scheme seems to be suitable for deployment in ad hoc m-commerce due to its
dynamic, P2P and distributed characteristics [48]. However, its normal incarnation
on the Internet requires a public certificate directory to store and distribute certifi-
cates, which is usually located at an online and centralized trusted third party entity.
This online and centralized public certificate directory is impractical to require in ad
hoc m-commerce as the availability of the trusted third party where the directory
is placed cannot be guaranteed all the time due to frequent network disconnections
as well as irregular participation by trading parties. To enable this scheme to be
used in ad hoc m-commerce, storage of certificates needs to be decentralized and
some effective decentralized scheme for certificate revocation needs to be devised.
In addition to that, due to infrequent communications among traders in ad hoc
m-commerce, there needs to be an appropriate attestation mechanism to vouch for
the continuing validity of the certificates in such a loose community.
3.3.4.2 Reputation System
Reputation Systems are essentially feedback systems which enable participating par-
ties in a transaction to provide feedback on each other [134]. The feedback usually
consists of a rating (positive, neutral or negative) and comments, and these ratings
and comments can be aggregated to represent the reputation of a user in the system.
The original design goals of reputation systems are to assist users in deciding who
to trust in a system, to encourage trustworthy behaviour, and to discourage and
deter untrustworthy or dishonest people from participating in the system where the
reputation system is implemented [134].
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Reputation systems have already proven useful in many commercial online applica-
tions. In eBay’s reputation system [1], a buyer can rate a seller by giving a positive,
negative or neutral rating and also a short comment after the completion of each
transaction. An overall score is computed based on the percentage of the total num-
ber of positive and negative ratings that a seller has received for the past 12 months.
A buyer can also provide more detailed information about a seller by giving a 5-star
rating on the aspects of the item’s description, communication, delivery time and
postage and packaging charges. An average rating for each aspect is published. A
study by [134] shows that eBay ratings encourage users to engage in transactions
offered by highly rated sellers and sometimes allow them to charge higher prices.
3.3.5 Possible Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are security weaknesses that can be exploited to make a system sus-
ceptible to an attack [116]. Similar to other systems, an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system could also be vulnerable to attacks if its security services are not implemented
in a proper manner, especially in utilizing public key cryptography for the establish-
ment of its traders’ online identity and also data encryption and authentication. In
order to prevent ill-intentioned parties from compromising the security of an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system, locating and mitigating vulnerabilities in the design
phase of its security services is a critical step.
Thus, according to the key assets of the trading system as discussed in Section
3.3.2.1, this thesis classifies possible vulnerabilities in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system to the following:
3.3.5.1 Vulnerabilities Associated with Digital Identity
Due to the dynamic and infrastructure-less nature of an ad hoc wireless network,
the implementation of public key cryptography in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system requires careful consideration and needs to be done properly. Improper
implementation can create several vulnerabilities that are associated with traders’
digital identity, data and so on.
Common public key cryptography’s vulnerabilities associated with traders’ digital
identity include the following:
Weak digital certificates’ verification process - This is due to lack of processes
to verify the identity credentials in a trader’s digital certificate when they create their
online identity, which will make it easier for ill-intentioned trading parties to spoof
another party’s identity, create multiple identities or re-enter the trading system
with a new identity. This problem is likely to affect honest trading parties who
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might be defrauded and also reputable trading parties whose reputation might be
damaged when the false identities are taken as legitimate.
Weak, stolen or compromised cryptography keys - One of the implications
of this vulnerability is that ill-intentioned parties can use weak, stolen or compro-
mised cryptography keys to spoof another party’s identity or produce a valid digital
signature to attest fake certificates, trading histories or membership data of their
associates. A digital certificate whose corresponding private key is stolen or compro-
mised needs to be revoked. New key pairs need to be generated and a notification
about the certificate revocation needs to be distributed to all participating parties of
the trading system. It may take considerable time to notify all participating parties,
especially in such a dynamic trading system.
Long-lived digital certificates - Digital certificates are normally valid for a year
or more [54]. Certificates that have a long validity period, for example 5 years or
more, may contain attributes that cease to be valid during the time it is nominally
current. An old photograph in a certificate may have ceased to look the same as the
current physical appearance of its owner. This might cause the other parties in the
trading system to consider the certificate as no longer valid as the validity of the
photograph, which is part of the identity credentials in that certificate, cannot be
verified. Another issue with a long-lived digital certificate is that its corresponding
private key is vulnerable to being accidentally disclosed or compromised, as the time
during which it might become available to an attacker will be considerable.
3.3.5.2 Vulnerabilities Associated with Data
Another potential security vulnerability in utilizing public key cryptography is the
possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack, which could occur due to the following:
Unencrypted communications - This may arise from wilful disregard of secu-
rity procedures of the trading system or as a normal action taken in spontaneous
circumstances. This might enable the eavesdroppers who monitor the network to
reveal or tamper with the unencrypted data.
Unsigned messages or documents - This may arise from wilful disregard of
procedures of the trading system to digitally sign any messages or documents be-
fore sending them over the network or as a normal action taken in spontaneous
circumstances. The implications of this kind of vulnerability is that the authentic-
ity and integrity of the messages or documents being sent cannot be assured and
this will enable the ill-intentioned parties to credibly deny sending those messages
or documents.
Stolen or Compromised private keys - This will enable the ill-intentioned par-
ties to use the compromised private key to tamper with the data being transmitted
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between two parties without the knowledge of the two end parties. In addition to
that, with the stolen or compromised private key, the ill-intentioned parties can
send messages using that private key or produce a perfect digital signature to sign
messages or documents in the name of the party whose private key is compromised.
Bogus public keys - In public key cryptography, users’ public keys should be
made publicly available so that other users can use those keys to communicate and
exchange information with the key owners securely. One of the significant issues of
public key cryptography is that users must be able to trust that a public key really
belongs to the person to whom it purports to belong. It is important for users to
be aware of this kind of vulnerability as they may become a victim for trusting the
public key presented by an impersonator. This is because they may unintentionally
disclose confidential information to the impersonator when they send a message
or document that is encrypted using the bogus public key, which will then allow
the impersonator to decrypt and read the contents of the confidential message or
document with its corresponding private key.
3.3.5.3 Vulnerabilities Associated with Reputation System
In addition to the above vulnerabilities, inappropriate implementation of public
key cryptography could create other vulnerabilities associated with the reputation
system in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. This is due to the fact that
such reputation system is highly dependent on a valid identity of a trader and also
the authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of the messages or documents being
exchanged among traders. The reputation system itself provides opportunities for
ill-intentioned traders to collude in order to gain unwarranted benefits from the
system.
3.4 Security Requirements for Ad Hoc M-Commerce
Trading Systems
To create sufficient confidence among traders to engage in ad hoc m-commerce trans-
actions and its other related activities, the identified threats and vulnerabilities
above need to be addressed or mitigated to an acceptable level. It seems that the
design of its security services requires careful considerations on the following aspects:
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3.4.1 Constraining Participation
One of the major security concerns in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems is to
establish sufficient trust among its participating parties in order to mitigate the
uncertainty and risks involved in its transactions. As mentioned in Section 3.3.4
above, a reputation system can be an effective means to develop such trust among
traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. However, a reputation system
alone cannot guarantee that all participating parties in such trading systems will
behave properly and remain trustworthy all the time. Some traders may carry out
each of their transactions honestly while some others may only carry out certain
transactions honestly but deceive when engaging in other transactions. Thus, it is
important to restrict an ad hoc m-commerce trading system participation to only
parties regarded as reasonably trustworthy by other participating parties of the
trading system. This can be achieved using group membership to set acceptable
limits of behaviour for traders and to specify how collective decisions are to be
obtained. It can be the first step towards creating an environment that is secure to
some degree for traders to communicate and collaborate with each other, as well as
to engage in online trading. More detailed discussion about an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system’s group membership will be presented in Chapter 7.
In order for the group membership management in an ad hoc m-commerce trad-
ing system to function in an effective manner, it requires a reliable online identity
support scheme. This is because a trader’s identity-membership information bind-
ing will help traders to determine the validity of each membership claim by their
peers online. It also enables traders to verify the authenticity, integrity and non-
repudiation of messages or documents being exchanged among traders in collabora-
tive decision making processes for group membership management.
3.4.2 Sharing Trading Experience
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, it is important for traders to share their
trading experience, either positive or negative with other traders to help them make
trust decisions. Traders can share positive experience of their trading counterparts
in their recent trading histories with other potential trading partners in order to
provide evidence of those counterparts’ good faith. Traders can also share their neg-
ative experience about a particular trader with other members of the trading system
to make it harder for that trader to behave dishonestly in future transactions. How-
ever, the sharing of such trading experience may cause traders to make inaccurate
decisions in choosing the right party to trade with if the availability, integrity and
reliability of such information cannot be assured, as it might not be available when
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it is required or might be tampered during transmission or be manipulated by ill-
intentioned parties for their own benefits.
Thus, an appropriate mechanism is required to enable traders to verify the authen-
ticity, integrity and non-repudiation of such important information as well as to
ensure its availability, reliability and efficient retrieval. In addition to that, the
identity of the party who is providing the information also need to be verified to
ensure that it comes from a trusted party.
3.4.3 Sharing Expressions of Trust
Trust is vital in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and it can be generated
through relationships among traders. As such relationships develop, traders will
gain more information about each other through their experiences, which will then
establish some degree of trust among themselves. However, in such a loose and
dynamic ad hoc m-commerce trading community, it cannot be assumed that all
traders know each other and have established trust relationships among themselves.
There are likely to be traders that irregularly participate in the trading system’s
activities and also new traders will replace traders that drop out. These kind of
traders may not have sufficient information about their potential trading partners
or other traders in the trading community to establish a satisfactory level of trust
among themselves. Thus, it is important for the traders to share their expressions
of trust about any particular trader that they know well with other traders to
help new and infrequent traders determine the extent to which they can trust other
traders. For instance, if several other traders trust that a particular trader’s identity
credentials in a digital certificate are genuine, then a possible trading partner is likely
to assume those credentials are genuine as well and use them to determine to what
extent to trust that identity if those other traders seem reputable themselves.
However, similar to the sharing of trading experience, the sharing of such kind of
trust information requires traders to be able to verify the authenticity and integrity
of the shared information, as well as the identity of the traders who are providing
the information.
3.5 Conclusion
In order to find appropriate security solutions for an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system, this chapter defines a threat model that help specify the security objectives
and key assets of the trading system. The threat model also identifies a set of possible
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threats that could subvert the functionality of such trading system. The threats are
classified into three main categories; namely identity-related threats, information-
related threats and misbehaviour-related threats. The threat model also makes
recommendations on possible countermeasures for each category of the threats and
identifies several vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an ill-intentioned party in
an attempt to compromise the security of the trading system, if the countermeasures
are not properly designed and implemented.
To mitigate the identified threats and vulnerabilities, the design of ad hoc m-
commerce security services needs to consider carefully three main aspects; con-
straining participation in the trading system, sharing trading experience and shar-
ing expressions of trust among traders. The suggested countermeasures in Section
3.3.4 need to be modified and implemented in a way that can suit with the nature,
characteristics and security requirements of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system.
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Chapter 4
An Ad Hoc M-Commerce Trading
System Framework
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the design of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, a frame-
work for m-commerce trading conducted online and wirelessly outside established
computer infrastructures. This framework provides a foundation structure for appli-
cation developers to organize the effective development, maintenance and enhance-
ment of such trading systems. It takes into consideration the general capabilities
and also constraints of mobile devices without specifying any device platform or op-
erating system in particular, so that application developers can focus on the design
and implementation of certain aspects or services that are required to support the
core functionality of the trading system. In this thesis, this framework serves as a
basis for addressing the major security issues involved in trading wirelessly among
computing nodes in a dynamic network and in the absence of a network service
provider, as discussed in Chapter 3.
Section 4.2 gives the general idea of how an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
operates and discusses the processes that need to be performed by a trader in order
to join a particular trading system. This section also discusses the activities that
traders are allowed to perform when they participate as a member of a particular
trading forum. Section 4.3 presents the abstract architecture for an ad hoc m-
commerce trading peer and further explains the functionality of each of the services
provided by the service layer. Section 4.4 discusses the four main steps involved
in an ad hoc m-commerce transaction. As the main objective of this thesis is to
define an environment that is sufficiently secure for traders to participate in ad hoc
m-commerce transactions, Section 4.5 further elaborates on the design of an ad hoc
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m-commerce trading system framework membership service and also its security
and trust service. Section 4.6 discusses the key characteristics of the ad hoc m-
commerce trading system framework. Section 4.7 compares the design of an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system framework with existing infrastructure-supported
m-commerce architectures and examines their characteristics and discusses several
fundamental differences between their characteristics and implementation. Finally,
Section 4.8 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Ad Hoc M-Commerce Trading System Overview
An ad hoc m-commerce trading system is a platform for mobile users to engage
in mobile commerce transactions using ad hoc wireless networking. It is a self-
organized and self-configured m-commerce venue that can be initiated anywhere by
any two or more traders that are in close proximity with each other and does not
require any third party infrastructure to support it. To participate in the trad-
ing system, traders must be equipped with a Wi-Fi capable mobile device and an
appropriate ad hoc m-commerce application. Traders can join the trading system
as a seller or buyer or both. The trading system does not limit its participating
parties to engage in ad hoc m-commerce transactions only, but it allows the traders
to communicate and collaborate with each other to control and manage its group
membership management and security and trust service which include the following:
• Give recommendations about other traders’ online identities, trading histories,
testimonials and reputations.
• Attest other traders’ digital certificates that bind together their identity in-
formation with their public keys, membership information, testimonials and
trading histories.
• Evaluate each other after each transaction by providing deal evaluations. The
deal evaluations are used by the traders as a means to express their satisfac-
tion about their trading counterparts’ behaviour in fulfilling their transaction
agreements.
• Share negative evaluations about their trading partners with other traders in
the forum.
• Sanction those traders who misbehave or have a history of being given poor
evaluations.
Each trading system will operate a trading model such as for swapping of digital
resources or selling or buying items or for conducting online auctions and so on, and
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have policies governing how it handles dissemination of trust data and deals with
forum membership and sanctions. Some forums will have an open membership while
others will have a closed membership or be open to all but banned parties. More
details about a trading system’s group membership will be discussed in Chapter 7.
To join a trading forum, traders must first activate the appropriate m-commerce ap-
plication on their mobile device and create an online identity to represent themselves
in the trading system. More details about a trader’s online identity establishment
will be presented in Chapter 5. Prospective traders are expected to send a join re-
quest together with their identity credentials to any available peers that are within
communication range with them. Once accepted as a member of a particular trading
forum, traders can engage in m-commerce transactions, as well as participate in any
of the trading system’s activities as mentioned above.
4.3 The Abstract Architecture
As this thesis focuses on the use of mobile devices that operate as peers with a similar
role to each other in a dynamic and decentralized network, the design and imple-
mentation of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system is based on a P2P architecture.
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the abstract architecture for an ad hoc m-commerce
trading peer.
Figure 4.1: An abstract architecture for an ad hoc m-commerce trading peer
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The first two layers sequentially include a mobile device and an operating system
required for operating the m-commerce applications. The Service layer provides
services that are required to support the core functionality of the trading system
which include the following:
Discovery Service - Provides the ability for peers to search and discover available
trading forums, advertisements and other peers in the network. For a mobile host to
join a group, or for a group to merge with another group, they must be able to find
out what groups are present in their vicinity. The discovery protocol carries out this
function and serves as a supporting layer for the group membership maintenance
protocol.
Membership Service - Provides the ability for peers to organize themselves into
a trading forum, which includes the ability to join, renew membership and also to
exclude a member from a trading forum.
Forum Decision Making Service - To facilitate any forum wide decision making
processes by fostering effective communication among forum members.
Messaging Service - Provides support for message delivery over the network. This
includes specifications for routing, relaying and propagating messages as well as the
message structure and so on.
Security and Trust Services - Provides support for identity establishment, trust
establishment as well as message authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-
repudiation. This service will also provide security advice to make participating
users understand the issues and their responsibilities in securing ad hoc m-commerce
trading systems.
• Message authentication and encryption in order to ensure the authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality of the messages transmitted over the network.
• Peer authentication to ensure that communications are with valid peers. When
a trader joins a trading forum, he has to provide his digital certificate that
consists of his trading pseudonym, photograph and digital signature as his
identity credentials. The digital certificate needs to be digitally signed by at
least one other party that is considered as a trusted party by other peers to
confirm its validity.
• Identity establishment which includes generating public and private key pairs,
signing PGP certificates as well as verifying the certificates.
Negotiation Service - To facilitate a negotiation process during a deal until a
mutual agreement or disagreement is reached between the participating parties.
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Transaction Service - To facilitate the processes for traders to complete a trans-
action, which may include a payment process.
The Application layer is the implementation of ad hoc m-commerce applications
such as mobile auctions, swapping of digital resources, buying or selling items and
so on.
4.4 The Standard Trading Pattern
To participate in ad hoc m-commerce transactions, traders must first join a trading
forum that offers services that they are interested in such as to buy and sell second
hand goods. It is expected that after a party advertises items to be traded and
potential trading parties express their interest, traders will perform transactions
according to at least the following four main steps, as shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Four main steps involved in an ad hoc m-commerce transaction
Exchanging trading standing - In this step, both traders will exchange their
digitally signed trading standings which consist of a set of recent deal evaluations
and any testimonials that they have as well as their membership voucher and PGP
certificate. Each will check the PGP certificate [119] and membership voucher [118]
offered as satisfactory. The PGP certificate can be checked through the certificate
authentication process, which will be discussed later in Chapter 5, while membership
voucher can be checked through the membership voucher verification process, which
will be discussed in Chapter 7.
After evaluating each others’ reputation and checking their local repository to see if
any negative reputation report or forum exclusion proposal has been made against
the other party as well as considering the potential risk involved in the transaction,
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both traders will decide whether or not to enter into a transaction. A trader may
receive responses from more than one potential trading partner. In this case, a
trader needs to decide with whom to trade with after assessing the trustworthiness
of potential trading counterparties and considering the potential transaction risks.
Agree a deal - The traders will negotiate a deal based on the advertised trade.
It will specify the terms including what is to be exchanged for what and how this
will be effected. If both of the traders agree with the deal and decide to proceed
with the transaction, the process will continue with both parties digitally signing a
transaction contract which is produced by instantiating it from a standard pattern
approved by the forum. The transaction contract will consist of at least the following
information; both traders trading pseudonyms, items to be exchanged or purchased
(i.e., name, type, specifications of the items), quantity, price per item, delivery date
and place, method and date of payment, digital signature of both traders, time and
date the contract is signed.
If no deal is finally agreed between the traders, then the transaction will not take
place. The trader who initiates the transaction may prefer to try to make a deal
with another potential trading partner instead.
Direct interaction to complete transaction - At this stage, if no party repu-
diates the contract, the transaction will take place where both traders will interact
directly to try to complete the transaction. This will involve a step of verification
during which each party will assess whether the offered resource or item is as de-
scribed or whether the money or swap offered is as agreed. The identities of the
parties will also be further verified by checking that the photograph on the other
trader’s PGP certificate resembles his current appearance [119] (in the case that
both parties did not have a physical meeting during the authentication process of
their digital certificates).
If one of the traders repudiates the contract, then his trading counterpart may
call off their deal. In this case, although the transaction between the traders does
not take place, the trading counterpart may circulate a negative evaluation about
that trader’s misbehaviour for repudiating their transaction contract in the trading
forum.
If one of the traders calls off the deal, his trading counterpart may also circulate an
adverse evaluation about that trader’s misbehaviour for breaching their transaction
contract in the trading forum.
Exchange deal evaluations - After the completion of each transaction, traders
are expected to generate a deal evaluation about the trade, digitally sign it and
then send it to their trading counterparty. The deal evaluation will also contain
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the transaction contract that is digitally signed by both parties involved in the
transaction [119]. Adverse evaluations can be circulated more widely in the trading
forum at either trader’s choice.
4.5 Addressing the Security and Trust Issues
Provision for secure transactions is a necessary element of an m-commerce trading
system. Thus, in order to support security for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
to a sufficient degree for trade to be viable using it, the security and trust service
and membership service for the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework has
been designed in the following ways:
Online Identity Establishment - The ad hoc m-commerce trading system frame-
works adopts a PGP web of trust scheme as discussed in section 3.7.2. Each trader
creates their own trading pseudonym and also public and private key pairs. The
traders then establish their own online identity by using their trading pseudonym
and photograph as their identity credentials in a self-signed PGP certificate. Each
trader’s PGP certificate needs to be attested by other parties to ensure the validity of
such certificate, as well as to avoid an ill-intentioned trading party from masquerad-
ing as others. To minimize the risk that any one certificate signatory is unrecognized
or untrusted as an attestor, multiple signatories will usually be required. Traders
will verify other traders’ certificates based on their knowledge and recommendations
from their trusted peers. To make the retrieval of the certificate information easier
for verification purposes, traders need to keep their own certificate and other traders’
certificates that they have attested or acquired in their local certificate repository.
More details about the design of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system’s identity
support scheme are provided in Chapter 5.
Trust Establishment - To mitigate security issues related to misbehaviour of a
trader, the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework adopts a fully distributed
reputation system that employs a sanction-backed mechanism as a means to foster
trust among traders. Traders are expected to evaluate their trading counterpart’s
behaviour in participating in a trade by generating a deal evaluation after the com-
pletion or abandonment of each trade. They then digitally sign the deal evaluation
and send it to their trading counterpart. Traders can choose to circulate adverse eval-
uations about their trading counterpart more widely in the trading forum. Traders
that have a series of adverse evaluations are open to be sanctioned by other members
of the trading forum. Chapter 6 will discuss more details about the design of an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system’s reputation system.
64
Attestation Mechanism - Attestation is used as a means for traders to vouch
for other parties credentials such as their digital certificates, membership status and
reputation reports. It can be an effective way for traders to share their expressions of
trust about a particular party in the trading community. It helps to mitigate risks in
transactions, especially in situations that involve dealing with unfamiliar traders. As
traders are peers who consider each other as equals, the attestation process is done
in a P2P manner among traders without involving any higher certification authority
and is based on each attestor’s knowledge. Any trader can be an attestor to vouch
for another trader’s credentials. Anyone who trusts the attestor as an attestor, will
consider any credentials signed by the attestor to be valid to the extent of that trust.
Group Membership Management - The ad hoc m-commerce trading system
framework employs group membership [118] as a means for establishing greater trust
and more secure interactions among trading parties in a particular trading forum.
It is intended to restrict participation in a trading forum to only those parties that
are regarded as reasonably trustworthy by their peers. In order for traders to be a
member of a particular trading forum, they have to obtain a membership voucher
that has a sufficient number of votes and is digitally signed by recognized group
members. The membership voucher serves as a credential that can be used by
traders to prove their membership to other members of the forum and it is only
valid for a certain period of time. To remain as a member of a particular trading
forum, each trader needs to renew their membership voucher periodically when the
existing one expires. Any members that misbehave are open to be excluded from the
trading forum. Again, any exclusion requires a quorate decision from other members
of the trading forum. Details about the design of an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system’s group membership are discussed in chapter 7.
Sanction-backed Mechanism - The ad hoc m-commerce trading system’s repu-
tation system incorporates a sanction-backed mechanism as a strong incentive for
traders to behave appropriately especially in fulfilling their transaction agreement
and providing truthful deal evaluations and testimonials. Traders that misbehave
or have a poor reputation risk being excluded from a trading forum’s membership
if other traders receive complaints about their misbehaviour. The decision for the
exclusion is based on collaborative decision making by a sufficiently large number
of forum members, depending on each trading forum’s participation and exclusion
policy [118].
Security Warning Scheme - A security warning scheme is used as a means to
improve the security of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. It provides a struc-
tured process for traders to report, disseminate and act about suspicious behaviour
or suspected malpractice in the trading system. Any trader detecting significant
breaches of the norms of acceptable trading behaviour by another trader is expected
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to notify such misbehaviour to other traders in the trading system by multicasting
an alert message, so that they could take the necessary actions and be careful when
dealing with the same party in the future. The recipients of such an alert message
are then expected to forward it to other traders at later junctions until the message’s
liveness expires to ensure that a wide scope of traders in that trading community
receive such an alert message. This will help the traders in an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system to avoid or reduce their risk in transactions. In addition to that,
alerts can be used as reminders to encourage traders to behave properly and com-
ply with the trading system’s rules and regulations. Traders would be expected to
consider the prudence, ethics and legal implications when framing and circulating
such alerts.
4.6 Key Characteristics
The ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework is designed to exhibit the fol-
lowing characteristics:
Self-Organization - The ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework is self-
organizing, as it can be initiated anywhere by any trader that carries a mobile device
with Wi-Fi capability and runs an appropriate m-commerce application. In order for
traders to join a particular trading system, they need to set up their mobile device
appropriately, i.e. configure the network setting, install and activate an appropriate
m-commerce application and generate their online credentials. The self-organization
characteristic is important for the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework as
its participants are usually peers with similar roles and device capabilities and thus,
it is unlikely that such a trading system could support the existence of a trusted
third party administration to manage and control its services. In addition to that,
this kind of characteristic is required to provide reliable trading activities due to
dynamic participation by the traders in the trading system and unreliable means of
communication among them.
Infrastructure-less - In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework, as an
ad hoc wireless network is used as a communication medium among its participating
parties, all of its activities and services such as its membership, security and trust
services are handled and managed by its participants using their local and neigh-
bours’ resources without relying on any trusted third party supported infrastructure.
Traders will keep all their identification, membership and transaction related infor-
mation in their local repository and exchange it with their trusted neighbours when
the need arises.
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Low Cost - The ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework is designed to
exploit the characteristic of ad hoc wireless networks of being low cost for traders
to deploy, maintain and run a trading forum, as well as to participate in the trading
activities. Traders only need to purchase a Wi-Fi capable mobile device and install
an appropriate m-commerce application which is most likely to be at no or very
minimal cost in order to participate in m-commerce transactions, without having to
pay any subscription fee to a network service provider. In addition to that, traders
can disseminate advertisements for free.
Fully Distributed - The operation of the ad hoc m-commerce trading system
framework is designed to be distributed among its participants who are peers that
have similar constraints on their devices. Fully distributed characteristics are neces-
sary for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework as it cannot be expected
that any peer in an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum will always be available and
have a high capability mobile device that can act as a trusted server to store rele-
vant information on all other traders in the trading forum. In addition to that, it
is unlikely that any peer would be trusted by all other peers in the trading forum
to be the anchor point to store such information. Nor is a trusted distributed ser-
vice supported across all or most of the trading forum members’ mobile devices a
solution for storing relevant information. Too few nodes in such storage are likely
to be present in any local online interaction to guarantee access to relevant data
wanted by participants. Thus, it is more practical for traders to store their own
trading related information such as their identification details, membership infor-
mation, trading history and so on in their local repository to ensure that they have
the required information when it is needed or requested by other traders.
Dynamic - All services in the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework need
to be designed to be able to handle dynamic and irregular participation by its
participating parties, as well as frequent network disconnections among them. As
traders can easily join and leave the trading forum, it is important for the ad hoc
m-commerce trading system framework to have this kind of characteristic to enable
its group membership management service to handle such dynamic membership
changes without having to reconstitute the trading group. Any decisions to accept
a new member or exclude an existing member from a trading forum are delegated
to subsets of the group members and do not require participation by all group
members. Furthermore, as the presence of a centralized authority to vouch for the
validity of a trader’s digital certificate, membership status and reputation reports
cannot be guaranteed all the time due to dynamic participation by trading parties,
the function of an attestor is also delegated to any members of a trading forum.
To lessen the risk that any one certificate signatory is unknown or untrusted as an
attestor, multiple signatories will usually be required.
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Absence of Authority - As activities in the ad hoc m-commerce trading system
framework cannot be expected to involve any authority higher than a peer, the re-
sponsibility for managing the services in the ad hoc m-commerce trading system
framework especially its membership management service and security and trust
service are devolved among members without recourse to trusted parties with dele-
gated authority as no party’s presence can be guaranteed in any live trading context.
For instance, in the attestation process, any traders who are considered as a trusted
peer by other traders can be an attestor to vouch for other traders’ certificates,
membership, trading history and etc.
Robustness - Due to intermittent participation by members, unreliable means of
communication and the absence of dependable enduring infrastructure services, all
services in the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework need to be designed
to have failure tolerance support.
Organisational Simplicity - As traders use unreliable communication means to
communicate with each other and may make a spontaneous decision to participate
in m-commerce transactions when they are on the move, it is important for an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system framework to support m-commerce trading proto-
cols that do not require traders to be involved in complicated and time consuming
activities to complete protocol stages.
4.7 Ad Hoc M-commerce Trading System Design
Comparison
This section compares the ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework with other
existing infrastructure-supported m-commerce trading architectures, client/server
and P2P m-commerce architectures, and examines several fundamental differences
between their properties and implementation.
4.7.1 Ad Hoc M-commerce Trading System Framework vs
Infrastructure-Supported Client/Server M-commerce
Architectures
Although m-commerce has been recognized as a new way of conducting today’s busi-
nesses and has grown rapidly in a significant way, most of the existing infrastructure-
supported m-commerce systems were designed based on a client/server architec-
ture [181],[182],[34],[101]. Several popular examples of m-commerce systems in-
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clude Zillow.com that provides real estate services, Nordstrom.com that provides
online shopping services and Target.com that also provides online shopping services
[64],[2],[3],[4]. Infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems support
complex chains of operations normally by utilizing the Internet [144],[180]. Although
infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems share some characteris-
tics with ad hoc m-commerce systems such as location and motion independence,
personalization, convenience and etc, their implementation has several fundamental
differences from ad hoc m-commerce systems in terms of the following:
Cost for Both Merchants and Customers - A major issue faced by mer-
chants in infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems is that to
implement and operate an m-commerce system requires a substantial investment
[144],[42],[181],[142], which could be costly for small and medium-size businesses.
The costs relate to the the following:
• Cost of designing, developing and maintaining the m-commerce systems; both
the front-end and back-end systems.
• Cost of purchasing the necessary software licenses and devices, such as web
servers, database servers and so on, in order to implement an end-to-end m-
commerce system.
• High initial cost of establishing mobile communication infrastructures using
technologies such as GSM, UMTS, GPRS, EDGE etc to better manage the
supply chain operations and so on [154].
For customers, they need to pay the mobile network operator or network service
provider for the mobile connection service that they use to perform the m-commerce
transactions. The charges that they have to pay are normally based on the following
factors [160],[159],[153]:
• Airtime - Customers may need to pay connection charges if a long connection
is required in order to maintain connectivity to the necessary servers while a
transaction completes.
• Number of transactions - Customers often pay based on the number of trans-
actions that they have performed.
• Session - Customers may need to pay for a whole session, regardless of the
number of transactions that they have performed.
• Number of messages -Customers pay based on the number of messages that
they have sent.
69
• Combination of all the above - Customers pay a basic rate for the connection
and also for the transactions or sessions or messages that they have initiated.
In contrast, an ad hoc m-commerce system only requires traders; both buyers (or
customers) and sellers (or providers) to spend lesser amounts in order to implement
and operate it. This is due to the fact that traders use an ad hoc wireless network,
which is a free wireless communication medium to communicate with each other
and they only need to spend the amount of money needed to purchase a mobile
device and also appropriate ad hoc m-commerce applications, which might even be
obtained for free if they are developed on the popular open source model. They do
not need to recompense a third party service provider in order to use the service.
Communication Technology - There are a variety of wireless communication
standards that can be used to provide fundamental mobile communication infras-
tructures to support the activities of infrastructure-supported m-commerce systems,
ranging from global, regional to short distance communications, which include Satel-
lite, 4th. Generation (4G) and 3rd. generation (3G) networks, Wireless LAN (802.11
a/b) and Bluetooth [142],[42],[18],[111].
On the other hand, ad hoc m-commerce systems can only be conducted in a small
geographical area over ad hoc wireless networks. Currently, the ad hoc wireless
communication choices seem to be Bluetooth, ad hoc Wi-Fi and Wi-Fi direct, where
only the latter two have sufficient range to be of practical use.
Security Services - Infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems
usually rely on the mobile network operator to provide security services to its par-
ticipating parties to ensure dependable communications and transactions among
them.
In contrast, participating parties of ad hoc m-commerce systems need to cooperate
with each other using their available resources to support the security services of
such trading systems without relying on any infrastructure support from a mobile
network operator.
Participating parties - An infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce
system’s value chain normally involves entities like customers, merchants or con-
tent providers, mobile network operators, financial institutions and possibly other
entities [144],[42],[69],[167],[160]. Among the entities, a mobile network operator’s
role is vital in the whole infrastructure-supported m-commerce value chain. Its role
is not only to just provide mobile communication infrastructures for the other enti-
ties to communicate but can be more dynamic and complex such as to offer a mobile
portal or to act as an intermediary or a trusted third party for security services [160].
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However, in an ad hoc m-commerce framework, its transactions only involve two
main entities; customers (or buyers) and suppliers (or sellers). These two entities
are peers with a similar role that communicate and cooperate with each other to
carry out the m-commerce transactions and also handle its security services, without
any infrastructure support from a mobile network operator.
Applications’ Aim - Most of the existing infrastructure-supported client/server
m-commerce applications seem to be aimed at more formal and profit-based trading,
especially in the business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) market
[154],[68],[156],[144]. These kinds of trading sometimes require the m-commerce
systems to be linked to financial institutions in order to support mobile payment.
Whereas, ad hoc m-commerce applications suit more informal or casual trading
among a group of local people that are in close proximity with each other and involve
the trade of digital resources or items that do not have large monetary values. Local
trading means that it is practical for traders to have a physical meeting with each
other to inspect and swap goods and to make payment for items that are being
traded between them. To link ad hoc m-commerce systems to financial institutions
or the Bitcoin block chain to support mobile payment among traders might be
challenging due to the infrastructure-less nature of an ad hoc wireless network or
the inability to guarantee the presence of trusted third parties to underpin online
payment processes.
Target Users - Infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems target
a wide range of users which include businesses and end-users that might be located
globally or locally. In contrast, ad hoc m-commerce systems target only end users
that are located in the same area and within the coverage of Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.
The fundamental differences between the implementation of ad hoc m-commerce sys-
tems and infrastructure-supported client/server m-commerce systems as discussed
above are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Infrastructure-Supported Ad Hoc M-Commerce
Client/Server
M-Commerce
Cost
Business Initial Cost Large Investment Free or Small
( Merchants or Content Investment
Providers or Sellers)
Access Charge Mobile Service Charges Free
(Customers or Buyers) / Free Wi-Fi Zones
Communication
Technology
Wireless GSM, TDMA, CDMA, Ad Hoc Wi-Fi,
Communication EDGE, GPRS and etc. Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth
Standards
Service Coverage Long Range Short Range
Security Services
Mobile Network Yes No
Operator Support
Participating
Parties
Main Entities Customers, Merchants Traders
Mobile Network (Buyers, Sellers, Swappers)
Operators, Financial
Institutions etc.
Mobile Network
Operator Essential None
Involvement
Applications’
Aim
Type of Trading Formal and Informal or Casual
Profit-based (Person-to-Person)
(B2C or B2B)
Online Payment Possible Possible in Future
Support
Target Users
Type of Users Businesses and End Users and
End Users Local Market Traders
Scope Wide Area Small Area within
Globally or Wi-Fi or Bluetooth
Regionally Coverage
Table 4.1: Fundamental differences between ad hoc m-commerce and infrastructure-
supported client/server m-commerce
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4.7.2 Ad Hoc M-commerce Trading System Framework vs
Infrastructure-Supported P2P M-commerce Architec-
tures
P2P technology such as JXTA from Sun [155] and .Net from Microsoft [10], has
enabled infrastructure-supported m-commerce systems to be implemented based on
P2P architectures. Some examples of infrastructure-supported m-commerce systems
that were designed based on P2P architectures can be seen in the current implemen-
tation of digital content exchange or media distribution applications [36],[17], such
as Mobile eDonkey [17],[74] and IMS Mobile P2P [93],[98]. A number of recent P2P
schemes have been proposed and developed to carry out Internet-based e-commerce
applications in cellular mobile environments [17],[115],[137],[177],[21]. Most of the
proposed schemes are based on a hybrid P2P architecture, where the network still
utilizes central entities and it consists of two types of nodes; super nodes and ordi-
nary nodes. The super nodes hold most of the network overhead and the ordinary
nodes need to be connected to one of the super nodes in order to communicate with
the other peers.
Although the design of both infrastructure-supported P2P m-commerce and ad hoc
m-commerce is based on a P2P architecture that allows their participating parties
to manage and control the operation of such trading systems, there are several
fundamental differences between them in terms of the following:
Cost - The cost for the users to participate in infrastructure-supported P2P m-
commerce may not be as high as with client/server m-commerce, but the users still
need to pay some network access subscription fees to a mobile network operator,
which is not required with ad hoc m-commerce.
Communication Technology - Similar to infrastructure-supported client/server
m-commerce, there are several wireless communication standards provided by mobile
network operators that can be used by the users to participate in infrastructure-
supported P2P m-commerce such as GSM, GPRS, EDGE and High Speed Packet
Access (HSPA). Thus, users may experience the same network incompatability and
adaptation problems as in client/server m-commerce. However, users of ad hoc
m-commerce do not face similar diversity of choice in supporting communication
protocols.
Architecture - As mentioned above, most of the P2P schemes that have been
proposed or developed for infrastructure-supported P2P m-commerce were designed
based on a hybrid P2P architecture that utilizes centralized entities and place most
of the network overhead on the super peers. In this case, the super peers need
to have higher device capabilities than the ordinary peers in order to support the
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operation of such trading systems. In contrast, the ad hoc m-commerce framework
is designed based on a pure P2P architecture where all peers are similar in terms of
their role and device capabilities.
Security Services - Although infrastructure-supported P2P m-commerce allows its
participating parties to control its security services such as in distributed reputation
systems and so on, communications among them still require network infrastructure
support from a mobile network operator. On the other hand, as mentioned in Section
4.7.1 above, participating parties in an ad hoc m-commerce system communicate and
cooperate with each other by utilizing their available resources to control the security
services of such trading system without relying on any infrastructure support from
a mobile network operator.
Table 4.2 summarizes the fundamental differences between ad hoc m-commerce and
infrastructure-supported P2P m-commerce.
Infrastructure-Supported Ad Hoc M-Commerce
P2P M-Commerce
Cost
Access Charge Mobile Service Charges Free
(Customers or Buyers) / Free Wi-Fi Zones
Communication
Technology
Wireless GSM, GPRS, EDGE Ad Hoc Wi-Fi,
Communication etc. Wi-Fi Direct, Bluetooth
Standards
Service Coverage Long Range Short Range
Mobile Network
Operator Essential None
Involvement
Architecture
P2P Architecture Mostly Hybrid P2P Pure P2P
Security
Services
Mobile Network Yes No
Operator Support
Table 4.2: Fundamental differences between ad hoc m-commerce and infrastructure-
supported P2P m-commerce
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4.8 Conclusion
An ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework provides a novel paradigm for
pure P2P m-commerce. It includes features and characteristics that are different
from infrastructure supported m-commerce, especially the client/server based archi-
tecture, as the discussion above has pointed out, although they share some similar
properties. The unique characteristics of ad hoc m-commerce framework reflect its
advantages and its drawbacks.
The process of designing and developing ad hoc m-commerce services and applica-
tions is inherently more complex and challenging, as compared to infrastructure-
supported m-commerce (both client/server and hybrid P2P based architectures),
due to the fact that they are executed on resource constrained devices and in an
environment that is dynamic and cannot rely on any infrastructure support from a
network service provider or any authority higher than a peer. Cost remains as an
important obstacle in infrastructure-supported m-commerce implementations, either
client/server or hybrid P2P based architectures.
From the above comparisons, it is seen that ad hoc m-commerce framework has the
potential to provide an alternative way for traders to perform m-commerce trading.
However, as ad hoc m-commerce has several unique characteristics that make it
different from infrastructure-supported m-commerce, application developers need
to weigh considerations carefully when designing and developing its services and
applications.
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Chapter 5
Online Identification with a Fully
Self-Organized PGP Certificates
5.1 Introduction
Support for online identity establishment is a crucial element in a security and trust
service for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. It provides assurance for traders
that they are communicating, collaborating, carrying out transactions, managing
membership and establishing trust relationships with known other parties. Such
support not only protects traders from attacks based on identity disguise but can also
be used to protect the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation of
the information being exchanged among traders throughout the network, as well as
to allow traders’ reputation to be shared within the group and support membership
in a trading system. A tight binding between an online identity and its reputation
enables traders to assess the behaviour and trustworthiness of each trader as well as
to favour trustworthy and reputable parties to trade with while avoiding dubious or
untrustworthy ones in order to keep transaction risks low. The binding between an
online identity and its membership data helps traders to determine the validity of
each member’s membership status and also each message sent by them in collabo-
rative decision making processes for group membership management. This enables
participation in a particular trading system to be restricted to only those parties that
are considered to be reasonably trustworthy by other peers in the trading system.
Public key cryptography, via digital certificates provide a means for traders in an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system to establish their online identity. A digital
certificate enables traders to verify the identity of each party in a trading system.
Used in conjunction with encryption, it provides assurance that the messages be-
ing exchanged among traders are authentic. However, the validity of the identity
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credentials in a digital certificate will only be accepted by the relying parties if it
is signed directly or indirectly by a recognized trusted third party. In addition to
that, public key cryptography, if it is not implemented in a proper manner will cre-
ate vulnerabilities that will undermine the security and functionality of the trading
system, as discussed in Section 3.3.5.
This chapter starts by examining forms of online identity in the context of online
trading in Section 5.2 and then discusses the online identity establishment in an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system in Section 5.3. Significant related work is critically
assessed in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the conceptual design of an identity
support scheme for a security and trust service for an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system. Section 5.6 presents a security analysis of the proposed identity support
scheme. Several recommendations on things that a trader should do when dealing
with digital certificates are discussed in Section 5.7 and finally, Section 5.8 concludes
this chapter.
5.2 Online Identity
In online trading, traders are represented by online identities. An online identity
refers to a social identity that is established by users as a means to represent them-
selves in online communities. The main choice here seems to be between using their
real identities such as their legal name, date of birth and home address, or a trading
pseudonym to represent themselves online. Real identities are predominantly used
in trading for items like houses and cars where legal documentation of ownership is
important to have. Other forms of trading like buying goods in shops don’t require
identity establishment unless electronic payment is needed. Traders may choose
to use a trading pseudonym if the trading context that they participate in offers
no reason for them to provide their real identity, in terms of legal documents or
otherwise.
The use of a trading pseudonym would enable traders to participate in online trad-
ing incognito. It would also allow traders to keep their trading behaviour discrete
and thus protect their privacy. A trading pseudonym enables traders to create an
identity that is separate from their personal life and this will allow them to interact
and trade with some degree of confidence without fear that their real identity will
be stolen, abused or revealed. Furthermore, it would enable traders to project a
persona that was distinctive. For example, a pseudonym of Honest Eddy or the
Professor could signify a style of approach to trading that reinforces a reputation
they wish to maintain. The real identity of a trader in terms of their legal name,
date of birth and home address is not necessarily a relevant issue in online trading
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if electronic payment is not an issue. Traders can still build reputations in their
trading pseudonyms through their trading histories and interactions with others,
without linking their real identity to the pseudonym. The reputation of a trading
pseudonym can be compromised just as easily as the reputation associated with a
real identity. So the value of maintaining that reputation can act as a strong disin-
centive to abusing a trading pseudonym. By linking together reputation to a trader’s
pseudonym, the trustworthiness as well as future behaviour of that trader can be
evaluated and predicted as long as a persistent identity is used. Pseudonyms make
things harder where parties seek legal redress against criminal trading practices or
against torts (contract violations) in civil law. However, in casual local trading such
recourses to law are rare and anyway the problem of converting a trading pseudonym
to the real identity behind it is not insuperable.
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, using real identities would create a problem
of verification. Attestors of such identities would have to assure themselves that a
trader was entitled to call himself by his purported legal name, was actually born
on the stipulated date and genuinely resided at the stated address. Performing
such checks adequately is tricky, requires the careful perusal of documentation and
requires skills in detecting fraudulent ID papers that ordinary parties like other
traders would not normally be expected to have. However, in practice, casual trading
attestors want to attest an identity established by a recognised appearance and a
recognised form of address for trading purposes. What the subject’s legal name is or
when they were born or where they really live is beside the point. Also, using real
identities can make it harder for traders to maintain secrecy about their engaging in
particular transactions. Lack of secrecy can threaten a trader’s privacy, put them at
risk of harm from hostile competitors or even compromise the profitability of deals
that they undertake. In addition to that, some traders may have legal name that
is uncommon to a certain community or difficult to spell or pronounce. The use of
names that are common in a particular community or easier to spell or pronounce as
a trading pseudonym can help traders to develop a presence that others can recognize
and remember easily, which could subsequently draw a more positive response from
other traders in that community. There is also a possibility that several traders have
the same legal name such as same first name and surname, which will make it difficult
for other traders in that community to distinguish the right trader they’re going to
trade with. A trading pseudonym will give the opportunity for those traders to have
a name that is different from with each other, which can help others to recognize
them as a different person easily.
However, allowing pseudonyms raises the issue of whether it allows traders to create
multiple identities or change their presented identity too easily. Traders might also
try to hide their relation to a particular action like an attestation or vote and thus
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avoid being held accountable for that action. To prevent such issues in ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems requires robust identification of traders. Robust means
of identification will not only protect traders from attacks aimed at identity disguise,
but also lets other elements of a security and trust service function properly and
effectively.
5.3 Online Identity Establishment in an Ad Hoc
M-Commerce Trading System
Due to the infrastructure-less nature of an ad hoc wireless network, frequent network
disconnections and irregular participations by its members, an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system cannot rely on a network service provider to act as a CA nor can
it rely upon any particular trusted party being present at each trading session to
serve as a CA. The ad hoc nature of such trading means it can happen anywhere
between any subset of the membership. What seems to be needed is some kind
of devolution of the CA function over all the membership. Thus, a web of trust
scheme using PGP certificates might be such an alternative way for traders in such
trading system to establish their online identity in a fully self-organized manner as
it would allow traders to generate their own digital certificates and collaborate with
each other to handle the verification process of such certificates without relying on
a common omnipresent CA or set of CAs to provide such services.
5.4 Related Work
A number of research studies have been done on public key management in ad hoc
wireless networks based on a PGP web of trust scheme [79],[31],[94],[163],[178],[45],[170].
Capkun et al. in [31] have proposed a fully self-organized public key management
scheme that allows users to generate their own public key pairs, issue digital cer-
tificates to other users and also perform authentication with each other by merging
their local certificate repositories. The users then evaluate the authenticity of the
public key based on the certificates available in the merged repository. Interesting
aspects of this approach are that it enables users to control the security settings
of the system and also to perform key authentication based on the available in-
formation in each user’s local repository. In addition to that, it does not require
participation by all users during the authentication process. This approach seems to
be suitable for ad hoc m-commerce due to its self-organized and distributed charac-
teristics. However, its certificate renewal mechanism, which requires the same issuer
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to issue a new updated version of certificate to the same user, would not be appro-
priate in ad hoc m-commerce as regular participation by trading parties cannot be
guaranteed in such trading community. Traders with expired certificates would be
at serious risk of having to wait for a long time in order to get in contact with their
original certificate issuer. They might not even ever be able to get in contact with
those issuers if those issuers no longer participate in the trading system or have been
excluded from the trading group.
Dahshan and Irvine in [45],[46] have proposed a similar approach where users create
their own public key pairs and issue digital certificates to their neighboring nodes.
Users store their own certificate and also the certificates that they have issued to
others in their local repository. The difference is that their approach allows users
to perform authentication through at least two independent certificate chains. For
example, node A wants to authenticate the public key of node D. Thus, node A has
to acquire a chain of valid certificates from its node to node D. The first certificate
in the chain must be issued by node A and the last certificate holds the public key of
node D, as shown in the certificate chain in Figure 5.1. The in-between certificates
will be verified using the public key of the previous certificate in the chain. This
approach also seems to be practical to be applied in ad hoc m-commerce due to its
self-organized, P2P and distributed characteristics. However, requiring the use of
two certificate chains to verify the validity of a certificate seems too demanding for
ad hoc m-commerce as the chance of two trading parties not known to each other
not having two independent certificate chains between their certificates seems quite
likely in such a dynamic and fragmented trading community.
Figure 5.1: A certificate chain
Li et al. in [94] have proposed an approach that utilises a self-signed public key
certificate and also the broadcasting property of radio communications to distribute
a public key certificate among all nodes in the network. In their approach, it is
assumed that every honest node joins the network with a unique network identity
(ID) and is equipped with an omni-directional antenna for network communications.
A node distributes its public key certificate to other nodes in the network using two
processes; neighbourhood certificate distribution and multi-hop certificate distribu-
tion. Nodes within two hops of each other exchange their certificates by using a
neighbourhood certificate distribution process while nodes that are more than two
hops away with each other exchange their certificates using a multi-hop certificate
distribution process.
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Every node that first joins the network will distribute its self-signed certificate using
a neighbourhood certificate distribution process by broadcasting a request message
that includes its certificate to its 1-hop neighbours. The receiving nodes validate the
request message by verifying the sender’s digital signature with its public key in the
request message. The receiving nodes then update their neighbourhood certificate
and network certificate tables and rebroadcast a reply message that includes their
public key certificate and also the public key certificates of all their 1-hop neigh-
bours. The initial sender then updates its neighbourhood certificate and network
certificate tables according to the information in the reply message. Other nodes
that receive the reply message will not rebroadcast the message, but will instead
update their neighbourhood certificate and network certificate tables accordingly
if there is a new certificate. After a defined time, the initial sender will send an
update message that contains its public key certificate and all its 1-hop neighbours’
certificates to all its 1-hop neighbours. This update message is to ensure that all its
2-hops range neighbours receive its public key certificate, in case there are new nodes
that have just joined the neighbourhood. The verification of public key certificates
is done through neighbourhood monitoring. A node can verify that its certificate
is distributed correctly to both its 1-hop and 2-hop neighbours by hearing the mes-
sage that its 1-hop neighbours rebroadcast. If it is noticed that its certificate was
published incorrectly, then it will notify other nodes in the network.
The multi-hop distribution process complies with the rule that each intermediate
node will not rebroadcast a message that has already been transmitted by its two
1-hop neighbours. The intermediate nodes verify that the message they received has
not been altered by the preceding two nodes, as the two nodes are their 1-hop and
2-hop neighbours and thus, they have their certificate information.
Two interesting aspects of this approach are that it allows the operation of public
key management to be fully organized by the nodes themselves without relying on
any online trusted third party and it can adapt to the dynamic changes of neighbour
relationship and network membership caused by node movement. However, this ap-
proach does not discuss any mechanism to vouch for the validity of the self-signed
certificates. A self-signed certificate needs to be attested by another party that is
trusted to some sufficient degree by its relying parties to verify the validity of its
public key and identity information binding, which is important to prevent identity-
related issues like identity spoofing and Sybil attacks. In ad hoc m-commerce , it is
a necessity to attest the validity of a self-signed certificate as there is a possibility
that a trader’s pseudonym may not be unique and there is no inherent association
between a public key and the identity credentials listed in such a self-signed certifi-
cate. Another issue with this approach is that each node has to store the certificates
of all the neighbhours within its two hops range as well as the certificates of all avail-
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able nodes in the network that it knows. It may not be convenient or even practical
for ad hoc m-commerce traders with limited storage capacity device to store such
certificate information as they need to store other information as well, such as their
trading history, transaction-related information, group membership information and
so on.
Although some of the properties in the solutions proposed by the above related work
seem suitable to be applied in ad hoc m-commerce, none of them has proposed a
certificate attestation mechanism that is suitable overall for the nature and require-
ments of ad hoc m-commerce. It seems that an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
requires a scheme that allows its participating parties to collaborate to establish
their online identity using PGP digital certificates and handle the attestation pro-
cess of those certificates in a fully P2P manner, without any mediation of a CA.
The scheme should also support a self-revocation mechanism.
5.5 Design
This section presents the identity support scheme for a security and trust service
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system that employs a public key cryptographic
mechanism in a fully self-organised manner, where a trading pseudonym and pho-
tograph are used as identity credentials in the PGP certificate. The scheme lets
participating parties collaborate in a P2P way to establish their online identity
without any mediation of a CA. It is assumed that:
• Traders maintain their own local certificate repository that contains their cer-
tificate and other traders’ certificates that they have attested or acquired.
• Traders must only use a single trading pseudonym in this trading community
at any time unless a pseudonym clash is discovered. To minimise the risk of
a pseudonym clash, traders are expected to check for this possibility against
all trading pseudonyms that they have heard of, before creating their trading
pseudonym.
• Traders’ physical appearance will change with time.
• Certificates have a limited validity period of a few years or less (e.g. 4 years).
This constrains the period in which identity fraud is possible should a certifi-
cate compromise occur. Traders are expected to renew their certificates before
the expiration date occurs. Each certificate will have a grace period for its re-
newal, for example, a grace period of 3 months before or after the expiration
date. Thus, a certificate that has expired is allowed to be renewed if it is still
within the grace period for renewing the certificate.
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• Traders must change their public keys every time they change or renew their
certificate.
• Traders may have multiple public keys that are all current but only one key is
used at a time to bind their identity credentials in a digital certificate.
5.5.1 The Creation of Public/Private Key Pairs
Using PGP technology [9, 10], each trader in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
will create their own private-public key pairs locally and then store the keys in
encrypted form in two separate key rings in their local repositories.
5.5.2 The Generation of Digital Certificates
Traders will also generate their own self-signed digital certificates locally in the form
of PGP certificates. Each certificate will contain at least the following information:-
• Type of certificate. Traders are required to choose one of the following three
types of certificates when they are generating their PGP certificates:
– ”New” if they want to generate a completely new certificate.
– ”Renew” if they want to renew their existing certificate.
– ”Update” if they want to revoke their existing certificate.
To renew or update a certificate, traders are required to send together their
old certificate when requesting other traders to vouch for the validity of the
new certificate.
• The certificate holder’s public key.
• The certificate holder’s identity credentials which include a trading pseudonym
and photograph.
• The digital signature of the certificate owner.
• The certificate’s validity period. Each certificate will be issued with a standard
limited validity period. Certificates need to be time limited to some degree
such as a few years because turnover in the actively participating parties in
a trading forum is expected to be high and the signers of certificates are
increasingly likely as time passes to cease to be part of the community. Also
aging and weight change make mismatches between physical appearance and
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photo become increasingly likely and the risks that a user’s private key is
compromised grow with time. Short validity periods of a year or less for
certificates are probably undesirable to avoid the nuisance value and overheads
of their renewal too frequently, but 5 years or more seems too long. So 2 to 4
years seems a sensible compromise.
• The digital signature(s) of the certificate’s attestor(s) and their certificate
identifiers. Multiple recognised signatures on a single certificate give more
assurance to the relying parties that the photograph and trading pseudonym in
the certificate accurately identify a party with knowledge of the corresponding
private key.
5.5.3 The Verification of Digital Certificates
Since there is no inherent association between a public key and the identity creden-
tials listed in the self-signed digital certificates, the validity of such certificates need
to be attested by other parties to avoid an-ill intentioned trader from masquerading
as others. In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, participating parties are peers
who consider each other as equals. So any peer can vouch for another peer’s digital
certificate. However, the validity of such a certificate will only be accepted if the
relying party recognises a party who has vouched for the certificate as a trustable
party. This process is based on the concept of a web-of-trust [9-11]. Anyone who
trusts the attestor as an attestor, will consider any certificates signed by the attestor
to be valid to the extent of that trust. To lessen the risk that any single certificate
signatory is unknown or untrusted as an attestor, multiple signatories will usually
be required. Fundamental verification processes in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system include the following two processes; namely attestation and authentication.
5.5.3.1 Attestation Process
The process of verifying the identity credentials and public key binding that re-
flects an identity in a digital certificate is crucial in order to prevent identity-related
threats, especially identity spoofing. Without a reliable attestation process, an
ill-intentioned trader could masquerade as another trader by using the identity cre-
dentials of that trader. Thus, in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, traders are
required to activate the following automated attestation checks when they receive a
request by other traders to vouch for their digital certificates’ validity by signing it.
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A. Attestation Checks
Below are the steps that should be performed by the trading system’s application
when the automated checks for a certificate attestation are initiated. A flowchart
in Figure 5.2 (page 86) illustrates the step-by-step checks. Traders are expected to
take the necessary actions based on the result of each check.
Step 1 - Check whether the presented certificate is a completely new one
or a renewal or an update of an earlier one by checking its type.
If the certificate is found to be a completely new one, the trading software will
proceed to step 2 to perform further checks on the certificate. Otherwise it will
perform the steps that will be discussed in Section 5.5.3.1(B).
Step 2 - Check the self signature of the presented certificate against its
public key to ensure that the contents of the certificate were not altered.
If the self signature on the presented certificate checks out, the trading software will
proceed to step 3. Otherwise, it will display an alert message that the presented
certificate is suspected to have been compromised. Thus, the attestor should refuse
to sign it.
Step 3 - Check the trading pseudonym in the certificate against its store
of certificates to see if that trading pseudonym has already been used by
another party.
If no match is found, the trading software will perform step 4. Otherwise, it will
check whether the public key of the presented certificate matches with the public
key of the existing certificate.
If there is no match between the two certificates’ public key, the trading software
will display an alert message that the trading pseudonym has been used by another
party. If the alert message shows the photos of two different persons, as illustrated in
Figure 5.3 (page 87), then the attestor should refuse to sign the certificate and inform
the sender that the presented trading pseudonym is already in use and suggest the
use of another trading pseudonym.
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Figure 5.2: A flowchart for the automated attestation checks for a new certificate
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Figure 5.3: An example alert screen for a trading pseudonym match (different
photo appearance)
If the photos in the alert message have some or a clear resemblance with each other,
as illustrated in Figure 5.4, there is a possibility that both users are the same person.
However, in this case, the attestor should also refuse to sign the presented certificate
and inform the sender that the trading pseudonym has been used by an existing
identity. If the sender claims that he is renewing his old certificate but mistakenly
sent it as a new one, then the attestor should inform him to send another request
for a certificate renewal where he has to send it together with his old certificate.
Figure 5.4: An example alert screen for a trading pseudonym match (similar photo
appearance)
If the public key of both certificates are found to be matched with each other, the
trading software will display an alert message as illustrated in Figure 5.5. In this
case, if the photos in the alert screen are sufficiently different from each other, the
attestor should refuse to sign the presented certificate as there may have been an
attempt by its sender to spoof the identity of an existing party. If the photos have
some or a clear resemblance to each other, the attestor should also refuse to sign the
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presented certificate. This is because if the sender is renewing his old certificate, he
is supposed to go through a proper certificate renewal process.
Figure 5.5: An example alert screen for a trading pseudonym and public key match
This step should reduce the likelihood but not prevent the possibility that two or
more parties in the same trading system use the same trading pseudonym.
Step 4 - Check the photo in the presented certificate against its store
of certificates to see if that appearance is used with a different trading
pseudonym.
If no match is found, the trading software will then perform the check in step 5.
Otherwise, it will display an alert message as illustrated in Figure 5.6. In this
situation, the attestor is expected to perform further checks, which will be discussed
in Scenario 1 in Section 5.5.3.1(C). If more than one matches are found, then all the
certificates that have similar photograph appearance should also be checked.
Figure 5.6: An example alert screen for a similar photo appearance used by other
identity
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Step 5 - Check the validity period of the presented certificate, whether
the current date and time is within the validity period.
If the current date and time is within the certificate’s validity period, the trading
software will then proceed to step 6. Otherwise, it will display an alert message that
the current date and time is outside the presented certificate’s validity period and
thus, the attestor should refuse to sign it.
Step 6 - Check whether the certificate has other signatories whose cer-
tificates are available in the local certificate repository.
If the certificate has no other signatories, the trading software will display a message
that all checks on the presented certificate are successful, as shown in Figure 5.7.
However, the attestor must verify that the owner has the right to use the trading
pseudonym by checking with other traders and physically meet the sender to make
sure that his physical appearance is similar to the enclosed photo in the presented
certificate, before signing the certificate. Otherwise, the trading software will per-
form step 7.
Figure 5.7: An example result screen for a certificate that has no other signatories
Step 7 - Check whether any of the signatories’ certificates is recorded as
”suspected compromised” in the local certificate repository
If none of those signatories’ certificates is recorded as ”suspected compromised”, the
trading software will also display a message as shown in Figure 5.7. In such a case,
the attestor may vouch for the validity of the presented certificate by signing it.
However, the attestor is expected to perform the same action as discussed in step
6, before signing the certificate.
If one or more of the signatories’ certificates are found to be recorded as ”suspected
compromised”, then the trading software will display an alert message as illustrated
in Figure 5.8. In such a case, the attestor should be wary about signing the presented
certificate.
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Figure 5.8: An example alert screen for a certificate that one or more of its
signatories’ certificates is recorded as ”suspected compromised”
B. Attestation Checks for a Certificate Renewal or Revocation
The following checks as illustrated in a flowchart in Figure 5.9, will be performed
by the trading software when the result of step 1 in Figure 5.2 (page 86) found that
the presented certificate is a renewal or an update of an earlier one.
Step 1 - Check whether the self-signature on both the new and older
certificates matches with their corresponding public key.
This step is to ensure that the contents of both certificates were not altered. Thus, if
the signatures on both certificates check out, the trading software will then perform
step 2. If the signature on one or both of the certificates is found to be mismatched
with its corresponding public key, the trading software will display an alert message
as illustrated in Figure 5.10 (page 92). In such a case, the attestor should reject the
certificate renewal or revocation request.
Step 2 - Check the old certificate’s trading pseudonym and public key
against its store of certificates to see whether there is a copy of that
certificate locally.
If there is a copy, the trading software will proceed to step 3. Otherwise, it will
display an alert message that a copy of the old certificate is not available locally.
Thus, the attestor is expected to verify the validity of the presented certificate by
checking with other traders about its owner’s right to use the trading pseudonym
and meeting the presenting party in person to confirm that his physical appearance
is similar to the photo in the presented certificate, before signing it.
Step 3 - Check whether the presented certificate is a renewal or an update
of an earlier one by checking its type.
If the certificate type is stated as ”renew”, the trading software will then proceed to
step 4, else it will display an alert message that the presented certificate is found to
be an update of an earlier one and further checks are required for a revocation of a
certificate. The further checks will be discussed in Scenario 2 in Section 5.5.3.1(C).
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Figure 5.9: A flowchart for the automated attestation checks for a certificate
renewal or revocation
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Figure 5.10: An example alert screen for a self-signature on the older certificate is
found to be mismatched with its corresponding public key
Step 4 - Check whether the old certificate is recorded as ”suspected
compromised” in the local certificate repository.
If the old certificate is not recorded as ”suspected compromised”, the trading soft-
ware will perform step 5. Otherwise, it will display an alert message that the cer-
tificate renewal is not allowed because the old certificate is suspected to have been
compromised. The attestor is expected to refuse to sign the presented certificate
unless they have good reasons to the contrary.
Step 5 - Check the validity period of the old certificate, whether the
current date and time is within its renewal grace period.
If the current date and time is outside its renewal grace period, the trading software
will display an alert message that the certificate renewal is not allowed due to the
current date and time is outside the old certificate’s renewal grace period. Thus,
the attestor should reject the renewal request.
Otherwise, the trading software will then perform steps 5 to 7 in Figure 5.2 (page
86). If the checks in these steps are successful, the trading software will then display
a result screen that all checks are successful. If the result screen shows that the
photos in both certificates have some or a clear resemblance with each other, as
illustrated in Figure 5.11, the attestor could verify the validity of the new certificate
by signing it.
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Figure 5.11: An example result screen for successful attestation checks (similar
photo appearance)
However, the attestor would normally be expected to meet the sender in person
to confirm that his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the presented
certificate, before signing it. If the photos in both certificates are found to be
sufficiently different from each other, as shown in Figure 5.12, the attestor should
refuse to sign the new certificate.
Figure 5.12: An example result screen for successful attestation checks (different
photo appearance)
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C. Further Checks
As the results of some of the automated checks may not give sufficient information for
the traders to decide whether to sign or not a PGP digital certificate that is presented
to them, they need to perform further checks to make sure that the certificate that
they are verifying prior to attestation is valid and belongs to the person claiming
its ownership before signing it. The checks may differ from one situation to another
situation, and will be discussed in a series of scenarios below.
Scenario 1 - A situation where the checks done by the trading software in Step 4 in
Figure 5.2 (page 86) finds that the photograph in the presented certificate is similar
to the photograph in an existing certificate with a different trading pseudonym in
the local certificate repository. In this situation, the attestor should perform the
following checks:
1) Check whether that existing certificate is recorded as ”suspected compromised”
in the local certificate repository by clicking at the Certificate Details button in
the alert message and then choose to see the detail information and status of the
existing certificate.
If the certificate is not recorded as ”suspected compromised”, the attestor needs
to perform step 2. Otherwise, the attestor needs to physically meet the presenting
party to see whether his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the presented
certificate.
If the physical appearance of that party is sufficiently different from the photo in the
presented certificate, then there is a doubt whether they are the same person. Thus,
the attestor should refuse to sign the presented certificate as there may have been
an attempt by the presenting party to create a fake identity using another party’s
photograph.
If the physical appearance of the presenting party is similar to the photograph in
both the presented and existing certificates, there is a possibility that the presenting
party is a genuine trader who wants to create a new identity after his old certificate
was compromised. However, in this situation, the attestor should refuse to sign the
presented certificate. If the presenting party claims that the existing certificate is
also his certificate that was suspected to be compromised, then the attestor should
inform that party to go through a proper certificate revocation process in order to
have a new certificate. The attestor is also expected to inform the presenting party
that he needs to continue to use the same trading pseudonym.
2) Check whether the existing identity is someone they know from personal expe-
rience and have interacted with before. If it is someone that they know who has
maintained a good reputation, then there may be an attempt by the presenting
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party to create a fake identity by using that party’s photo. If the existing identity
is someone with a suspect or bad reputation before, or someone that the attestor
does not have any personal experience with or have never dealt with in any trading
or other activities before, then there may be an attempt by the presenting party to
have multiple identities. If the existing identity is someone who has been excluded
from the trading forum membership, then there may be an attempt to re-enter the
trading forum with a new identity. In all cases, the attestor needs to physically meet
with the presenting party to check whether his physical appearance is similar to the
photo in the presented certificate.
If the physical appearance of that party is sufficiently different from the photograph
in the presented certificate, there may be genuine doubt whether they are the same
person. In such a case, the attestor is expected to refuse to sign the certificate as
there may have been an attempt by the presenting party to create a fake identity
using an existing party’s photograph.
If the physical appearance of the person bears some or a clear resemblance to the
photograph in both the presented and existing certificates, and that party is known
to have a bad reputation before or is someone with no reputation yet, or is someone
who has been excluded from the trading forum membership, the attestor should
refuse to sign the certificate. This is because it could be an attempt by that party
to have multiple identities or re-enter the trading forum with a new identity. If that
party is someone that is known to have a good reputation before, the attestor should
also refuse to sign the presented certificate and inform that party that traders of an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system are not allowed to have more than one trading
pseudonym.
Scenario 2 - A situation where the trading software checks in Step 3 in Figure 5.9
(page 91) finds that the presented certificate is an update of an earlier one, the
attestor is expected to perform at least the following checks before attesting the
presented certificate by signing it.
1) Check the reason(s) for the revocation. This can be done by clicking on the
Certificate Details button in the alert message. If the reason(s) given is acceptable
for a certificate revocation, then the attestor should perform step 2, else the pre-
sented certificate should not be signed. Section 5.5.5 will discuss the reasons that
are acceptable for a revocation of a certificate.
2) Check whether the current date and time of the presented certificate is within
the certificate’s validity period. If the current date and time is within the validity
period, the attestor should then perform step 3. Otherwise, the presented certificate
should not be signed.
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3) Compare the photos in the presented and old certificates. This can be done
by clicking to view the details of each certificate from the alert message. If the
photos in both certificates show some or a clear resemblance with each other, the
attestor is expected to meet the presenting party in person to verify that his physical
appearance is similar with the photos in both old and presented certificates before
signing the presented certificate and marking the old one as ”revoked”. If the photos
in both certificates are sufficiently different from each other, the attestor should
refuse to sign the presented certificate.
5.5.3.2 Authentication Process
Certificate authentication is the process of verifying that a particular person present-
ing a digital certificate is whom he or she claims to be. This process is also critical
to prevent identity-related threats. This is because even with a proper attestation
process, if the authentication fails, identity spoofing can still occur. Thus, in an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system, the following automated authentication checks
should be performed by the trading system’s application when a trader receives a
digital certificate from other trader for trading or other related activities.
A. The Automated Authentication Checks
Below are the checks that should be performed by the trading software during the
authentication process of a PGP digital certificate. A flowchart in Figure 5.13 illus-
trates the step-by-step checks. Traders are expected to take the necessary actions
based on the result of each check.
Step 1 - Check of the self signature of the certificate against the certifi-
cate’s public key.
This step is to ensure that the presenting party has not altered the contents of the
presented certificate like the certificate’s validity period or its owner’s photograph.
If the self signature checks out, the trading software will perform step 2. Otherwise,
it will display an alert message that the presented certificate is suspected to have
been compromised. Thus, the certificate should not be trusted.
Step 2 - Check of the validity period of the certificate, whether the current
date and time is within the validity period.
If the current date and time is within the validity period, the trading software will
proceed to step 3. Otherwise, it will display an alert message that the current
date and time of the presented certificate have been found to be outside its validity
period. The recipient is expected not to trust the presented certificate.
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Figure 5.13: A flowchart for the automated authentication checks
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Step 3 - Check of the presented certificate’s trading pseudonym against
its store of certificates to see whether there is an existing certificate with
the same trading pseudonym.
If a match is found, the trading software will perform step 4. Otherwise, it will
perform further checks on the presented certificate, which will be discussed in Section
5.5.3.2(B).
Step 4 - Check whether the presented certificate’s public key matches
with the public key of the existing certificate with the same trading
pseudonym.
This step is to determine whether the recipient has interacted with the same iden-
tity before. If yes, there should be a copy of the presented certificate in the local
certificate repository. Thus, if there is a match between the presented certificate’s
public key with the existing certificate’s public key, the trading software will proceed
to step 5 to further check the certificate. If not, it will display an alert message as
illustrated in Figure 5.14. In such a case, the recipient is expected to compare the
photos in both the presented and existing certificates by viewing the details of each
certificate.
Figure 5.14: An example alert screen for a certificate that has a similar trading
pseudonym with an existing certificate, but different public key
If the photos in both certificates are found to have some or a clear resemblance to
each other, the recipient should then meet the presenting party in person to verify
his physical appearance. If his physical appearance is sufficiently different from the
photos in both certificates, then there may be a genuine doubt whether they are the
same person. Thus, the recipient is expected not to trust the presented certificate
as there may have been an attempt by the presenting party to spoof the existing
party’s identity. If the physical appearance of that party is similar to the photos in
both certificates, then there is a possibility that they are the same person. Thus, in
this case, if the presenting party claims that the presented certificate is a renewed
version of the older one and the recipient may have not yet received that certificate
renewal notification, the recipient should then ask that party to prove knowledge of
the private key corresponding to the older certificate’s public key. Failure to do so
will cause the recipient to reject the presented certificate.
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If the photos in both certificates are found to be sufficiently different from each
other, then the recipient should not trust the presented certificate.
Step 5 - Check whether the existing certificate is recorded as ”suspected
compromised” in the local certificate repository.
If the certificate is found to be recorded as ”suspected compromised”, the trading
software will display an alert message that the presented certificate is suspected to
have been compromised and thus, it should no longer be trusted unless the recipient
has good reasons to the contrary.
Otherwise, the trading software will display the final result of the checks. The recip-
ient is expected to accept the presented certificate if the photos in both certificates
in the result screen show some or a clear resemblance to each other, as illustrated
in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15: An example result screen for successful authentication checks (similar
photo appearance)
However, the recipient needs to have a physical meeting with the sender to verify his
physical appearance before accepting the certificate. If the photos in both certificates
were of two different persons as illustrated in Figure 5.16, then the recipient should
not trust the presented certificate.
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Figure 5.16: An example result screen for successful authentication checks
(different photo appearance)
B. Further Authentication Checks on the Presented Certificate
The following checks as illustrated in a flowchart in Figure 5.17, will be performed
by the trading software when the result of step 3 in Figure 5.13 (page 97) found that
there is no existing certificate in the local certificate repository that has a similar
trading pseudonym as in the presented certificate.
Step 1 - Check the photo in the presented certificate against its store
of certificates to see if that appearance is used by a different trading
pseudonym.
If this check is successful, the trading software will perform step 2. Otherwise, it
will display an alert message as illustrated in Figure 5.6 (page 88). In such a case,
the recipient is expected to perform further checks on the presented certificate as
discussed in Scenario 1 in Section 5.5.3.1 (C).
Step 2 - Check whether the digital certificate of any third parties who
have signed the presented certificate are available in the local certificate
repository.
If one or more of the signatories’ certificates are available locally, the trading soft-
ware will then perform step 3 to further check those certificates. Otherwise it will
display an alert message as illustrated in Figure 5.18. In this case, as the presenting
party and the certificate’s signatories are parties that the recipient has never inter-
acted with before, the recipient is expected to checks with other traders about the
presenting party’s right to use the pseudonym and meet him in person to confirm
that his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the presented certificate,
before relying on that certificate.
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Figure 5.17: A flowchart for further authentication checks on the presented
certificate
Figure 5.18: An example alert screen when a copy of the presented certificate and
its signatories’ certificates are not available in the local certificate repository
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Step 3 - Check whether any of the signatories’ certificates is recorded as
”suspected compromised” in the local certificate repository.
If none of the signatories’ certificates is found to be recorded as ”suspected com-
promised”, the trading software will proceed to step 4. Otherwise, it will display
an alert message as illustrated in Figure 5.19. In this case, the recipient should be
wary about trusting the presented certificate. The recipient is also expected to check
around whether the party in question is known by his pseudonym and physically
meet with the sender before relying on that certificate.
Figure 5.19: An example alert screen for a certificate that one or more of its
signatories’ certificates is recorded as ”suspected compromised”
Step 4 - Check whether the signatories’ certificates are still within their
validity period during which the presented certificate is attested.
If one or more of the signatories’ certificates is found to have been expired during
the time the presented certificate is attested, the trading software will display an
alert message as in Figure 5.20. Thus, the recipient should exercise caution before
relying on the presented certificate.
Figure 5.20: An example alert screen for a certificate that one or more of its
signatories’ certificates is already expired during the time it is attested
Otherwise the trading software will display the final result of the checks as illustrated
in Figure 5.21. The recipient may trust the presented certificate if its signatories
are considered as trusted key signers. However, as they have never interacted with
each other before, the recipient should check with other traders about the owner’s
right to use the pseudonym and meet him in person to confirm that his physical
appearance is similar to the photo in the presented certificate, before relying on
that certificate to establish anything with regard to its owner’s identity.
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Figure 5.21: An example result screen for a certificate that its copy is not available
in the local certificate repository
5.5.4 Certificate Renewal
Certificates are normally created with a restricted lifetime: a start date/time and an
expiration date/time. Although an expired certificate doesn’t disprove the identity
of its presenter, it does raise doubts about the usefulness of the photo and about
whether the presenter has had difficulties finding trustable third parties to sign a
current certificate for that party. Thus, it is necessary for traders to renew their cer-
tificates before the existing one expires or the renewal grace period for the certificate
is over. To renew a certificate, a trader needs to perform the following steps:
1) First, generate a new self-signed certificate that binds their identity credentials
with a new public key.
2) Second, send a certificate renewal request message together with the newly gen-
erated certificate and their older certificate to any traders that they believe to be
trustworthy for certificate attestation.
3) Third, multicast a certificate renewal message that is signed by the new and old
private keys together with the newly generated certificate and the older certificate
to other traders in the trading system.
The receiving parties are then expected to update their local certificate repository
with the new certificate, if the checks done by the trading software show the following
results. They are also expected to forward the renewal message and its contents to
other traders at later occasions until the message’s liveness expires to ensure that
traders of the trading system are updated with that certificate renewal.
1) Signatures on the renewal message check out. If this check fails, the receiving
parties should not trust the new certificate.
2) The trading pseudonym is the same. If not, the new certificate should not be
trusted.
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3) The photos in both old and new certificates seem to be of the same person. If
the photos are sufficiently different, the receiving parties should not trust the new
certificate.
5.5.5 Certificate Revocation
Certificates are only useful while they are valid. It is unsafe to simply assume that
a certificate is valid forever as it might be compromised before its expiration date
arrives. A certificate that has been compromised needs to be revoked. Other reasons
why digital certificates may need to be revoked include the following:
• Attestor’s certificate is compromised.
• Identity credentials need to be updated. For example, to change an old pho-
tograph with a new photograph as the user may have put on a lot of weight.
• A trader has generated another key pair and prefers to use that key instead.
It might be longer and promise more security.
• A trader no longer wishes to be a member of a trading system and opt out to
exit the trading system forever in a clean way.
5.6 Security Analysis
This section analyzes the means by which the ill-intentioned parties in an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system can pose identity-related threats to subvert its security
by compromising the proposed identity support scheme. It also discusses on how
the verification steps in both attestation and authentication processes help traders
to detect and mitigate such threats.
5.6.1 Addressing Identity Spoofing
There are several ways that ill-intentioned parties can spoof other parties identities
using PGP certificates, which include the following:
5.6.1.1 Compromising The Attestation Process
With respect to the attestation process, there is always the risk that an ill-intentioned
trader misrepresents their identity credentials and tries to masquerade as someone
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else. An ill-intentioned trader might, for example;
1) Generate a new key pair and put the public key in a digital certificate using a
reputable party’s trading pseudonym and photograph, and then self-sign the digital
certificate with the corresponding private key. In this scenario, if the certificate
is sent as a new certificate and the attestor has a copy of that reputable party’
certificate in his local certificate repository, the check in step 3 in Figure 5.2 (page 86)
should be able to detect that the trading pseudonym in the presented certificate has
been used by an existing certificate with a different public key in the local certificate
repository. Thus, the trading software will alert the attestor that the certificate
should not be signed because its trading pseudonym has been used by another
party, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 (page 87). However, as the photo appearance in the
presented certificate has some resemblance to the photo in the existing certificate, the
presenting party might claim that he is renewing his older certificate but mistakenly
sent it as a new one. The attestor can test this claim by asking the presenting party
to go through a proper certificate renewal process where he has to send together
his old certificate in order for the new certificate to be signed. Failure to do so will
cause the certificate renewal request to be rejected.
If the attestor does not have a copy of the reputable party’s certificate in his local
certificate repository, the check in step 3 will be passed. The checks in steps 4 to 7
will also be passed if the ill-intentioned party does not have any other identity and
the certificate does not have any other signatories. However, the trading software will
alert the attestor to verify the validity of the presented certificate by checking with
other traders that the party in question is known by his pseudonym, and meeting
with the presenting party in person to confirm that his physical appearance is similar
to the photograph in the presented certificate. This should reduce the likelihood of
a successful attempt by the ill-intentioned party to masquerade as another party.
2) Generate a new key pair and put the public key in a digital certificate using a
reputable party’s trading pseudonym and his own photograph, and then self-sign
the digital certificate with the corresponding private key. In this scenario, if the
certificate is sent as a new certificate and the attestor has a copy of that reputable
party’ certificate locally, the check in step 3 in Figure 5.2 (page 86) will alert the
attestor that the trading pseudonym in the presented certificate has been used by
another party, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 (page 87). If the presenting party claims
that the older certificate is also his certificate and the alert screen shows that his
photo appearance in the presented certificate is sufficiently different from the photo
in the existing certificate, then there is a genuine doubt whether they are the same
person.
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If a copy of the certificate of the actual party who is known by that pseudonym is
not available in the attestor’s local certificate repository, the attestor may not detect
such an attempt. This is because all the checks in Figure 5.2 will be successful and
the physical meeting with the presenting party will also verify that he is the person
in the photo in the presented certificate. However, by checking with other traders
about the presenting party’s right to use the pseudonym should reduce the likelihood
of such an attempt to be successful.
3) Compromise another party’s private key and then generate a new certificate that
contains the target party’s trading pseudonym and his own photograph, and self-
sign the new certificate with the compromised private key. The certificate could be
passed off as an updated version of the old certificate. However, it is unlikely for
such an attempt to be successful because to update or renew a certificate would
require a trader to send together his old certificate with the new one to the attestor
for verification. If the trader fails to do so, such a request will not be processed by
the trading software.
However, if the trader managed to enclose together the old certificate, the checks
done by the trading software in Figure 5.9 (page 91) should enable the attestor to
detect such an attempt. This can be described in the following scenarios. It is
assumed that the attestor has a copy of the old certificate locally.
Scenario 1 - Consider the case where the old certificate in the attestor’s local
certificate repository is not recorded as ”suspected compromised”. This may be
due to the information about the compromised private key has not yet reached
the attestor or the target party does not even know that his private key has been
compromised. In such a case, the check in step 4 in Figure 5.9 will be passed.
However, if the validity period of that certificate is not within its renewal grace
period (for a certificate renewal request), the check in step 5 will be unsuccessful
and thus, the new certificate will not be signed. But, if this step is also successful due
to the validity period of the old certificate is within the renewal grace period, then
the final result that displays the photos in both the new and old certificates should
enable the attestor to compare whether they are the same person (Figures 5.11 and
5.12 - page 93). In this case, if the photos are sufficiently different from each other,
the presented certificate should not be signed.
Scenario 2 - Consider instead the case where the old certificate in the attestor’s local
certificate repository is recorded as ”suspected compromised”. The check in step 4
will alert the attestor that the old certificate is suspected to have been compromised
and thus, the presented certificate should not be signed. In addition to that, the
attestor can also compare the photos in both the presented and old certificates by
viewing the details of each certificate. If the photos are sufficiently different from
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each other, then it will be a ground for suspecting that the presenting party may be
attempting to spoof the target party’s identity.
If a copy of the old certificate is not available locally, the attestor is expected to
check with other traders about the presenting party’s right to use the pseudonym
and also have a physical meeting with him to verify his physical appearance. This
should reduce the likelihood of such an attempt to be successful.
5.6.1.2 Compromising The Authentication Process
With respect to the authentication process, there is the risk that although a trader
was correctly identified based on legitimate identity credentials, the digital certificate
used to link that trader to their identity credentials might be compromised, thereby
allowing an ill-intentioned party to successfully complete the authentication process
and steal that trader’s identity.
One way for an ill-intentioned party to compromise the authentication process is by
obtaining the target party’s private key. Once the ill-intentioned party has obtained
the private key, he can compromise the target party’s digital certificate by making
signatures using the compromised private key. The ill-intentioned party can, for
example;
1) Alter the identity credentials of the compromised digital certificate, for example,
substitute the real owner’s photograph with his own photograph and pose as the
compromised trader by presenting the compromised certificate to deceive others into
participating in a trading with him or sending other important information to him,
which could possibly cause great damage to the parties involved. In this case, such
an attempt should be detected by the trading software checks if a copy of the target
party’s certificate is available in the relying party’s local certificate repository and
the theft of the private key is known about. The trading software check in step
5 in Figure 5.13 (page 97) will alert the recipient that the presented certificate is
suspected to have been compromised and should no longer be trusted. If there is
no record about the theft of the private key, the result of the check will show the
photos of the certificate’s owner that are sufficiently different from one another, as
illustrated in Figure 5.16 (page 100). This should enable the recipient to detect that
they are not the same person.
If the target party’s certificate is not available locally and the presenting party does
not have any other identity or his other identity’s certificate is not available locally,
such an attempt may not be detected by the trading software checks. However, the
trading software will alert the relying party that he is interacting with an unknown
party and thus, further actions are expected, such as checking with other traders
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whether the subject is known by his pseudonym and meeting him in person to verify
his physical appearance. This should reduce the likelihood of a successful attempt.
2) Use the compromised private key and certificate to attest his associates’ false
identity. In this situation, the relying parties may mistakenly accept the false cer-
tificate, as it seems to be attested by a trusted key signer. However, if a copy of
the target party’s certificate is available locally, the presented certificate’s trading
pseudonym does not match with any existing certificate and the theft of the private
key is known about, the software check in step 3 in Figure 5.17 (page 101) will alert
the relying party that one of the certificates of the presented certificate’s signatories
is recorded as ”suspected compromised” and thus, the relying party should exercise
caution before relying on the presented certificate. If the theft of the private key is
not known about and all the signatories’ certificates are within their validity period,
the result of the authentication checks will alert the relying party that he is interact-
ing with an unknown party as illustrated in Figure 5.21 (page 103) and thus, further
actions are expected to verify the validity of the presented certificate by checking
around about its owner’s right to use the pseudonym and having a physical meeting
with him to confirm his physical appearance.
If a copy of the target party’s certificate is not available locally, and the presenting
party does not have any other identity or his other identity’s certificate is not avail-
able locally then the software checks in Figure 5.17 will be successful. In this case,
the trading software will alert the relying party that he has never interacted with
the presenting party and the certificate’s signatories before. Thus, the relying party
is expected to check with other traders about the presenting party’s right to use the
pseudonym and meeting with him in person. This should reduce the likelihood for
such an attempt by the presenting party to use a fake identity to be successful.
Another way for an ill-intentioned party to compromise the authentication process is
by colluding with his associates to attest his digital certificate that is generated using
another party’s identity credentials. However, such an attempt should be detected
if the relying parties take note on all the alerts given by the trading software in each
step in the authentication process. This can be described in the following scenarios:
1) The certificate is generated using another party’s trading pseudonym and photo-
graph and is self-signed using the ill-intentioned party’s private key. In this scenario,
if the recipient has a copy of the certificate of the actual party who is known by that
pseudonym in his local certificate repository, the check in step 4 in Figure 5.13 will
not be successful and the recipient is expected to perform further checks as discussed
in Section 5.5.3.2(A).
However, if a copy of the actual party’s certificate is not available locally, the check
in step 3 in Figure 5.13 will be passed. The check in step 1 in Figure 5.17 will also be
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passed if no photo of another identity in the local certificate repository is found to
be similar to the photo in the presented certificate. The check in step 2 in the same
figure will alert the recipient that he has never interacted with the presenting party
and the parties who have attested his certificate before, if none of those parties’
certificates is available in the local certificate repository. In this case, the recipient
is expected to verify the validity of the presented certificate by checking with other
traders about its owner’s right to use the pseudonym and having a physical meeting
with the presenting party to verify his physical appearance. This should enable the
recipient to detect the presenting party’s attempt to masquerade as another party.
If one or more of the signatories’ certificates are available locally, the check in step
2 in Figure 5.17 will be passed. The checks in steps 3 to 4 will also be passed
if those signatories’ certificates are not recorded as ”suspected compromised” and
within their validity period when the presented certificate was attested. However,
the system will alert the recipient that he has never interacted with the presenting
party before. Thus, the recipient would be expected to verify the validity of the
presented certificate by checking with other traders about its owner’s right to use
the pseudonym and meeting the presenting party in person to verify his physical
appearance. This should reduce the likelihood of a successful attempt by the ill-
intentioned party to spoof another party’s identity.
2) The certificate is generated using another party’s trading pseudonym and the ill-
intentioned party’s photograph, and is self-signed using the ill-intentioned party’s
private key. In this scenario, if a copy of the actual party who is known by that
pseudonym is available locally, the check in step 4 in Figure 5.13 will not be passed
and the trading software will alert the recipient to perform further checks, as illus-
trated in Figure 5.14 (page 98). When the recipient performs the further check by
comparing the photos in both certificates, he should be able to see that they are not
the same person.
If a copy of the actual party’s certificate is not available locally, the result would be
similar to what have been discussed in the first scenario.
3) The certificate is self-signed using a compromised private key and consists of the
target party’s trading pseudonym and the photograph of the ill-intentioned party. In
this scenario, if a copy of the target party’s certificate is available in the recipient’s
local certificate repository and the theft of the private key is known about, the
check in step 5 in Figure 5.13 will alert the recipient that the presented certificate
is suspected to have been compromised. Thus, the presented certificate should no
longer be trusted.
If the target party’s certificate is available locally but the the theft of the private key
is not known about, the result of this check will display the photos of the certificate’s
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owner that are sufficiently different from one another, as illustrated in Figure 5.16
(page 100). This should enable the recipient to detect that they are not the same
person.
If a copy of the target party’s certificate is not available locally, then the result
would be similar to what have been discussed in the first scenario.
5.6.2 Addressing Sybil Attacks
As traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are allowed to create their
own digital certificates, an ill-intentioned trader may take this opportunity to create
multiple identities by creating several self-signed digital certificates. The certificates
may consist of different trading pseudonyms and photographs of the user in different
disguises. The ill-intentioned trader may then request other traders or his associates
to vouch for the certificates’ validity.
5.6.2.1 Certificate Attestation by Traders
In this case, if the attestors have a copy of the certificates for the other identities lo-
cally and each of the certificates consists of a photograph that has some resemblance
to one another, the checks done by the trading software in step 4 in Figure 5.2 (page
86) will be able to detect the existence of several certificates that have similar photo
appearances. It will alert the attestor that the photo in the presented certificate is
found to have some resemblance to the photo of other identity in the local certificate
repository, as illustrated in Figure 5.6 (page 88), and thus further checks on that
certificate are required, as discussed in Scenario 1 in Section 5.5.3.1(C). If each of
the certificates consists of a photograph that is sufficiently different from one an-
other, then the checks in step 4 will be passed. The check in step 5 also be passed
if the certificate’s current date and time is within its validity period. However, the
result of the checks will alert the attestor to check with other traders about the
presenting party’s right to use the pseudonym and also meet him in person to verify
his physical appearance before signing the presented certificate. This should reduce
the likelihood of a successful attempt by the ill-intentioned party to get such an
unwarranted endorsement for the presented certificate.
If the attestors do not have a copy of the certificates for the other identities locally,
then all the checks in Figure 5.2 will be passed. However, the final result of the
checks as illustrated in Figure 5.7 (page 89), will alert the attestors to verify the
validity of the certificate by checking with other traders about its owner’s right to
use the pseudonym and having a physical meeting with him to check whether his
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physical appearance is similar to the photo in the certificate. This should reduce
the likelihood of such an attempt to be successful.
5.6.2.2 Certificate Attestation by Associates
On the other hand, if the attestors are the ill-intentioned party’s associates, then
they can attest all of the ill-intentioned party’s multiple identities successfully. In
this case, if the relying parties have a copy of the certificates for the other identities
locally and each of the certificates consists of a photograph that has some resem-
blance to one another, the trading software checks in step 1 in Figure 5.17 (page
101) will be able to detect such an attempt and alert the relying parties to take the
necessary actions, as discussed in this step. If each of the certificates consists of a
photograph that is sufficiently different from one another, then the check in step
1 will be passed. However, the check in step 2 will alert the relying parties that
they have never interacted with the presenting party and the third parties who have
signed the presented certificate before, if a copy of the certificate for the certificate’s
signatories is not available locally. Thus, the relying parties are expected to check
around that the party in question is known by his pseudonym and meet him in per-
son to verify that his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the certificate.
This should reduce the likelihood of a successful attempt by the presenting party to
have multiple identities. If one or more of the signatories’ certificates are available
locally, the checks in steps 3 to 4 will be passed if those signatories’ certificates
are not recorded as ”suspected compromised” and within their validity period when
the presented certificate was attested. However, the outcome of step 4 will alert
the relying parties that they have never interacted with the same identity before.
Thus, necessary actions are expected such as checking with other traders about the
presenting party’s right to use the pseudonym and having a physical meeting with
him to verify that his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the presented
certificate.
If the relying parties do not have a copy of the certificates for the other identities and
the certificate’s signatories locally, the result of step 2 will alert the relying parties to
verify the validity of the presented certificate by checking with other traders about
its owner’s right to use the pseudonym and having a physical meeting with him to
check whether his physical appearance is similar to the photo in the certificate.
5.6.3 Addressing Whitewashing
Similar to Sybil Attacks, as traders in an ad hoc m-commerce system are allowed
to create their own digital certificates, an ill-intentioned trader may take this op-
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portunity to hide his misbehaviour or poor reputation by generating a new digital
certificate that consists of a new trading pseudonym and photograph, and is self-
signed by a new private key. The ill-intentioned trader may then request other par-
ties or his associates to vouch for the validity of the new certificate. The discussion
on how the trading software checks in the attestation and authentication processes
help traders to detect such an attempt would be similar to what have been discussed
in Sections 5.6.2.1 and 5.6.2.2.
5.7 Discussion
This section discusses the things that a trader in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system should and should not do when dealing with PGP digital certificates. It also
discusses the responsibilities of a trader as an attestor or a relying party of a PGP
certificate, in order to mitigate the above identity-related threats.
5.7.1 Essential Recommendations When Dealing with Dig-
ital Certificates
When dealing with digital certificates, traders of an ad hoc m-commerce are expected
to do the following:
1) Update their PGP digital certificates periodically as its identity credentials may
no longer be valid after a certain period. For instance, a digital certificate may
contain an old photograph that does not resemble the current physical appearance of
its owner or the parties who have attested the certificate may no longer be members
of that particular trading system and so on.
2) Change the private/public keys on a regular schedule. This will limit the time
during which the keys are made available to the attackers, which will diminish the
opportunities for the attackers to compromise the keys.
3) Distribute a new public key and notification of a digital certificate revocation to
other peers in the trading system as rapidly as possible when a private key is com-
promised. If a trader ever learns or suspects his private key has been compromised,
he should contact all people that he has exchanged his PGP certificate or encrypted
messages, warn them of the compromise and instruct them to stop using his public
key.
4) If a digital certificate is revoked, include some information about the reason for
the certificate being revoked.
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5) Distribute a notification of a digital certificate renewal to other traders every time
he participates in a trading system around its renewal time so that they can acquire
a copy of the new certificate in their local certificate repository.
6) Keep the private key secure in a key store encrypted by a long memorable, hard
to guess key. It should not be stored on any machine that the traders do not have
physical control over.
5.7.2 Responsibilities as an Attestor
As attestation is a crucial stage in establishing online identity in an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system, traders should be aware of the following responsibilities
when they vouch for the validity of other traders’ digital certificates:
1) Properly and accurately identify the subjects and identity credentials in the
presented certificates, which include:
• Collect sufficient information as necessary, through trading software checks,
personal knowledge, advice from other trusted parties and a physical meeting
with the subject, to perform the validation needed to attest the certificates.
• Ensure that all identity credentials are accurate, based on current valid infor-
mation that is properly checked, for example, the photograph in the presented
certificate must be suitably like the physical appearance of the subject.
2) Do not sign another party’s certificate using the private key of a certificate that
is already expired, or is suspected or known to have been compromised, or has been
revoked.
3) Do not attest certificates that lack clear photographs of the whole face of their
subject.
4) Check with other traders about the subject’s right to use the trading pseudonym
and meet the subject in person to verify the validity of a certificate before signing
it, although the checks on their certificates by the trading software did not find any
suspicious elements.
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, as its traders are usually peers with similar
role, no authority higher than a peer can be expected to monitor or control any of its
security services, and no party’s presence can be guaranteed in any of its live trading
context, it is unlikely that any peer would be specially trusted by all other peers to
monitor the behaviour of other parties in attesting the validity of a PGP certificate.
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Anyone who trust a party as an attestor, will consider any credentials signed by that
attestor to be valid to the extend of that trust. The trading software check in Step
2 in Figure 5.17 (page 101) will alert the relying parties to perform the necessary
actions if the signer of the certificate is an unknown or untrusted party. Multiple
signatories on a certificate will lessen the risk that any one certificate signatory is
unknown or untrusted as an attestor. Any attempts by the ill-intentioned parties
to compromise the certificate attestation process will expose them to the risk of
being excluded from the trading system membership if the information about their
misbehaviour are circulated among other traders.
5.7.3 Responsibilities as a Relying Party
Similar to attestation, authentication is also vital in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system in order to prevent an ill-intentioned party from misrepresenting themselves
as a legitimate party. Thus, as a relying party of a PGP digital certificate, traders
should be aware of the following responsibilities when dealing with unknown parties
in the trading system, in order to ensure that they are dealing with the right party.
1) Properly authenticate the trading pseudonym, photograph and also private key
in the presented certificate before relying on it, by performing the trading software
checks in the authentication process, as well as other further checks as advised in
the trading software alert message.
2) Take into account all advice in alert messages from the trading software checks
such as to check with other traders about the subject’s right to use the trading
pseudonym and meet the subject in person, particularly in situations where the
traders have never interacted with the subject before.
3) Do not accept certificates that have indistinct photographs.
4) Do not accept a certificate if none of its signatories are regarded as a trusted key
signer, although the checks done by the trading software on their certificates did not
find any suspicious elements.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter introduces a novel form of support for identity establishment in an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system, based on a PGP web of trust model. The scheme
allows traders of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system to establish their online
identity in a fully self-organizing manner using a trading pseudonym and a photo-
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graph as identity credentials in a PGP certificate. The use of a trading pseudonym
and a photograph as a trader’s identity credentials, and a P2P attestation in this
scheme are offered as an appropriate way to deal with identity establishment in such
a dynamic ad hoc trading community, in the absence of a CA.
This chapter also analyzes the means by which the scheme can be compromised by ill-
intentioned parties. Thus, in order to mitigate identity-related threats, the validity
of a trader’s PGP certificate is verified in two verification processes; attestation and
authentication. Trading software checks in both processes, as discussed in Section
5.5.3.1 and 5.5.3.2, should enable the traders to detect if there is any attempt by
ill-intentioned parties to misrepresent their identity credentials, or be alerted that
further checks are required in order to verify the validity of the presented certificate
before it can be accepted. In addition to the trading software and further checks
in both verification processes, traders should also be aware of their responsibilities
when dealing with PGP certificates, either as the signer of the certificates or the
relying parties of such certificates.
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Chapter 6
A Fully Distributed Reputation
System for Ad Hoc M-Commerce
6.1 Introduction
Trust development among traders in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system is vital
to mitigate uncertainty and risks involved in transactions. It helps traders decide
whether to trade with potential trading partners as well as to gauge the degree of
confidence that they should give these parties. One way to facilitate such trust is
through use of a reputation system. A reputation system enables traders to share
their trading experience such as their recent trading histories with other members
of the trading system in order to provide evidence of their good faith.
However, designing a reliable reputation system for ad hoc m-commerce trading
systems is challenging as traders cannot be expected to spend lengthy periods of
time to obtain their potential trading counterparties’ reputation reports. Casual
online trading is likely to take place over fairly short periods and not on an extended
basis due to unpredictable network connectivity and irregular participation by its
members. Traders in this type of online trading will sometimes have to make rapid
decisions whether to trade or not with a potential trading counterparty. Delays
in making such decisions due to having insufficient reputation information might
cause a trader to lose a rare opportunity to trade for a valuable resource or item as
he might not be offered the same chance again in the foreseeable future. Another
important issue is that ill-intentioned traders might try to subvert the reputation
system by compromising the reliability of its reputation reports.
Thus, to be effective in assisting traders make fast and reasonably founded trust
decisions, a reputation system for ad hoc m-commerce trading systems must provide
high availability and efficient retrieval of relevant reputation information as well as
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be robust against the sort of attacks that could compromise the reliability of this
information.
This chapter starts by discussing the concept of trust in online trading and considers
how reputation information helps online traders to establish trust among themselves
in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses three key issues in designing a reputation system
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, namely reputation information storage,
integrity maintenance and reliability assurance. Section 6.4 analyses significant re-
lated work. Section 6.5 presents the design of a distributed reputation system for
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system that addresses the three key design issues.
Section 6.6 presents a security analysis of the proposed reputation system. Several
recommendations on things that a trader should do when dealing with reputation
information are discussed in Section 6.7 and finally, Section 6.8 concludes this chap-
ter.
6.2 Trust Establishment
To be a viable means to conduct online trading, ad hoc m-commerce must mitigate
uncertainty and risks in its transactions. Parkhe in [120], describes uncertainty in
online transactions as uncertainty about future transactions and about potential
trading partners’ behaviour in fulfilling their transaction agreements. These uncer-
tainties create a perception of significant risk that might discourage traders from
trading. A trust relationship established between two traders lets them believe that
their counterpart is a sufficiently reliable and honest party to trade with and that
the downside risks are low enough for them to undertake them.
Thus, this section defines the concept of trust from the perspective of online trading
and discusses how reputation information helps facilitate trust development among
traders.
6.2.1 Trust
Various views on trust [120],[84],[105],[27],[40],[91] have been offered in numerous
papers in the literature. In this thesis, trust will be taken to be evidentially founded
belief that one party has about another with respect to their reliability and honesty
in carrying out cooperative actions where there are significant risks of loss to the
first party. This definition emphasizes three aspects of trust in the context of a
transaction namely belief, evidence and associated risks.
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A trust relationship is established between two traders when both parties have a
belief supported by appropriate evidence that the other party is a reliable and honest
party to trade with. Such trust enables the parties to view the downside risks in
transactions such as being cheated through non-payment, the traded items not being
as described and so on, as acceptable. A reliable trader is a party that can be
depended upon to carry out a transaction in an expected way. An honest trader is a
party that is truthful in his representations, e.g. does not deceive or give misleading
information.
The supporting evidence could include testimonials of a trader’s trustworthiness,
history of evaluated trades, digital certificates attesting identity and so on. A trans-
action that is potentially risky becomes acceptable if supporting evidence is sufficient
for a trader to believe that his trading counterpart is a reliable and honest trader
and the likelihood and impact of downside losses are low enough for that trader to
expose himself to those risks.
Risk in a transaction depends on several factors such as the value at stake in a
transaction, opportunity costs of the transaction and so on. A transaction can be
considered as risky if engaging in it makes traders vulnerable to significant loss,
which can be in terms of the following:
The item being traded - Loss can be incurred if a trader does not get what he
has paid for or has received items or money in exchange for goods that are found to
be less than promised or not as described in the trading agreement.
Trading opportunities - A trader may lose opportunities to trade with other
traders on better terms if his trading counterpart, who has agreed to trade with him
withdraws from their deal or forces inferior terms on the deal under the threat of
withdrawal.
Reputation - Loss of reputation is another way of incurring loss. Engaging in
a transaction with an ill-intentioned trader who then provides an unfair negative
evaluation after their transaction, could negatively affect a trader’s good reputation.
Time and effort - Loss can also be incurred if one party does not turn up after
making an agreement to meet up at a certain place to do the exchange. In this case,
the significant loss is in terms of the time and effort to get to that place.
6.2.2 Reputation
Reputation is correlated with trust [85]. Trading reputation can be defined as a
perception about the trading behaviour of a party based on their past trading be-
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haviour, which is derived from personal experience with that party or based on
recommendations from other parties in a community [174]. A party’s good trading
reputation would be built up through its honest, reliable and agreeable behaviour
in previous trades. Thus, acquisition of a good reputation can be used as an incen-
tive for the parties to be more trustworthy, because parties that do not behave in a
trustworthy way will lose reputation and thus will be less likely to be accepted as
partners in future interactions or will only tend to be offered less generous terms of
trade.
In online trading, reputation reports to some degree reflect the trustworthiness of a
trader. They can be a useful reference in assisting traders making trust decisions.
Positive experience with a particular trader can help ease other traders’ perceptions
of risk and uncertainty when transacting with that same trader. Studies [1],[134]
show that a reputation system helps to reduce transaction risks by providing a means
for traders to develop trust relationships among themselves based upon their past
trading history. It is likely that other traders’ trust will increase significantly when a
trader is perceived to have a good reputation. This motivates traders to act honestly
in each of their transactions to maintain a sufficient reputation to remain active in
that marketplace. Furthermore, reputations can encourage traders to maintain a
persistent identity to continue to benefit from having established a good reputation.
Thus, supporting and exploiting usage of reputation can be an effective way to
encourage cooperation and honesty in ad hoc m-commerce transactions. In addition
to that, since a good reputation is valuable, it can be an incentive for traders to
maintain the same trading identity and build up and sustain its good reputation.
6.3 Design Issues
In order to enable traders to share trading experience among them, an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system requires a reputation system with high availability,
efficient retrieval and reliable reputation information. However, due to the nature of
an ad hoc wireless network and the characteristics of ad hoc m-commerce, to design
such a reputation system raises the following issues:
6.3.1 Storage of the Reputation Information
Reputation information needs to be stored and managed in a reliable way to ensure
that it is readily accessible and made available upon request. Thus, an important
factor to consider when designing a reputation system is to determine where to store
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the reputation information, so that it can be retrieved efficiently and be available
when required. In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, because it lacks a network
service infrastructure, is self-organized and has no centralized authority to manage a
trader’s reputation reports, its reputation system has to be fully distributed. One of
the challenges of a distributed reputation system in such a dynamic trading system
is to determine the most appropriate location to store reputation reports.
One approach is to store a trader’s reputation reports with his trading counterparties
who have evaluated their trades with him or created testimonials recommending him.
However, this approach requires a trader who is considering transacting with another
trader to send reputation requests to as many potential recommenders as possible
to elicit such reputation reports. This might generate unacceptable communication
delays and could overburden other traders. In addition to that, due to dynamic
participation in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, those third parties may also
be unreachable or no longer active in the trading system at the time the reputation
reports are required. It also cannot be expected that all traders in the trading
system will be willing to use up their mobile device’s storage to store other parties’
information.
A second approach would be to store all reputation information in a trusted shared
store that is always accessible and access it on demand. However, this approach is
infeasible in ad hoc networked communities. These communities have no computing
components that are omnipresent to host such a store. Nor does it seem viable that
such a store could be established in some distributed way across whatever nodes of
the community happen to be connected by ad hoc networking at the moment.
A third approach is called a self-maintaining approach where traders store their own
reputation reports locally. This approach minimizes communication overhead and
delay as it does not require any reputation request to be sent to any other third
parties and the requested party does not need to wait for recommendations from
others. It will also make the retrieval of reputation information more efficient as it is
stored locally and can be provided anytime by its owner when requested by others.
Furthermore, it makes it possible for traders to get a detailed view of his potential
trading counterparty’s trading history.
6.3.2 Integrity of the Reputation Information
The integrity of reputation information is an important element that is directly con-
nected with the reliability of a reputation system. In an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system, there are several ways in which ill-intentioned parties can try to compromise
the integrity of reputation information. One of the most obvious ways would be to
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intercept or alter other parties’ reputation information during its transmission over
an insecure ad hoc wireless network. Another possible way is to alter their own
reputation information while it is being stored on their mobile device. Thus, trans-
mitting and storing such information should be done in a secure manner in order to
ensure its integrity.
6.3.3 Reliability of the Reputation Information
The usefulness of a reputation system depends critically on the reliability of its rep-
utation information. Unreliable reputation information will expose traders to the
risk of significant loss if it incorrectly supports a good reputation for a dishonest
trader. In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, ill-intentioned traders might try
to compromise the reliability of such reputation information by providing unfair
deal evaluations (overstating or slandering) or by colluding with their accomplices,
either to increase their own reputation (hyping) or harm other parties’ good reputa-
tion (bad mouthing). Another way an ill-intentioned trader can try to manipulate
reputation information is by creating and using multiple identities (Sybil Attack) to
create many bogus deal evaluations. For example, a trader creates multiple trading
pseudonyms and corresponding credentials to enable him to create bogus transac-
tions with those identities. He then uses those identities to provide good evaluations
for each of the transactions that he has created, so that his own reputation will ap-
parently be increased.
Thus, to ensure traders obtain reliable reputation information, a reputation sys-
tem for an ad hoc m-commerce needs to be robust against Sybil Attacks and
misbehaviour-related threats such as unfair deal evaluations and collusions.
6.4 Related work
The emergence of online trading communities has changed many aspects of con-
ducting business and demands corresponding means for trust development among
participating parties in such a community to minimize transaction risks. A con-
siderable amount of research has been conducted into this issue and a number of
solutions have been proposed in the literature [172],[86],[8],[51],[176],[104].
Xiong and Liu in [172] have proposed a dynamic trust model for P2P e-commerce
communities using a transaction-based feedback system where a trader’s trustworthi-
ness is measured based on five factors, namely satisfaction, number of transactions,
credibility of feedback, transaction context and community context. It is a fully de-
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centralized system that uses an overlay for supporting trust propagation and a public
key infrastructure for securing remote trust scores. This proposal is among the most
credible yet for supporting decentralized support for P2P online transactions that
require trust judgements. However, the assumption made in the proposal that net-
work connectivity is always available for traders to obtain reputation information
seems to be unlikely to be fulfilled in ad hoc m-commerce trading communities. This
proposal also assumes that a reputable party will provide accurate deal appraisals,
which may not always happen.
Jurca and Faltings in [86] have proposed an incentive-compatible mechanism using
a side-payment scheme to encourage agents to report reputation information ac-
curately. The side-payment scheme is organized through a set of agents that act
as brokers to buy and sell reputation information. These broker agents are called
R-agents. Agents can buy another agent’s reputation information from an R-agent
at a certain cost F1 and then sell reputation information to the same R-agent at
another cost F2. The integrity of reputation information and its binding to its owner
is protected using a cryptography mechanism. However, this approach is vulnerable
to collusions even when only two agents are involved. Any agent can collude with
an R-agent to provide fake reputation information to other agents. Furthermore, it
is not useful for trading parties in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems to store their
reputation information with a third party as the availability of such reputation in-
formation cannot be guaranteed every time it is required. This is because the party
who stores the reputation information may not be participating in the trading sys-
tem during the transaction period or may no longer be an active participant. It will
take unpredictable periods of time for the requestor of the reputation information
to get in contact with that party.
Another approach by Aberer and Despotovic [8] is based on a binary valued concept
of trust, where an agent can only be trustworthy or not. In their approach, only
information on dishonest transactions is used to evaluate the trustworthiness of each
agent. If an agent discovers that its counterpart is dishonest in their transaction,
that agent can forward a complaint about its counterpart’s misbehaviour to other
agents. To store the complaints in a P2P network, a decentralized storage method,
called a P-Grid is used. To evaluate the trustworthiness of a particular agent, an
agent will search the leaf level of the P-Grid for complaints on that agent. The main
interest in this approach is that it does not require any centralised infrastructure for
agents to assess the trustworthiness of other agents as well as to store complaints on
each agent’s misconduct. However, the use of complaints as the only relevant data
to assess trustworthiness is not an adequate way of evaluating an agents reputation.
The absence of complaints is not positive evidence of an established reputation. Only
a reasonable number of recently conducted mutually satisfactory trades is evidence
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of that. In addition to that, in Aberer and Despotovics approach, no consideration is
made of the possibility of an agent making an inaccurate complaint. It is important
to consider this issue to ensure that there is little likelihood of a malicious agent
undermining the purpose of the reputation system by compromising the reliability
of a complaint.
6.5 Design
This section presents the design of a distributed reputation system that aims at
providing an effective way to facilitate trust development among traders in an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system by addressing the three key design issues discussed
in Section 6.3, namely reputation information storage, integrity maintenance and
reliability assurance. To enable efficient retrieval as well as a high availability of
reputation information, it is proposed that the reputation system for ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems let traders maintain their own reputation information
locally and share their knowledge about other traders’ trading behavior in a totally
P2P manner without having to rely on network services that are always available.
It is also proposed that a sanction-backed mechanism be employed to encourage
traders to provide truthful reputation reports in order to ensure the reliability of
such information.
6.5.1 Reputation Information
In many existing reputation systems, traders build their reputation by means of deal
evaluations which are provided after the completion of each transaction that they
participate in. Positive evaluations can be used as proof that a trader has engaged
in transactions before in a proper manner whereas negative evaluations are evidence
that a trader has misbehaved or at least failed to satisfy in his previous transaction
agreements. To help traders make sensible trust decisions, the proposed reputation
system for ad hoc m-commerce uses both positive and negative evaluations.
However, the use of deal evaluations as the only relevant reputation information
to evaluate a trader’s trustworthiness will make it difficult for new members in a
particular trading system to begin participating in transactions. They will struggle
to get started as they can only build a reputation after they have participated in
several transactions. A testimonial recommending that a trader is worth dealing
with from a respected member of the forum could help them get started. Testimo-
nials provide a secondary method for a trader’s good faith and professionalism to
be supported. Their worth depends on trusting the judgement of their provider and
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their provider’s own reputation is a good basis for deciding on that.
6.5.1.1 Deal Evaluation
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, traders are expected to generate a deal
evaluation of their counterparty’s trading conduct after the completion of each trans-
action, digitally sign it and then send it to their trading counterparties. This will
enable the traders to store reputation information about their trading conduct on
their mobile device, which will make such information readily accessible when it is
required in their future transactions. A deal evaluation that is signed by its sender’s
digital signature before it is sent to its recipient will ensure that no other third
party can alter it during transmission without the knowledge of both its sender and
receiver. Any attempts by the recipient to modify it when it is stored on his mobile
device will also be detectable. Thus its authenticity and integrity can be guaranteed.
To prevent both parties from repudiating offers or bargain struck between them, the
deal evaluation will also contain a transaction contract that is digitally signed by
them [118] as a proof that they have agreed to engage in the transaction.
There are many ways in which traders can evaluate their trading counterpart’s
behavior in satisfying their trade.
1. A rather simple one would use a one dimensional evaluation parameter where
1 is used to indicate a good transaction, -1 to indicate a bad transaction and
0 to indicate neutral, as is used in eBay’s reputation system. This approach,
although simple to understand, is too unspecific and does not allow traders to
clearly specify the variations in the quality of the items being traded or the
quality of the behaviour of a trader in fulfilling their transaction agreement.
A reputation system with such a common or subjective evaluation parameter
would blur pertinent detail into a rating that merely gives an overall impres-
sion, which could subsequently lead to illfounded trust decisions.
2. A second approach adopted by some existing reputation systems evaluates
trades by means of a rating using a single numerical value. For example, trader
A gives a value 0.9 to trader B for satisfying their transaction agreement on
a scale of 0 (bad) to 1 (good). However, single numerical measures like this
misleadingly suggest that one dimension of valuation sums up all the key
qualities at stake to quite a fine degree of precision.
3. A third approach is to use a scheme that differentiates out different quality
aspects based on several parameters such as:
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• Honesty in describing what is traded - This expresses a trader’s
satisfaction as to the quality of the traded items being as described.
• Conformity to agreement - This expresses a trader’s satisfaction with
how well the other party has fulfilled the transaction agreement, e.g.
made payment or delivered the traded items as agreed.
• Manner of dealing - This expresses a trader’s satisfaction with how
well the other party behaved in doing the deal. Did they act in good
faith or did they try to take unfair advantage or cheat.
To express the amount of satisfaction for each parameter, a 4-category grading
scheme as shown in Table 6.1 might be used to signify fully satisfied, satisfied,
unsatisfied or wholly unsatisfied. Traders can also qualify their satisfaction by
leaving short textual comments.
Rating Honesty Contractual Manner
Compliance
Fully Traded items Fulfilled their Behaved well
Satisfied exactly as described end exactly
Satisfied Traded items A bit late or not Grudging but
roughly as described quite as agreed roughly acceptable
Unsatisfied Traded items Late payment Tried to take
barely as described or delivery unfair advantage or
failed to deal fairly
Wholly Traded items Non-payment or Cheated or
Unsatisfied not at all non-delivery tried to cheat
as described
Table 6.1: Possible grading scheme in a deal evaluation
Consider for example, a scenario where trader A has bought a second hand bike
from trader B in a selling or buying items trading forum. Trader B describes
the bike as new and never been used but when trader A goes to collect the
bike and pay for it, it is not exactly as described but is still in an acceptable
condition. After the trade is completed, trader A might give the following
evaluation to trader B, as shown in Table 6.2.
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Trader: SmartJane
Item Traded: Bicycle
Date: 19 September 2013
Honesty Contractual Manner Comments
Compliance
Satisfied Fully Fully Not brand new but in good
Satisfied Satisfied condition and barely used
Table 6.2: Example of a deal evaluation
To aggregate such evaluations data, a simple summation scheme might be used
by a trading software to total up the number of reliable ratings received by a
trader for each parameter. For example, a trader with 10 recent transactions
in the past 6 months might have the following deal evaluations summary as
depicted in Table 6.3.
Deal Evaluation Summary: Last 6 months
Total Transactions: 10
Rating Honesty Contractual Manner
Compliance
Fully Satisfied 5 2 0
Satisfied 3 6 8
Unsatisfied 2 1 2
Wholly Unsatisfied 0 1 0
Table 6.3: Example of a deal evaluation summary
The third approach seems to be more suitable for an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system as it enables the evaluation given by different parties to be comparable
using several categories of degree as well as being simple for traders to understand
and make fast trust decisions. Flea market traders using an ad hoc m-commerce
application for low value trading might not be keen to use a more complex evaluation
scheme as it might require them to spend a lengthy period of time in order to
understand how it functions. If the traders fail to understand properly how the
evaluation scheme works, there is a possibility that they might unintentionally give
inappropriate or inaccurate evaluations to their trading partners. In addition to that,
a reputation system with complex evaluation parameters would require participants
to spend substantial amounts of time grading deals on all these parameters. Busy
traders with no big ticket risks might be tempted to skip doing this thoroughly which
could lead to incomplete or illconsidered evaluations that undermined its value.
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However, as this thesis only focuses on addressing three key design issues as dis-
cussed in Section 6.3, the suggested scheme for evaluating deals is not presented
as preferable to use over any other scheme of evaluation. The key point is that
whatever scheme is used to evaluate deals, it should clearly distinguish good from
bad evaluations to suitable degrees so that software can summarize such data in a
readily understood form. It should also suit the type of trading involved so that
capturing deal evaluations after every trade or attempted trade is realistic to expect
will happen.
Ad hoc m-commerce trading forums might be expected to design their own deal
evaluation templates to suit the stakes involved in trading, the manner in which
exchanges take place and the norms of acceptable conduct in such trading.
6.5.1.2 Testimonials
One way for traders to share their expressions of trust about a particular trader’s
honesty in performing transactions is by providing tradeworthiness recommenda-
tions in the form of a testimonial. Testimonials from respected and well known rep-
utable traders can be an effective means for new comers in an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system to build trust with future trading partners, which will then help
them to get started and quickly participate actively in the trading system’s activi-
ties. Recommendations of this kind would also help established traders be accepted
as reputable in addition to favorable evaluations of their past deals. Testimonials
have value as well in helping traders who have been unsatisfactorily evaluated in a
few deals to have these evaluations put in a wider perspective of relevant evidence.
One approach to capture such tradeworthiness recommendations in an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system is to use the testimonial template as shown in Figure 6.1.
Its structure helps elicit key aspects and makes comparisons easier to make. An
alternative would be to use unstructured text of a certain maximum size. Either
might be employed, or an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum might design their
own testimonial template to reflect the norms and forms of the style of trading
accomplished within.
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Figure 6.1: Testimonial template
To ensure that a testimonial is authentic and not a fake recommendation by an
ill-intentioned party, it needs to be digitally signed by its sender before it is sent to
its recipient.
6.5.2 Reputation Information Storage
As discussed in Section 6.3.1, the most appropriate and reliable way to store and
manage reputation information in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system is to allow
traders to maintain their own reputation information in their mobile device local
repository. The benefits of allowing traders to store their own reputation information
locally are;
• The retrieval of such information will be more efficient as it can be accessed
immediately by its owner when requested by others without having to rely on
any third parties to supply it. This reduces communication overheads among
traders.
• It addresses the availability issue for much of the reputation information. If
such information is stored on any other third party’s mobile device, it might
not be available when it is required because that third party may not be
available or no longer participate in the trading system.
• It simplifies the storage issue in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and
also reduces each trader’s storage overheads.
However, if traders store their own reputation information locally, two issues need
to be addressed. The first issue is the integrity of the reputation information as
ill-intentioned traders might attempt to alter it while it is in their local repository
in order to increase their reputation dishonestly. The other issue is that traders may
refuse to supply or fail even to store negative evaluations about themselves.
For the first issue, it will be difficult for the ill-intentioned traders to tamper with
the reputation information in their local repository without being detected by other
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traders who receive their reputation reports. This is because these reports will be
signed and so long as a checker has access to the public key in the signer’s public key
certificate, the checker will be able to detect any changes made to the document after
it is signed and thus its authenticity and integrity will be guaranteed. It will also
ensure that the evaluator cannot credibly deny having made that deal evaluation or
testimonial.
To guard against traders discarding or withholding poor evaluations of their trades,
traders are expected to multicast markedly poor evaluations of trades within the
trading community. Recipients would be expected to store such data but could
condense or expire it as it ages or threatens to exceed allocated storage space.
It is also recommended that trading software implementing this approach provide
no software supported means for users to discard or filter out unwanted recent
evaluations of their dealing behaviour when sharing evaluation data. This would
make it difficult for all but the most technically sophisticated to selectively edit the
presentation of their trading history.
6.5.3 Sanction-backed Mechanism
A sanction-backed mechanism is potentially useful in handling misbehaviour among
traders. One example type of misbehaviour in online trading is where a buyer pays
the seller for an item but the seller does not transfer the traded item at all to the
buyer, or transfers an item to the buyer that is not as described or promised in
their deal agreement or has undisclosed quality deficiencies. In this case, if the
seller is not sanctioned after receiving a series of poor deal evaluations from his
trading counterparts due to his misbehaviour in several transactions, then he has
no incentive beyond a poor reputation to behave properly and honestly in all of his
transactions. This will subsequently affect other traders’ confidence to participate
in such trading system as there could be perceived to be insufficient disincentive to
constrain traders from misbehaving or cheating in their transactions. Thus, it can
be useful to employ a sanction mechanism in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
as an inducement to encourage traders to behave in a proper manner and comply
with the rules and regulations of the trading system, especially when participating
in a deal, or providing deal evaluations or testimonials to other traders, or attesting
other traders’ credentials. A sanction-backed mechanism can also be an effective
way to restrict an ad hoc m-commerce trading system’s membership to only parties
that are regarded as reasonably trustworthy by other participating parties.
Without a centralized authority and established network infrastructure, it can be a
challenging task to administer sanctions in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system.
The mechanism needs to be distributed and controlled by the traders themselves
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in a fully P2P manner. This thesis advocates using exclusion from membership
of a trading forum to sanction traders that misbehave or have a series of poor
deal evaluations. This mechanism enables any trader who has evidence about a
particular trader’s misbehavior to multicast a proposal to exclude that trader from
a trading forum’s membership to other traders in the trading forum. The exclusion
proposal will consist of the target party’s trading pseudonym, brief reasons for the
exclusion, relevant evidence and also the digital signature of the party who makes
the proposal [118]. To reduce the risk of traders being unfairly excluded from a
particular trading forum’s membership, traders are expected to verify the identity
of the sender of the proposal exclusion is whom he claims to be by checking his PGP
certificate through the certificate authentication process and check his credibility,
whether poor evaluation reports have been broadcast about him or whether he
himself is the subject of an exclusion proposal. As the decision for the exclusion will
be based on collective decision making by any sufficiently large number of current
forum members, depending on each trading forum’s exclusion policy [118], traders
with views on the proposal will have the opportunity to give their vote. If they
do not regard the sender of the exclusion proposal as a credible party, they can
vote their disapproval. Having a vote based exclusion policy helps diminish the
possibility of unfair exclusions due to collusion among ill-intentioned traders as they
would need to have a substantial number of associates in order to obtain a quorate
decision for the exclusion. The sender’s digital signature on the exclusion proposal
will ensure that he is accountable for any exclusion proposal that he has made. Any
unfair exclusion proposal can be used as an evidence for other traders to exclude
him in turn from a trading forum’s membership for his misbehavior. More details
about the exclusion mechanism will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Thus, a trader who makes a habit of providing unfair negative evaluations or collud-
ing with accomplices to harm other traders’ reputations or unfairly tries to exclude
them, will also be open to the risk of being excluded from membership of a trading
forum if other traders receive poor reputation reports and an exclusion proposal
from one of his unsatisfied trading counterparties. As mentioned in Section 6.5.1.2
above, testimonials from respected reputable traders in the trading forum can be
valuable evidence to rebut a trader’s poor evaluation report if they can be obtained.
The sanction mechanism will be a significant incentive for traders to desist from
behavior that creates negative evidence that other traders can use as a basis for
excluding them from a trading forum’s membership. The proposed identity support
scheme as discussed in Chapter 5 will also make it difficult for them to reenter with
a whitewashed new identity once they are excluded.
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6.6 Security Analysis
Misbehaviour by ill-intentioned traders is a major threat to the effective operation
of an online trading system. The existence of such traders may subvert the relia-
bility of a reputation system and the functionality of a trading system, which will
subsequently cause loss of trust among traders if the system fails to detect them in
a timely way and constrain their misbehaviour effectively. Generally, ill-intentioned
traders can do such damage by working alone or in coalitions, such as by behaving
dishonestly in their transactions or manipulating reputation information through
collusion with associates or multiple identities in order to gain personal benefits,
and so on.
Thus, this section examines the means by which the ill-intentioned parties in an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system can pose threats to compromise the reliability of
its reputation system and discusses how the proposed design of a reputation system
can detect and mitigate such threats to a sufficient degree.
6.6.1 Mitigating Poor Trading Behaviour
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, traders can act dishonestly in their trans-
actions in many ways, which include the following:
• Provide misleading information to their trading partners about the items to
be traded in terms of their price, quality, originality, condition and so on. For
instance, a seller can advertise a used computer as a brand new one, or a fake
designer watch as a genuine one.
• Deceive in their transactions. For instance, a seller does not provide the item
that has been traded to the buyer or a buyer does not pay the seller for the
item that has been traded between them and so on.
To mitigate such poor trading behaviour in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system,
traders are encouraged to multicast negative evaluations about a particular dishon-
est trader to the whole community of the trading system. By sharing such negative
trading experience with other members of the trading system, the opportunities for
the dishonest trader to participate in future transactions, especially the profitable
ones are likely to be reduced. This is because when negative information about a
trader is spread over the whole community, the other members who receive such
information may refuse to deal with that trader to avoid from being exposed to
significant risks of loss. Negative evaluations that a trader receives, even from a
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single transaction are likely to damage that trader’s reputation, which will signifi-
cantly diminish the other traders’ confidence and trust to engage in a deal with that
trader. Thus, the sharing of negative trading experience among members of a trad-
ing system helps to motivate traders to behave and fulfill each of their transactions
honestly as the gain that they obtained from their misbehaviour might be smaller
if compared to their future losses due to their poor trading history.
In addition to the sharing of negative trading experience among traders, a trader
that receives a series of negative evaluations from his trading counterparts is open
to the risk of being excluded from membership of the trading system. An exclusion
mechanism is used as a means to encourage cooperative behaviour among traders
in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system by inflicting indirect punishment on the
users who cheat or misbehave. Such a mechanism can assist in the establishment
of trust among traders in such an ad hoc trading community by excluding traders
that misbehave or have a history of poorly evaluated trading deals.
However, the sharing of negative evaluations among traders might create another
risk for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. An ill-intentioned trader might
provide unfair negative evaluations about an honest trader with the intention of
damaging that trader’s reputation, through either slandering or badmouthing. The
issues of slandering or badmouthing in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are
addressed using testimonials and an exclusion mechanism. As discussed in Section
6.5.1.2, testimonials from trusted and well known reputable traders in the trading
community can be used as relevant evidence to support a trader’s explanation to
other members that he has been evaluated unfairly by his trading counterpart(s).
Another way to address the issues of slandering and badmouthing is to use an
exclusion mechanism to sanction traders who provide unusually high numbers of
negative evaluations. In this case, a trader can also include his testimonials as
evidence to support his exclusion proposal to exclude ill-intentioned traders that
have given him unfair negative evaluations from a trading system’s membership.
6.6.2 Mitigating Overstating and Hyping
The issue of overstating and hyping is challenging to tackle. It requires a mech-
anism that provides significant incentives for traders to remain honest under any
circumstances. Overstating and hyping are not necessarily harmful. They are only
so if traders use artificially boosted reputations to defraud others. To boost their
reputation through overstating or hyping, ill-intentioned traders may cooperate with
their associates or use multiple identities to create bogus transactions and so provide
good evaluations for those transactions. For this reason, it is important for traders
when considering deal evaluations to take into account who they are from. If the
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evaluations are from known cronies of a dubious trader, then they can be accorded
little weight however ecstatic they are. If they are from completely unknown parties
with no other known participation in trading with parties the assessor is familiar
with, then they should equally be accorded little weight. Only evaluations from
parties the assessor has favorable knowledge of either directly or indirectly can be
accorded credence.
Traders can also be provided with a means to verify the authenticity of a transaction.
This can be achieved by requiring participants to produce a transaction contract
after both parties have agreed to engage in a deal. A trader needs to send the
transaction contract that has been time stamped and digitally signed by both parties
together with a deal evaluation to his trading counterpart after the completion of
each transaction as a proof that the transaction is real and has occurred between
them.
6.6.3 Mitigating Sybil Collusions
Sybil collusion is a major collusion hazard that can occur in any reputation systems
that has weak identification processes. Ill-intentioned traders in a trading commu-
nity may exploit weak identification processes to generate multiple new identities. A
study has shown that a user can then use these identities to collude to boost his own
reputation or his associates’ or damage another trader’s reputation [96], which may
subsequently lead other members of the trading system to making inaccurate trust
decisions. In order to prevent sybil collusions, a trading system needs to provide a
means to constrain a trader from generating and also exploiting multiple identities,
which can be achieved through the following approaches:
• Restrict the generation of multiple identities in the identity establishment
process.
• Detect the presence of multiple identities within the identity verification pro-
cesses.
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, it might be difficult to restrict the gen-
eration of multiple identities as ill-intentioned traders might compromise the digital
certificates generation process in Section 5.5.2. This is due to the fact that traders
are allowed to create their own self-signed digital certificates and there is no cen-
tralize authority or a CA to control such process. Thus, the only way to mitigate
sybil collusions is by detecting the presence of sybils through digital certificates ver-
ification processes, which include the attestation and authentication processes as
discussed in Section 5.6.2. The use of a photograph in a trader’s PGP certificate
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will make it difficult for traders to operate with multiple identities without this
becoming apparent [119].
6.7 Discussion
This section discusses the things that a trader in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system should do when dealing with reputation reports or testimonials in order to
mitigate misbehaviour-related threats. Before relying on any reputation reports or
testimonials from other traders, traders of an ad hoc m-commerce are expected to
do the following:
1) Perform a trading software check to ensure that nothing has changed since the
last digital signature was applied to any of the deal evaluations in the reputation
report or the testimonials. This is to ensure that the integrity of such documents
has not been compromised when it is stored in its owner’s local repository or during
transmission.
2) Verify the validity of the digital certificate of each party that provides the deal
evaluations or testimonials to ensure that there is no sybil collusion attempt.
3) Check the credibility of the trader who sends a negative evaluation whether poor
evaluation reports have been broadcast about him or whether he himself is the
subject of an exclusion proposal.
4) Check the membership status of the parties that provide the deal evaluations or
testimonials to ensure that they are not recorded as being excluded from membership
or a subject of an exclusion proposal in their local membership list.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed three key design considerations in implementing a fully
distributed reputation system that can provide effective ways to facilitate trust de-
velopment among traders in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, namely reputation
information storage, integrity maintenance and reliability assurance. It also has pre-
sented the approach to address the three key design issues in order to assist traders
in making faster and more reliable trust decisions.
To enable efficient retrieval and high availability of reputation information, the pro-
posed approach lets traders maintain their own reputation information locally and
share their knowledge about other traders’ trading behavior in a totally P2P manner
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without having to rely on network services that are always available. It advocates
reinforcing this with a sanction-backed mechanism that lets traders collaborate to
exclude any member that has misbehaved unreasonably or has an overly poor trad-
ing history from a trading system’s membership to encourage traders to provide
truthful reputation reports.
This chapter also has examined the means by which the ill-intentioned traders in
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system can pose threats to subvert the reliability of
its reputation system and discussed how the proposed design of a reputation system
can detect and mitigate such threats to a sufficient degree. With support from the
proposed group membership service [118] and identity support scheme [119], the aim
is that this type of reputation system will make ad hoc m-commerce a viable means
to conduct online trading via ad hoc networking.
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Chapter 7
Collaborative Group Membership
in Ad Hoc Communities
7.1 Introduction
A basic concept in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems is the formation of a trad-
ing forum by two or more peers that are in the vicinity of each other and run an
appropriate software application. This trading forum defines the rules of trading
and provides the context for mobile users to engage in mobile commerce using ad
hoc wireless networking [117]. Its participants communicate and cooperate with
each other by utilizing their local resources and also their neighbours to accomplish
their transactions and other related activities. As an example, a group of peers with
wireless networking capability and a mobile auction application installed on each
device comes into communication range with each other. One of the peers reestab-
lishes a trading forum that offers auction services and advertises it for other peers
with similar interests to join. Peers able to join the trading forum session can then
participate in the auction activities as sellers or bidders. The mobile auction appli-
cation that runs on each peer’s device handles all the auction processes and provides
a graphical interface to the users. After the completion of each transaction, peers
can provide deal evaluations to each other.
A trading forum can be open to all comers or it can choose to use membership to
separate the members from the outsiders. Group membership can be the first step
towards creating a more secure and trusted environment for traders to trade and
communicate with each other. As new parties apply to join and existing members
may have to be excluded, the management and maintenance of such trading forums
entails support for a service to handle group membership. The function of a group
membership service is to track membership changes in a trading forum and help
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determine whether a peer is currently a member of a particular trading forum [22].
It consists of mechanisms for peers to join and be excluded from the trading forum,
as well as to verify membership.
However, managing group membership in an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum is
a challenging task as peers may only have partial knowledge of the current mem-
bership due to frequent network disconnections, infrequent participation and delays
in communication via intermediaries among them. The absence of a centralized
network infrastructure adds more complexity to this problem. Thus, this chapter
presents a fully distributed and self-organizing approach to managing group mem-
bership in such a loose ad hoc m-commerce trading community. It is designed to
suit the dynamic nature of ad hoc wireless networking and the social characteristics
of ad hoc m-commerce.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses how the
group membership acts as a filter to constrain trading parties’ participation into
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. Section 7.3 discusses and analyses signifi-
cant related work. The requirements for managing a group membership for an ad
hoc m-commerce trading system are described in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 presents
the details of each mechanism in the group membership service for an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system, which include a join mechanism, membership renewal
mechanism and also exclusion mechanism . Section 7.6 demonstrates a number of
reference scenarios. Section 7.7 presents a security analysis of the proposed group
membership service. Several recommendations on things that a trader should do
when dealing with membership vouchers and also when participating in a group
decision making process are discussed in Section 7.8 and and finally, Section 7.9
concludes the chapter.
7.2 Membership is a Filter
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, there is no network service provider that
can be relied upon to provide security services, or central administration to control
or manage its traders and their trading related activities. Its participating parties
will utilize their available computing resources to communicate and cooperate with
each other in order to participate in m-commerce transactions as well as to control
the security settings of such trading systems. This situation is of potential security
concern since not all of the participating parties will behave properly all the time
and cannot always be trusted in each of their transactions or other related activities
that require their participations, especially in controlling the security settings of the
trading forum. For instance, the attestation process of a trader’s digital certificate
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will only be reliable if the parties who vouch for the validity of the certificate are
recognized by other members of the trading forum as a trusted party. Thus, it is
necessary for ad hoc m-commerce trading systems to have a means to constrain
a trading forum’s participation to only traders that are regarded as reasonably
trustworthy by other members of the forum in order to establish greater trust and
more secure interactions among its group members.
Defining who is a member of a particular trading forum can be an effective means to
constrain a trading forum’s participation, which can be accomplished using group
membership. A trading forum membership can be restricted to only parties that
trust each other to a reasonable degree. This means that in order to remain as
a member of a particular trading forum, each trader needs to behave in a proper
manner all the time and have a decent reputation towards every other trader based
on their past trading experiences and also the sharing of trust among them. Group
membership is thus subject to a trader’s behaviour and reputation among the peers
in the trading community. A trader that has misbehaved or has a poor reputation
might be considered as untrustworthy by other members of the trading forum. They
may no longer be prepared to let him remain active in the trading community and
as a result exclude him from the trading forum’s membership.
Along with a reputation system, trading forum membership is useful to encourage
traders to behave honestly and be more responsible in each of their activities. This is
because a trader needs to maintain their good behaviour and reputation in order to
establish a good relationship with other members of the trading forum. A party who
has gained trust and respect from other traders in the trading forum is more likely to
get valuable information, better cooperation and responsible behaviour from those
traders and thus, is usually less likely to misbehave if he intends to remain active as
a reputable and trusted party in such a trading community. Those with no or little
reputation need to build their reputation by behaving well and be honest in each
of their activities in order to gain respect from other traders of the trading forum
and be recognised as a trustworthy party. This will indirectly limit the negative
behaviour of the traders.
7.3 Related Work
Several relevant research studies have been done in the area of group membership
in ad hoc wireless networks such as [102],[148],[100],[126],[136]. The main focus of
most of the work is to provide secure communications among group members. Some
of the solutions proposed are based on group key agreements. Maki, Aura and
Hietalahi in [102] have proposed a distributed certificate-based system to establish
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secure communications among members in ad hoc groups, where a certificate that
is signed by a group key is used to indicate the membership of each member. The
group key is used as the identifier of the group and is generated by a group leader
who is responsible for managing the group membership. To avoid a single point of
failure, a group leader’s authority is distributed to multiple sub-leaders. Thus, a
group can have one or more group leaders or sub-leaders.
A similar approach is used by Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner in [148] to address the
issue of secure group communications in dynamic peer groups. They have proposed a
protocol called CLIQUES which is based on a multiparty extension of Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. In this protocol, all members contribute to the establishment of a
group key. Whenever there is a membership change, the group key is reconstructed.
This approach also depends on having a group controller to manage the group
membership.
Liu, Sacchetti, Sailhan and Issarny [100] in their design of a generic group manage-
ment service for MANET have also proposed a group leader for managing the group
dynamics. In their approach, the group leader’s role is rotated from one member
to another in order to distribute the load of group management among members
and also to address the issue of group leaders dropping out of participation. The
selection of the group leader is based on a number of criteria that have been defined.
Another approach is a virtual partitioning (VP) based group membership algorithm
by Pradan and Helal [126]. This approach requires each group member to maintain
a complete and consistent view of group membership.
Roman, Huang and Hazemi in [136] have also proposed an algorithm to maintain a
consistent view of group membership in ad hoc wireless networks based on location
information.
Group key agreement does not seem to be workable for ad hoc m-commerce trading
forums. Participation by all members on a regular and frequent basis would be
required in order that new group keys could be constructed in a timely way for
each membership change and also for each member to get access to the new group
keys every time they are reconstructed. However, casual local online trading, a
representative type of ad hoc m-commerce is likely to involve a mixture of frequent
and infrequent participants and quite an amount of irregular participation. Thus,
it may not be possible for a new group key to be constructed in a timely way for
each membership change on each occasion that requires contribution by all group
members. It will take unpredictable periods of time for all members to be available
for the reconstruction process to happen. This might delay the first opportunity for
a new member to participate in the group communications as well as other activities
of the trading forum. This might also give an opportunity for a member subject
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to exclusion proceedings to remain as a member for a longer period of time. On
other occasions, the unavailability of some members during the reconstruction of
the group key might cause them to be excluded and the group shrinking as a subset
of the members reconstruct the group key among themselves. The reacceptance of
these unavailable members in the trading forum would demand the group key be
reconstructed again. This might lead to endless reconstruction of group keys as
frequent and regular participation by all group members cannot be guaranteed in
ad hoc m-commerce trading forums.
A hierarchical structure where one or more group leaders are responsible for man-
aging the group membership also does not seem to be workable for our work as
the presence of such authority in the current group context cannot be guaranteed
all the time. Furthermore, the loose nature of relationships in casual local trading
networks does not support the assumption of a core of well trusted parties around
which the rest of the trading community is constituted. Thus, a flat structure where
all members are given equal responsibility to manage the group membership would
seem to be more appropriate.
The requirement for each member to maintain a complete and consistent view of
current group membership is also not realistic for ad hoc m-commerce trading fo-
rums. Communication among members will often involve intermediaries, be subject
to frequent disconnections and take unpredictable periods of time from minutes to
several days or weeks with infrequent participants. Getting all group members to
participate in every membership decision will take too long to be practical. So
membership decision making needs to be delegated to subsets of the membership
and other members will have to accept their decision making when it is eventually
communicated to them. That in turn means that every member will only have a
partial view of the membership
7.4 Requirements
Due to the challenges posed by the nature of ad hoc wireless networking and the
social characteristics of ad hoc m-commerce [117], the following requirements for
managing a trading forum’s group membership will be needed on top of the usual
requirements for interactive m-commerce software such as adequate quality of service
and reliability in the wireless network, end-to-end security and so on:
Resource-limited - The processes and operating costs of group membership man-
agement should be affordable for resource-constrained devices.
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Dynamic - Group membership management should be able to handle dynamic
membership changes without having to reconstitute the group.
Absence of Authority - The responsibility for managing the group membership
has to be devolved among members without recourse to trusted parties with dele-
gated authority as the presence of no party can be guaranteed in any live trading
context.
Robustness - Intermittent participation by members, unreliable means of com-
munication and the absence of dependable enduring infrastructure services requires
failure tolerance throughout support for system services.
Convenience - The management of group membership should not involve users in
complicated and time consuming activities nor should making changes in member-
ship status take very long periods.
7.5 Design
This section presents a fully distributed and self-organizing approach for managing
group membership in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, which is based on mem-
bership vouchers, quorate decisions by some group members, partial membership
lists and the use of digital signatures.
7.5.1 Membership Voucher
A membership voucher serves as a credential that can be used by members of a
particular trading forum to prove their membership to other members of the forum.
It contains the following information as a minimum:-
• The trading forum name and ID.
• Its holder’s trading pseudonym.
• The collection of approvals and any vetoes among verified votes. Each vote
will consists of the voter’s trading pseudonym, the subject of the vote ei-
ther a joining request or membership renewal request, the requestor’s trading
pseudonym, voter’s agree or disagree statement, time and date as well as the
digital signature of the voter.
• Digital signature of its issuer.
• A validity period.
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To be recognised as a member of a trading forum, each peer must possess a mem-
bership voucher that is digitally signed by other group members who are expected
to be recognised. A recognised member is a member whose membership voucher has
been verified as having the following:-
• Its validity period has not expired.
• Has been issued and signed by parties who are recognised as members at the
time the membership voucher is issued.
• Has sufficient number of votes from parties who are recognised as members at
the time they participated in the vote.
Peers present the voucher and their certificate to attest their membership and receiv-
ing peers use the resources available to them such as personal records of previously
known members of the forum to decide whether to accept the claim. Members ex-
change these records with other trusted members to widen and update their views
of the scope of membership. However, as the judgments are made independently by
each peer based on their partial membership views without involving any authority
higher than a peer, membership claims cannot always be settled to the satisfaction
of all reasonable peers. It will depend on the level of trust that the receiving peers
have in the issuer and the voters of the presenting peers’ membership voucher as well
as the parties that attest their membership vouchers. If the receiving peers trust
those parties, it is expected that they will accept the presenting peer’s membership
claim.
The validity period of the voucher is used as a regular way to review the membership
status of each member. After its expiry date has elapsed, the voucher is no longer
applicable to prove a peer’s membership. Thus, to remain as a current member of
a particular trading forum, each peer needs periodically to renew their membership
voucher when the existing voucher expires.
7.5.2 Quorate Decisions
As members of a trading forum are peers that have similar constraints on their
devices and are offline most of the time, it is not realistic to expect to have a
trusted peer or unbroken chain of trusted peers who are responsible for managing
the group membership and are reachable all the time. All peers are given equal
responsibility in order to avoid circumstances where decisions cannot be made due to
the unavailability of an appropriate authority. Therefore, in this work, the decisions
to accept new members, exclude misbehaving members and also renew existing
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members’ membership vouchers are distributed to any sufficiently large subset of
existing group members. How many members need to agree and the maximum
number of members allowed to disagree in order to elicit a quorate decision will
depend on each trading forum’s decision making policies.
A trading forum’s decision making policy can be made simpler or more stringent
depending on the type of ad hoc m-commerce trading. A simple policy is probably
more desirable for circumstances that entail fast decision making, such as in the
admission process. It may require only a small number of approval replies and
no vetoes. For example, a trading forum with 30 current members may require
only a small fraction of currently active and connected members to agree and none
to disagree, in order to obtain a quorate decision whether to accept or reject the
application of a new member. By having such a policy, new admissions could take
place rapidly. On the other hand, to obtain a quorate decision for a more stringent
decision making policy might require a definite higher number of approvals and less
than a threshold number of vetoes. This may involve currently offline members
as the replies from currently connected members may not be sufficient to obtain a
quorate decision. However, to elicit the required number of members’ votes may take
some time as many members may not be reachable for significant periods or may not
participate frequently in group communications. Thus, this type of policy might be
more appropriate for circumstances that do not require rapid decision making such
as in the membership renewal process or in the exclusion of members which requires
more careful consideration. For example, to exclude a member from a trading forum
of 40 current members might require at least 20 members to agree and less than 5
members disagree with the exclusion proposal.
7.5.3 Membership Lists
A membership list contains records about sometime members of a trading forum. It
also provides information about the status of each member as to whether a member is
a current member or former member or has been excluded. A complete membership
list would keep members updated with the current membership of a particular group
[126].
However, all members of an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum cannot be expected
to have a complete and consistent view of membership as some of them may be
offline or unreachable or may not participate in group communications regularly or
may be active but not yet have had messages passed on to them about decisions
taken by other members. Instead, members of an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum
will each maintain a partial list of members and exclusions that they know about
and accept in their local storage and exchange it with other members to update and
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widen their view of membership every time they participate in the trading forum.
7.5.4 Digital Signature
A digital signature is used to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of a message
or document sent by a peer as well as to ensure that the sender cannot get away
with denying having sent the message or document. In ad hoc m-commerce trading
forums, messages and documents such as membership requests, votes, membership
vouchers, exclusion proposals and also exclusion orders are digitally signed by their
sender in order to give assurance to the receiving peers that those messages or
documents were actually sent by the specified sender and were not altered during
transmission and also so that the sender will not be able to credibly deny having
sent the message.
To digitally sign such documents, traders will use their private key that is self-
generated during their online identity establishment process, as discussed in the
Chapter 5 of this thesis. A trader’s digital signature is also a part of the information
in a digital certificate that binds that trader’s identity credentials to his membership
information.
7.5.5 Join Mechanism
For a new member to join a trading forum, he must first discover a member of the
forum and then send a join request. The following steps are involved:-
Step 1. Sending a request to join
A new member (Mnew) that has appropriate ad hoc m-commerce trading software
installed on his mobile device, sends a join request message together with his digital
certificate to at least one member of the trading forum. Any new members that
want to join the trading forum must first generate a digital certificate to establish
their online identity. The certificate must be at least self-signed but may also be
signed by other parties that have attested the validity of the certificate. The join
request message will contain the following information as a minimum:-
• The target trading forum name and ID
• Mnew’s trading pseudonym
• Digital signature of Mnew
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Step 2. Propagate Join Request
Upon receiving the join request message, the contacted member (Mcontact) will
verify the validity of the new member’s digital certificate through trading software
checks as discussed in Section 5.5.3. The contacted member may also perform the
manual certificate verification check whenever it is required. After the validity of
Mnew’s digital certificate is verified, Mcontact will then propagate the join request
message together with the verified digital certificate to other members of the forum
in order to obtain a quorate decision whether to accept or reject the application.
Mcontact will also include his membership voucher as a proof of his membership.
The propagated message will have a time limit (TTL) in order to limit the voting
period. However, Mcontact may consider having extra rounds of voting if the verified
votes received are not sufficient to obtain a quorate decision after the voting period
limit has expired.
In the case where the verification of Mnew’s digital certificate fails, either through
trading software checks or further manual checks, Mcontact is expected to discard
the join request message and may multicast a warning about Mnew’s attempt to gain
membership with an inappropriate digital certificate together with relevant details
to other members of the trading forum.
Step 3. Quorate decision by other members
Other members of the forum with views on the proposal are then expected to reply
with either a signed agree or disagree message to Mcontact, accompanied by their
membership voucher as a proof of their membership. This is done after they have
verified the validity of both Mcontact and Mnew digital certificates as well as Mcon-
tact’s membership voucher. In addition to that, they are also expected to perform
some checks on their local membership list to ensure that Mnew’s identity creden-
tials have not been used by any party that has been excluded in their membership
list.
Step 4. Issuance of membership voucher
Upon receiving the replies, Mcontact will first verify that the digital signature of
each voter is valid and not reported as being compromised. After the voters’ digital
signatures are verified, Mcontact will then verify the voters’ membership vouchers
as not having expired and as being of members Mcontact recognises as members or
having sufficient signatures of parties Mcontact recognises as members at the time
the membership vouchers were issued. Figure 7.1 depicts the steps involved in the
voters’ membership voucher verification process.
Votes that are not verified, or are received after the time limit, or come from a
party whose digital signature is not valid or is recorded as being compromised are
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discarded. Then the forum’s admissions policy is applied to the verified votes. If
there are sufficient acceptances and less than sufficient vetoes, Mcontact will send
a signed standard membership voucher to Mnew. In addition to a membership
voucher, Mcontact will also send his local partial lists of known members and known
members to be excluded to Mnew.
Figure 7.1: Voter’s membership voucher verification step
Step 5. Update membership list
Mnew will then notify other members about his new membership by multicasting a
Hello message accompanied by his digital certificate and membership voucher to all
currently active and connected members of the group. They will pass the multicast
on during further group interactions until the multicast message’s liveness expires.
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7.5.6 Exclusion Mechanism
To induce participating parties in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems to act hon-
estly and in a trustworthy way, it is valuable to have a mechanism to sanction forum
members that misbehave or have a history of being given poor evaluations of their
trades. One of the appropriate ways to do this is exclusion from membership. By
having a mechanism to exclude misbehaving members, a group membership service
can provide a degree of assurance about forum members trustworthiness and repu-
tations. It will sit alongside the reputation system, which is one of the elements in
the security and trust service for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, and serves
as the primary service to help assess the behavior and also the trustworthiness of
each member. Similar to the join process, to exclude an existing member requires a
quorate decision from other members of the trading forum. The following steps are
involved:-
Step 1. Multicasting a proposal to exclude
An existing member (Mpropose) can propose to exclude a misbehaving member or
a member with poor evaluations from a trading forum by multicasting a proposal to
exclude message to other forum members including the target member (Mtarget).
The message will consist of the following information:-
• The target member’s trading pseudonym.
• Mpropose digital signature
In addition to that, an accompanying note giving brief reasons and some relevant
evidence for the exclusion might also be expected.
Step 2. Quorate decision by other members
If other forum members agree or disagree with the exclusion proposal, they will reply
with a signed agree or disagree message (vote) to Mpropose within the required time
period. Each vote will consists of the voter’s trading pseudonym, the subject of the
vote which is exclusion proposal, the requestor’s trading pseudonym, voter’s agree
or disagree statement, time and date as well as the digital signature of the voter. In
addition to that, the trading pseudonym of the target party to be excluded will also
be included in the message. The target party can take this opportunity to rebut
the proposal by sending a disagree vote to Mpropose and also multicast a message
and supporting evidence to other members in order to defend himself from being
excluded from the trading forum’s membership.
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Step 3. Multicasting an exclusion order
Once enough replies from validated members are collected within the voting time
period limit and the forum’s exclusion criteria are satisfied, Mpropose will then mul-
ticast an exclusion order to other currently connected members with the intention
that they forward it more widely to other members when they next connect to the
forum. The exclusion order will have the following details:-
• The target party’s trading pseudonym
• The collection of signed messages approving and disapproving the target’s
exclusion
• The reason of the exclusion
• Digital signature of Mpropose
• Exclusion period
Mpropose is also expected to attach the target party’s digital certificate together
with the exclusion order so that other parties who do not have any record about
the target party’s identity credential in their local repository can use it for future
reference. In this case, forum members are expected to refrain from issuing a new
membership voucher to the target member after the validity period of his current
membership voucher has expired until the exclusion period has ended. Also, any
votes or membership vouchers issued by the target member will not be considered
as valid. Furthermore, forum members are also expected to not participate in any
transactions with that member.
7.5.7 Membership Renewal Mechanism
To remain as a member of a trading forum, each member should renew their mem-
bership near the end or after the validity period of their current membership voucher
expires. The following steps are involved:-
1. Sending a membership renewal request
A member who holds an expired or soon to expire membership voucher sends a
membership renewal request together with his old or current membership voucher
to at least one of the current members of the trading forum (Mcontact).
2. Propagate Renewal Request
Similar to the join and exclusion mechanisms, to renew a membership voucher also
requires a quorate decision from other forum members. Thus, upon receiving the
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membership renewal request, Mcontact will then propagate it to other forum mem-
bers in order to obtain a quorate decision whether to accept or reject the renewal
request.
3. Quorate decision by other members
In this situation, other members are expected to check whether any non-expired
order has been issued to exclude the requesting member from the trading forum be-
fore they each reply with either a digitally signed agree or disagree message together
with their valid membership voucher to Mcontact.
4. Collate agree messages
Once enough replies from validated members are collected within the voting period
limit and the forum’s membership renewal criteria are satisfied, Mcontact then col-
lates the replies and sends them together with a new membership voucher to the
requesting member. The voucher is signed by Mcontact as an accurate record of the
vote. The requesting member is then expected to multicast his new membership
voucher to other members of the trading forum to inform them about the renewal
of his membership.
7.5.8 Message Propagation
In this work, each message is associated with a unique identifier and a time to live
(TTL). To ensure reliable message propagation, each time a peer receives a message
for the first time, it will accept the message, store it and also forward it once to
each of its directly connected neighbours except the sender during the period of
its lifetime. To prevent duplicate propagation, each time a peer receives the same
message more than once, the message will be discarded. As all of the mechanisms
discussed above require sufficient members votes to obtain a quorate decision, it is
important for each voting activity to have an expiry time. Therefore, the use of a
TTL will ensure that each propagated message is discarded after its time limit has
expired.
7.6 Reference Scenarios
This section demonstrates each of the mechanisms discussed in Section 7.5 in a series
of scenarios; namely joining scenario, exclusion scenario and renewal scenario.
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7.6.1 Joining Scenario
A trading forum A consists of 5 members M1, M2, M3, M4 and M5. All members
are online during communication period t1. It is assumed that:-
• Each of them possesses a valid digital certificate and current membership
voucher.
• Each of them has appropriate ad hoc m-commerce trading software installed
on their Wi-Fi enabled mobile device.
• Each member’s local membership list contains the membership records of other
members as follows:
M1 (M2, M3, M4, M5)
M2 (M1, M3, M4, M5)
M3 (M1, M2, M4, M5)
M4 (M1, M2, M3, M5)
M5 (M1, M2, M3, M4)
• No member has any knowledge of parties to be excluded.
• This trading forum applies a simple admissions policy that requires at least
three members agree with the new application and none disagrees while votes
are being gathered.
A new member M6 comes into their communication range and sends a join request to
M2 together with his self-signed digital certificate. After verifying and attesting M6’s
self-signed digital certificate, M2 then propagates the request to other members, as
illustrated in Figure 7.2.
It is assumed that all members agree to accept the new application from M6 after
verifying its digital certificate and M2’s digital certificate and membership voucher.
They then each reply to M2 with their digitally signed agree message together with
their membership voucher. Upon receiving the replies, M2 will then verify each
of the voters’ digital certificates and membership vouchers. In this case, all votes
are accepted as each of the voters possesses a valid digital certificate and current
membership voucher and M2 recognises them all as members in his membership lists.
M2 then applies the trading forum’s admissions policy to the verified votes and sends
a signed standard membership voucher containing the four signed approvals and its
local membership list to M6. These steps are illustrated in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.2: Join mechanism - steps 1 and 2
Figure 7.3: Join mechanism - steps 3 and 4
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M6 then sends a hello message together with his digital certificate and membership
voucher to other connected members in order to notify them of his new membership,
as illustrated in Figure 7.4. Upon receiving M6’s hello message, digital certificate
and membership voucher, other connected members will independently verify M6’s
digital certificate and membership voucher before accepting the new membership
and update their local membership list. At the end of communication period t1, the
local membership list of each member will be as follows:-
M1 (M2, M3, M4, M5, M6)
M2 (M1, M3, M4, M5, M6)
M3 (M1, M2, M4, M5, M6)
M4 (M1, M2, M3, M5, M6)
M5 (M1, M2, M3, M4, M6)
M6 (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5)
Figure 7.4: Join mechanism - step 5
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7.6.2 Exclusion Scenario
This scenario takes place after the earlier one. It is assumed that:
• During this communication period, trading forum A consists of 20 parties (M1,
M2, ....., M19 and M20 ) that possess a current membership voucher. However,
only ten members M1, M2, M3, M4, M8, M10, M15, M16, M17 and M19 are
online while the others have gone offline.
• This trading forum applies an exclusion policy that requires at least 7 members
to agree with the exclusion and less than 3 vetoes before any member can be
excluded.
• The local membership list of each currently connected member contains the
membership record of other connected members as each of them needs to
send a hello message together with their membership voucher to all connected
members in order to rejoin the trading forum after being offline or disconnected
from the network.
M2 multicasts a proposal to exclude M8 together with relevant evidence to all cur-
rently connected members of the forum. It is assumed that all reply except M16
after the validity of M2’s certificate is verified and only M1, M3, M4, M10, M15
and M19 agree with the exclusion proposal while the other two members including
M8 disagree, and M2 receives their digitally signed votes within the voting period
limit. Upon receiving the votes, M2 then verifies the voters’ digital signatures and
membership voucher. M2 then accepts their votes as their digital signatures are
valid and not recorded as being compromised, the validity period on their mem-
bership vouchers are still applicable and M2 recognises them all as members in his
local membership list. After adding his own approval vote and the forum’s exclusion
policy is applied, there are sufficient number of approvals (7 approvals) and less than
sufficient vetoes (2 vetoes) for M2 to obtain a quorate decision to issue an exclusion
order. M2 then multicasts the exclusion order together with M8’s digital certificate
to all connected members. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 7.5, Figure 7.6 and
Figure 7.7.
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Figure 7.5: Exclusion mechanism - step 1
Figure 7.6: Exclusion mechanism - step 2
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Figure 7.7: Exclusion mechanism - step 3
7.6.3 Renewal Scenario
In this scenario, trading forum A consists of 25 current members (M1, M2, .....M7,
M9, ..... , M25) and it is assumed that:
• In the beginning, only M1, M4, M6, M7, M9 and M10 are online while the
others are offline.
• M1’s membership voucher is nearly expired.
• Renewal policy requires at least 7 members to agree with the renewal request
and no vetoes before any new membership voucher can be issued to the re-
questing member.
M1 sends a membership renewal request together with his current membership
voucher to M9 who then propagates the request to other currently connected mem-
bers. It is assumed that only M4, M6 and M7 agree with the request and reply with
a digitally signed agree message together with their membership voucher to M9 as
depicted in Figure 7.8. It is assumed that M10 received the propagated message but
decided not to participate in the vote. Upon receiving the agree replies, M9 then
verifies M4, M6 and M7s membership vouchers and accepts their votes as the valid-
ity period on their membership voucher is still applicable and M9 recognises them
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as members in his local membership list. However, in this situation, the number of
approval replies is still not sufficient for M9 to obtain a quorate decision to issue a
new membership voucher to M1. Thus, M9 has to wait until the voting period limit
expires before he can consider a second round of voting.
Figure 7.8: Renewal mechanism - steps 1, 2 and 3
After some further time has elapsed within the same voting period limit, it is as-
sumed that M4, M6, M7 and M10 have gone offline while M2, M5, M20, M23, and
M25 come into communication range with M1 and M9. The others remain offline.
M9 then propagates the membership renewal request to M2, M5, M20, and M23
after receiving their Hello Message and verifies their membership voucher. In this
case, it is assumed that M9 did not accept M25’s membership claim as he did not
recognise either the issuer of M25’s membership voucher or the issuer and voters
of that issuer as members in his membership list. Thus, the renewal request is not
propagated to M25. M2, M5, M20, and M23 agree with the request and they each
reply with a digitally signed agree message together with their membership voucher
to M9 within the voting period limit. M9 then validates their votes. Validated votes
from M2, M5, M20, and M23 as shown in Figure 7.9 now enable M9 to obtain a
quorate decision to issue a new membership voucher to M1.
7.7 Security Analysis
The aim of having a group membership service for ad hoc m-commerce trading
systems is to improve the security of such trading systems by restricting participation
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Figure 7.9: Renewal mechanism - steps 2, 3 and 4
to only parties that are regarded as trustworthy by their peers. However, as there is
no network service provider that can be relied upon to provide such service and the
task for managing it has to be devolved among participating parties of the trading
system, it is crucial that no one can compromise the reliability of such a membership
service.
Thus, this section examines the means by which the ill-intentioned parties in an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system can pose threats to compromise the reliability
of its membership service and discusses how the proposed design of a membership
service and also identity support scheme can detect and mitigate such threats to a
sufficient degree.
7.7.1 Addressing Whitewashing
The objective to constrain the trading system’s participation to only traders that
trust each other might not be successful if a trader that has been excluded from a
trading forum membership due to his poor reputation or misbehaviour can easily
re-join the trading forum using a new identity. There are at least two ways that such
ill-intentioned trader can re-join the trading forum using the proposed approach:
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7.7.1.1 By Working Alone
In this situation, an ill-intentioned trader will send a join request message together
with his new self-signed digital certificate to any of the trading forum members that
are online and within his communication range. The contact person who receives the
join request message is then expected to verify the validity of the self-signed digital
certificate through a certificate attestation process as discussed in Section 5.5.3.1,
before propagating it together with the join request message to other members. The
trading software checks in the attestation process should enable the contact person
to detect whether this is an attempt by the presenting party to re-enter the trading
forum with a new identity. This will alert the contact person to perform further
checks with his membership list to verify whether the identity credentials in the
presented certificate, especially the photograph has been used by other party that
is recorded as being excluded in his membership list. A physical meeting with the
presenting party will give further verification about the similarity of the photograph
of the excluded party with the physical appearance of the presenting party.
However, the contact person might not be able to detect such an attempt if he
does not have any record about the ill-intentioned party’s digital certificate and/or
membership information in his local repository due to the following reasons:
• They have never encountered each other or had a deal before.
• The contact person does not have a copy of the presenting party’s certificate
in his local certificate repository, or has not yet been passed the updated
membership list or the exclusion order for the ill-intentioned party from other
members of the trading forum.
In this case, the contact person is expected to propagate the join request message
without attesting the ill-intentioned party’s self-signed digital certificate. This will
alert the other parties who are participating in the vote to verify the validity of the
self-signed digital certificate properly before accepting the join request. Again, the
trading software and further manual checks in the attestation process, as well as
the membership list checks should enable the traders to detect such an attempt and
help them to make a decision to reject the join request application. Thus, it will
be less likely for the contact person to obtain sufficient votes to issue a membership
voucher to the ill-intentioned party.
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7.7.1.2 By Colluding with Associates
Another way for a member that has been excluded from a trading forum’s mem-
bership to re-join the trading forum is by choosing his associate to be the contact
person to propagate his join request message to other members of the trading fo-
rum. In this case, as they are associates, the contact person is likely to just ignore
any alerts given by the trading software checks regarding the identity credentials
in the ill-intentioned trader’s self-signed digital certificate before propagating the
join request message to other members. The contact person might also attest the
self-signed digital certificate to support that the validity of such certificate has been
verified and the join request message does not come from a suspicious identity.
However, the other members who view the join request message should be able to
detect such an attempt when they perform the trading software checks and also
further checks in the authentication process of the digital certificate, as discussed in
Section 5.5.3.2. Checks with their local membership list will further verify that the
identity credentials in the presented digital certificate have been used by another
party that is recorded as being excluded in their membership list. This can be used
as an evidence that the contact person is colluding with the excluded member to
compromise the membership service and thus, the contact person is also risking
being subject to being excluded from the trading forum’s membership due to his
misbehaviour.
In addition to the above, it is also possible for the ill-intentioned trader to collude
with a number of associates to enable him to re-join the trading forum. In this case,
one of the associates will be the contact person and the others will participate in the
vote. If the votes from their associates are sufficient to enable the contact person to
obtain a quorate decision to accept the join request, the ill-intentioned party will be
able to get a new membership voucher to enable him to re-join the trading forum.
However, the other members of the trading forum who receive the new membership
voucher may well be able to detect such an attempt when they verify the validity
of the ill-intentioned party’s digital certificate and also perform some checks with
their local membership list. Again, this can be used as an evidence that the signer
of the new membership voucher and its voters are colluding with the ill-intentioned
party to manipulate the group membership decision making process and thus, they
are risking being subject to being excluded from the trading forum’s membership
due to their misbehaviour.
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7.7.2 Addressing Unfair Exclusion
There are at least three ways that an ill-intentioned trader can attempt to use to
unfairly exclude a particular trader, for example an honest trader from the trading
forum’s membership, which include the following:
7.7.2.1 By Using his Own Identity
An ill-intentioned trader uses his own identity to multicast a proposal to unfairly
exclude another trader from a trading forum’s membership. In this case, it will be
a bit difficult for other members of the trading forum to detect such an attempt if
the ill-intentioned trader has the following elements;
• A valid digital certificate and membership voucher.
• A good reputation established by a series of favourable deal evaluations.
• Never received any complaints of misbehaviour from other members of the
trading forum.
• Never been the subject of an exclusion proposal
However, as the proposed approach advises that relevant evidence to support an
exclusion proposal be sent together with it, it is less likely that the ill-intentioned
trader will be able to obtain sufficient votes for the exclusion from other members
of the trading forum if he fails to provide such important evidence. In addition to
that, it is a bit risky for the ill-intentioned trader to use his own digital signature
to sign such a proposal. This is because his digital signature on the proposal will
ensure that he is accountable for what he has done and if the other traders find
out that the proposal is used to unfairly exclude another trader, they can use it
as an evidence to exclude him in turn from a trading forum’s membership for his
misbehavior.
7.7.2.2 By Using a Spoofed Identity
An ill-intentioned trader uses another trader’s identity, for example, the identity of
a respectable trader to multicast an unfair exclusion proposal to other members of
the trading forum. He can do this if he gets hold of the respectable trader’s private
key. In this case, when the other traders who receive the proposal perform some
checks on the credibility of its sender, it is unlikely that they will be suspicious of
the proposal as it comes from a credible and reputable trader in the community.
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However, they might just ignore the proposal if no relevant evidence is sent together
to support the proposal. In addition to that, the trading software checks in the
authentication process of the sender’s digital certificate may enable them to detect
that his digital certificate is recorded as suspected compromised in their local reposi-
tory. If they perform further checks by physically meeting with the sender, they will
be able to identify the real identity of the sender based on his physical appearance.
Again, this can be used as an evidence to exclude the ill-intentioned party in turn
from the membership of the trading forum for his misbehaviour.
7.7.2.3 By Colluding with Associates
Another tactic that an ill-intentioned trader can use to try to unfairly exclude an-
other trader from a trading forum’s membership is by colluding with his associates in
the voting process for the exclusion. In this case, the ill-intentioned trader or one of
his associates will multicast the unfair exclusion proposal and the other associates
will participate in the vote in order to manipulate the decision making process.
While the other members of the trading forum who are also participating in the
vote might just ignore the proposal if it is not supported with relevant evidence, the
associates will reply with their agree message in order to obtain a quorate decision
for such an unfair exclusion attempt to be successful. This possibility remains chal-
lenging to address as it involves a conspiracy among a group of accomplices that
can influence the group decision making process.
However, a stringent exclusion policy that requires a large number of agree votes
will help diminish the possibility of such unfair exclusions. This is because the ill-
intentioned traders would require significant numbers of associates in order to obtain
a quorate decision for the exclusion.
7.7.3 Addressing Integrity Issue of a Vote
The integrity of each trader’s votes is another important issue that needs to be
addressed to ensure the reliability of the proposed group membership service, as it
may influence the group decision making process to obtain a quorate decision. There
are at least two possible ways that the integrity of a vote can be compromised, which
include the following:
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7.7.3.1 Altered By a Contact Person
A trader that acts as a contact person might change the content of the votes that
he received from other members of the trading forum in order to manipulate the
group membership decision making process, for example in the voting process of
a membership renewal. By changing the content of some or all of the votes from
disagree to agree, the contact person would be able to obtain sufficient votes to issue
a new membership voucher to his associate although the majority of the voters have
actually given their disapproval for such renewal request.
However, as each vote is digitally signed by its sender, the contact person needs to
steal or compromise the voters’ private keys in order to correspondingly change the
signatures on the contents of the votes that he received, which is not an easy thing
to do. To accomplish the task requires some knowledge and technical skills with
cryptographic keys, as well as an appropriate tool or program.
In addition to that, the other traders who receive the new membership voucher may
be able to detect that the private key used to digitally sign some or all of the votes
has been reported to be compromised when they check the validity of the digital
certificates of the new membership voucher’s signer and voters. The trading software
checks in the authentication process of the digital certificates will alert the traders
that the private key for those certificates have been recorded as being compromised
in their local certificate repository.
7.7.3.2 Altered By an Intermediary Peer
An ill-intentioned trader that acts as an intermediary peer might try to change the
content of the votes that are transmitted through his node in order to subvert the
reliability of the group membership decision making process. However, as traders
are expected to encrypt each of their votes with the public key of the recipient before
sending them to the recipients, it will be a challenging task for the intermediary peer
to alter the content of such encrypted votes. Furthermore, the digital signature of
the sender that is used to digitally sign the votes will ensure that any alteration
made to the votes during transmission will be detected by the recipients. This check
will require the recipient to have a digital certificate for the sender.
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7.8 Discussion
This section discusses the things that a trader in an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system should do to mitigate some of the threats that can subvert the reliability of
its group membership service.
7.8.1 Essential Recommendations When Dealing with Mem-
bership Vouchers
Before accepting any membership claim from any traders, traders of an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system are expected to do the following:
1) Verify the validity of the digital certificate of the presented membership voucher’s
holder to ensure that there is no attempt from any parties to re-join the trading
forum after being excluded from membership.
2) Verify the validity of the digital certificates of the presented membership voucher’s
signer and also its voters to ensure that only parties that have a valid identity
participated in the decision making process to issue the membership voucher.
3) Verify the membership status of the presented membership voucher’s signer and
also its voters to ensure that it is issued by a recognised member and has sufficient
number of votes from recognised members at the time they participated in the vote.
4) Discard any membership voucher that fails to satisfy any of the above verification
processes.
7.8.2 Essential Recommendations When Participating in Group
Membership Decision Making Process
Traders of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system are expected to do the following
when they are involved in any of the voting processes for group membership;
7.8.2.1 As a Contact Person
A trader that acts as a contact person for either a join request or membership renewal
request, is expected to do the following before propagating the request message to
the other members of the trading forum.
1) Verify the validity of the digital certificate of the party who sends the request
163
message, especially the join request message to ensure that there is no attempt by
the sender to re-join the trading forum after being excluded from membership.
2) Do not attest any self-signed digital certificate from a self-professed new member
if unsure about the identity credentials in the certificate. This is to avoid the
possibility of being involved in an attempt by an excluded member to re-join the
trading forum after being excluded from membership.
3) Check the local membership list to ensure that the requestor is not in the list of
parties that are recorded as being excluded or as being subject to a valid exclusion
proposal.
7.8.2.2 As a Voter
Traders that are participating in the group decision making process are expected to
do the following before giving their digitally signed approval or disapproval for any
requests or proposals;
1) Verify the validity of the digital certificate of the party who sends the request
message, especially the join request message to ensure that there is no attempt by
the sender to re-join the trading forum after being excluded from membership.
2) Verify the validity of the digital certificate of the party who acts as a contact
person, especially in the exclusion proposal to ensure that there is no attempt by
that party to spoof another trader’s identity to avoid from being accountable for
any unfair exclusions.
3) Check the local membership list to ensure that both the requestor and contact
person are not in the list of parties that are recorded as being excluded or a subject
in the exclusion proposal.
7.9 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the values of constraining an ad hoc m-commerce trading sys-
tem participation by using a group membership service in order to establish greater
trust and more secure interactions among its group members. It also proposes a
design for a group membership service that does not rely on a complete knowledge
of the current group membership to determine whether a peer is a member of a par-
ticular trading forum. The proposed approach does not demand all group members
participate in group communications frequently and regularly in order to obtain a
quorate decision for managing group membership.
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However, as the attestation process does not involve any authority higher than a
peer and is done independently by each peer based on their partial knowledge of
group membership, membership claims acceptable to a sufficient number of peers to
qualify may not be found acceptable by all other reasonable peers.
This chapter has reviewed the means by which ill-intentioned parties can threaten
to compromise the reliability of the group membership service. It has shown that
appropriate checks can exclude nearly all threats except for those involving very
extensive collusion among enough parties to meet the trading forum’s membership
support requirements. With support from the proposed identity support scheme
[119] and reputation system, the aim is to propose that this type of group member-
ship service could be effectively used to improve the security of ad hoc m-commerce
trading systems by restricting participation to parties regarded as trustworthy by
their peers.
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Chapter 8
Sharing Knowledge About
Potential Threats in an Ad Hoc
M-Commerce Trading Community
8.1 Introduction
In an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, although its security services such as the
identity support scheme, reputation system and group membership service can en-
sure the security of the trading system to a sufficient degree for traders to participate
in its transactions, it cannot be assumed that all traders will always behave properly
and conform to the trading system’s rules and regulations. There might be some
traders who misbehave or breach the norms of acceptable trading behaviour, which
could subsequently pose potential threats that would undermine the functionality
and reliability of such security services. As there is no party who is specially trusted
that can be relied upon to monitor each of the trader’s behaviour in such a loose
ad hoc trading community, having a mechanism that allows traders to share their
knowledge about suspected misbehaviour or malpractice would help to mitigate or
avoid any undesirable consequences or potential threats due to a trader’s misbe-
haviour or malpractice. One way to accomplish this is through the use of security
warnings or alerts.
Warnings or alert messages can be used to inform traders about potential threats
or risks in their transactions, so that they can take the necessary actions to miti-
gate or avoid such threats or risks. Such messages can also serve as a reminder to
influence traders to behave properly and act honestly in each of their transactions
and activities in the trading system, which will subsequently improve the security of
the trading system. This is because if they are detected or suspected to have mis-
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behaved, the information about their misbehaviour might be shared among other
traders and they might lose their reputation or opportunities to trade or be excluded
from the trading system. Thus, in order for them to maintain their good reputation
and so on, they need to behave properly and conform to the trading system’s rules
and regulations.
However, the use of security warnings or alerts in such a loose ad hoc m-commerce
trading community may raise some issues. This is because traders may broadcast
warnings or alert messages based on their suspicions that are not well founded,
which could then raise the issues of libel as there could be an innocent explanation
from the accused parties for the actions that they have done. In addition to that,
ill-intentioned traders may misuse the warnings or alert messages to bully other
traders or to unfairly blacken their reputation, which could subsequently cause a
lot of conflicts as the accused parties may attempt to rebut such accusations. The
accused parties are likely to generate lots of responses to defend themselves from the
accusations and this may cause the network traffic to be heavy with such messages.
Thus, in order to mitigate the above-mentioned issues, the security warning scheme
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system needs to frame a warning or an alert
message in a way that lets it perform its intended function without raising further
problems. The message also needs to be expressed in a reasonably neutral language
and an easy to understand format, and supported with sufficient evidence in order
for it to be considered by the receiving parties. In addition to that, the accused
parties should be given an opportunity to respond to the accusation by giving their
short signed explanation in the message.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 8.2 presents the
security warning scheme for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. Several reference
scenarios are discussed in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 discusses the things that a trader
should and should not do when dealing with warning or alert messages and finally,
Section 8.5 concludes this chapter.
8.2 A Security Warning Scheme for an Ad Hoc
M-Commerce Trading System
This section discusses a detailed scheme of reporting, disseminating and acting on
warnings about suspicious behaviour of a trader or suspected lapses of security.
Any trader detecting such misbehaviour and have sufficient supporting evidence
or uncontestable facts about it may choose to notify other traders in the trading
system about the potential threats by multicasting an alert message. This will allow
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the traders who are exposed to the threats to be aware of their risks and take the
necessary actions to avoid or mitigate those risks.
Traders can generate an alert message by instantiating it from a standard form
approved by the trading forum. A standard form of an alert message should contain
at least the following types of information:
• The trading forum’s name.
• The communication scope to disseminate the alert message.
• The author’s trading pseudonym and date joined the trading forum.
• The date and time the alert message is generated.
• The subject or title of the alert message such as failure of a check in attesting
a certificate, failure of a check in verifying a membership voucher and so on.
• The target party’s trading pseudonym and date joined the trading forum.
• The type of the failures detected such as public key and self-signed signature
mismatch, photo in a presented certificate matches with a photo of another
identity in the local certificate repository, the content of a membership vote is
suspected to have been altered etc.
• The potential impact or consequences of the failures to a trader or the trading
community, in terms of loss of reputation or customers, or its influence to the
certificate attestation or authentication processes, membership group decision
making processes, and so on.
• The date and location the incident takes place.
• Short description on the incident and how the failure was detected.
• Short comments on the incident.
• Recommended actions to be taken by the recipients, such as to save the suspi-
cious certificate in the list of certificates that have been broadcast alerts about,
to exercise caution before relying on a membership voucher etc.
• Attached documents as evidence to support the alert message. Warning or
alert messages without any supporting evidence should not be considered.
• Short signed explanation or comments by the target party. Alerts without
signed repostes in them should be judged as less satisfactory because the target
party has not added any response.
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• The digital signature of the author to ensure that he cannot credibly deny
having sent the warning message.
Figure 8.1: A warning or alert message example
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate two examples of an alert message that might be
sent due to a failure in a certificate attestation check. The parties who receive the
message are then expected to perform the following:
1) Verify the identity of the author of the warning or alert message through a
certificate authentication process as discussed in Section 5.5.3.2, before deciding to
store or discard or forward it to other traders. If all the checks in the authentication
process are satisfactory, the sender is a credible party and there is sufficient evidence
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Figure 8.2: Another example of a warning or alert message
to support the message, the recipients are expected to store the warning or alert
message for future reference and forward it to other traders. Otherwise, they may
choose to ignore or discard the message.
2) Forward the message to other traders at later junctions until the message’s liveness
expires to ensure that those who missed the alert message have another chance to
receive it, or those who ignored an earlier message, have another opportunity to
reconsider it.
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8.3 Reference Scenarios
8.3.1 Failure in a Certificate Attestation Check
Consider the scenario where the trading software check in step 4 in Section 5.5.3.1
(A) finds that a photo in a presented certificate is similar to the photo of an existing
identity in the local certificate repository and further checks done by the attestor
on the existing identity’s certificate finds that it has been issued with an exclusion
proposal. Furthermore, when the attestor meets with the presenting party in person,
it is found that his physical appearance is similar with the photo in both certificates.
In this case, it could be an attempt by the presenting party to re-enter the trading
forum with a new identity and thus, the attestor should refuse to sign the presented
certificate. However, the presenting party may then request another trader to attest
his new certificate and if that trader does not have the certificate of the other identity
in his local certificate repository, he may sign the presented certificate.
In such a case, if the first attestor multicast a warning or an alert message as
illustrated in Figure 8.1 to other traders in the trading forum, it could alert them
to be careful and take the necessary actions if they receive a certificate attestation
request from the same party. If there is an attempt by the presenting party to re-
enter the trading forum with a new identity, this could reduce the likelihood of such
an attempt to be successful. The short signed explanation or response by the target
party will help the relying parties to consider whether the issue being expressed in
the message is satisfactory or not.
8.3.2 Failure in a Certificate Authentication Check
Consider another scenario where a trading software check in step 5 in Section
5.5.3.2(A) finds that a copy of the certificate presented by a trader who multicast a
proposal to exclude another trader from the trading forum membership, is recorded
as ”suspected compromised” in the local certificate repository. A physical meeting
with that trader finds that his physical appearance is sufficiently different from the
photo in the presented certificate. Thus, it is expected that the relying parties will
ignore the exclusion proposal as the presented certificate should no longer be trusted
and there is sufficient evidence that its sender is using a spoofed identity to send
such a proposal. However, there could be parties who receive the exclusion proposal
that do not have a copy of the actual party’s certificate in their local certificate
repository, or may have not received the notification about the theft of that cer-
tificate’ private key yet. In this case, they may agree with the exclusion proposal,
which could then result in an unfair exclusion to the target party.
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However, if the relying parties who detect such a failure, multicast a warning or alert
message as illustrated in Figure 8.3 to other traders in the trading forum, it could
alert them to exercise caution and take the necessary actions when they receive an
exclusion proposal from the same party. This could help to reduce the possibility
for such an unfair exclusion.
Figure 8.3: An example of a warning or alert message for a failure in a certificate
authentication check
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8.4 Discussion
This section discusses the responsibilities of a trader as an author or a relying party
of a warning or an alert message.
8.4.1 Responsibilities as an Author
As an author of a warning or an alert message, traders should be aware of the
following responsibilities when issuing such messages so that they won’t create issues
like libel risks and so on.
1) Ensure that there is adequate evidence or uncontestable facts that fraud is being
attempted before issuing any warnings or alert messages.
2) Make sure the title and contents of the warning or alert message do not suggest
anything that will lead to libel risks.
3) Do not use any words or terms that impute bad intentions or could lead other
traders to wrong conclusions.
4) Avoid exaggerating any facts or evidence.
5) If possible, get a response from the target party about the issue being expressed
in the alert message before multicasting it to other traders.
8.4.2 Responsibilities as a Relying Party
As a relying party, traders should be aware of the following responsibilities.
1) Forward a warning or an alert message to other traders only if convinced that
fraud is being attempted, the identity of its source or author is verified, its content
has not been altered and supporting evidence is available.
2) Ignore or discard any warnings or alert messages if the identity of its source or
author cannot be verified, its content is suspected to have been altered, or supporting
evidence is not available or insufficient or unsatisfactory.
3) Take into account any response from the target party which is included in the
warning or alert message, before deciding to accept or ignore it.
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8.5 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the importance of allowing traders to share their knowledge
about suspected misbehaviour or malpractice with other traders in the trading sys-
tem by using warnings or alert messages. Although there are advantages that can
be obtained by sharing such knowledge, it may also raise further issues such as libel,
as the warnings or alert messages could be circulated based on unsound suspicions,
or be maliciously inspired.
Thus, this chapter proposes a security warning scheme that is framed in a reasonably
neutral way so that ill-intentioned traders cannot easily use the warnings or alert
messages to support malpractice and does not encourage traders to leap to wrong
conclusions. With support from the identity support scheme, reputation system and
group membership service, the aim of this security warning scheme is to improve the
security of the trading system by allowing traders to share knowledge about potential
threats or risks, so that they will be wary in relevant transactions. However, before
deciding to circulate any warnings or alert messages, traders are expected to consider
the prudence, ethics and legal implications of issuing such messages.
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Chapter 9
Formal Verification of Ad Hoc
M-commerce Trading Systems
with SPIN
9.1 Introduction
The reliability of ad hoc m-commerce trading systems is important to increase users’
confidence in the safety and correctness of the trading system. However, designing
a reliable ad hoc m-commerce trading system is a challenging task. Such trading
systems with complex processes may not function in an expected way or may be
prone to failure due to common design flaws such as system deadlock, livelock and
so on. For example, a trading request from a potential trader can be unexpectedly
rejected due to these design flaws, resulting in that trader to lose an opportunity to
engage in a particular transaction.
Thus, in order to ensure the reliability of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, it
is necessary to ensure that it satisfies enough system correctness properties. There
are at least two categories of correctness properties that a system usually wants to
satisfy, which are safety properties and liveness properties [13]. The safety properties
assert that bad things should not happen, which means that a program should
not enter an unacceptable state. The liveness properties assert that eventually
something good happens, which means that a program eventually enters a desirable
state.
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One way to check whether the processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
satisfy its desired correctness properties is by performing formal verification of the
system. A formal verification is a process of checking whether the design of a system
satisfies certain requirements or properties. Thus, this chapter presents a formal
verification of the processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system to ensure
the reliability of the trading system, through an example of verifying the processes
in one of its main trading steps using the SPIN model checker. However, it only
concentrates on verifying certain safety properties of ad hoc m-commerce trading
systems.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 9.2 discusses the
method used for formal verification of ad hoc m-commerce trading systems. Section
9.3 specifies the processes involved in the formal verification of ad hoc m-commerce
trading systems. Section 9.4 discusses how the specified ad an hoc m-commerce
trading system processes can be translated into a PROMELA model. Section 9.5
specifies the safety properties to be verified and presents the verification results.
Finally, Section 9.6 concludes this chapter.
9.2 Verification Method
There are several methods that can be used to verify the correctness properties of a
system, which include simulation, testing, deductive verification and model checking
[16]. Model checking seems to be the appropriate approach for ensuring the safety
properties of ad hoc m-commerce trading systems due to its ability to easily deal with
system properties such as safety and liveness properties. It provides an automated
way to check whether a system satisfies certain properties, by building an abstract
model of the system and exploring all of its possible execution paths.
To verify the safety properties of ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, the model
checker SPIN will be used as a model checking tool.
9.2.1 SPIN
SPIN is one of the most prominent model checker tools that can be used for the
formal verification of distributed and concurrent systems [75],[5],[141]. It is designed
to perform model checking and simulation on a verification model of a system written
in PROMELA (Process Meta-Language).
A PROMELA model consists of processes, message channels and variables. Pro-
cesses are the system components that communicate with each other via message
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channels and shared variables. With SPIN, the PROMELA models can be ana-
lyzed to verify the correctness of a system’s behaviour or desired properties that are
specified using LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) statements [141].
9.3 Ad Hoc M-commerce Trading Processes
To engage in ad hoc m-commerce transactions, traders must perform at least the
following four main steps (the details of each step are discussed in Section 4.4):
Step 1 - Exchange trading standing
Step 2 - Agree a deal
Step 3 - Direct interaction to complete transaction
Step 4 - Exchange deal evaluations
However, as most of the main processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
occur during the exchange trading standing step, this thesis will use the processes in
this step for the formal verification of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. The
processes include the PGP authentication process, membership voucher verification
process and also reputation check process.
9.3.1 Exchange Trading Standing Processes
The exchange trading standing step is initiated when a trader receives a trading
request together with a digitally signed trading standing from a potential trading
partner. The digitally signed trading standing consists of the requested party’s
PGP certificate, membership voucher and a set of his recent deal evaluations and
any testimonials that he has. The ad hoc m-commerce trading system will first check
the validity of the presented PGP certificate through the certificate authentication
process (Chapter 5). If the check is successful, it will then check the validity of the
presented membership voucher through the membership voucher verification process
(Chapter 7). If not, it will alert the trader with a failure notification. If both PGP
certificate and membership voucher checks are successful, it will then evaluate the
requested party’s reputation (Chapter 6). If the result of the reputation checks is
satisfactory, the trader will decide whether or not to enter into the transaction, after
considering the potential transaction risks.
If the trader decides to proceed with the transaction, he will need to send an agree
message together with his trading standing to the potential trading partner so that
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he can perform the same process before they can proceed to agree a deal step.
Otherwise, the trading request will be rejected and the process will be terminated.
Figure 9.1 illustrates how the processes in the exchange trading standing step can be
modeled as a BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation) diagram [6]. The model
is presented as a BPMN diagram because it provides a standard, easy to define and
also understand the core elements in a business process, which is required to specify
the processes involved in the Exchange Trading Standing step.
Figure 9.1: A BPMN model for the exchange trading standing processes
9.4 The Promela Model
This section will specify the activities involved in the exchange trading standing
process as a PROMELA model. In this PROMELA model, six (6) global channels
(denoted by the array of channels ch) are required to allow communication between
two given activities, for example, channel ch[0] is used to establish communication
between Trading Request activity and Verify PGP Certificate activity.
Trading Request - This activity is initiated by receiving a request from a potential
trading party for a trade and is translated into the PROMELA process tradingRe-
quest as follows:
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proctype tradingRequest( ) /* A trader request for a trade */
{
ch[0]!1;
}
Verify PGP Certificate - This activity will check the validity of a PGP certificate
sent by the requested party (the details of the PGP certificate checks are discussed
in Chapter 5) and it has to choose one of the two possibilities; whether to acti-
vate the verifyMembership process or sendFailurenotice process, depending
on the result of the check. This activity is translated into the PROMELA process
verifyCert as follows:
proctype verifyCert(mtype certstatus)
{ int x;
ch[0]?x; /* To receive from tradingRequest */
if
:: certstatus == Passed ->ch[1]!1; run verifyMembership(...);goto End;
:: certstatus == Failed ->ch[2]!1; run sendFailurenotice(); goto End;
:: else ->goto End;
fi;
End: skip;
}
Send Failure Notice - This activity will be activated when the check done by
the verifyCert or verifyMembership or checkReputation or proceedTrad-
ing processes fails. It will inform the trader to reject the trading request and
terminate the process. This activity is translated into the following PROMELA
process sendFailurenotice :
179
proctype sendFailurenotice()
{ int y;
ch[2]?y; /* To receive from verifyCert or VerifyMembership
or checkReputation or proceedTrading */
}
Verify Membership Voucher - This activity will check the validity of a member-
ship voucher of the requested party (the details of the membership voucher checks
are discussed in Chapter 7) and it has to choose one of the two possibilities; whether
to activate the checkReputation process or sendFailurenotice process, depend-
ing on the result of the check.
It is translated into the PROMELA process verifyMembership as follows:.
proctype verifyMembership(mtype memberstatus)
{ int x;
ch[1]?x; /* To receive from verifyCert */
if
:: memberstatus == Passed ->ch[3]!1; run checkReputation(...);goto End;
:: memberstatus == Failed ->ch[2]!1; run sendFailurenotice(); goto End;
:: else ->goto End;
fi;
End: skip;
}
Check Reputation - This activity will check the reputation of the requested party
and it has to choose one of the two possibilities, whether to activate the proceed-
Trading process or sendFailurenotice process; depending on the result of the
reputation check. It is translated to the following PROMELA process checkRep-
utation :
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proctype checkReputation(mtype rstatus)
{ int x;
ch[3]?x; /* To receive from verifyMembership */
if
:: rstatus == Passed ->ch[4]!1; run proceedTrading(...);goto End;
:: rstatus == Failed ->ch[2]!1; run sendFailurenotice(); goto End;
:: else ->goto End;
fi;
End: skip;
}
Proceed Trading - This activity will inform the trader that the PGP certificate,
membership voucher and reputation checks are successful. The trader can then
choose one of the two possibilities; whether to accept or reject the trading request.
It is translated to the PROMELA process proceedTrading as follows:
proctype proceedTrading(mtype decision)
{ int x;
ch[4]?x; /* To receive from checkReputation */
if
:: decision == OK ->ch[5]!1; run sendAgreeresponse(); goto End;
:: decision == No ->ch[2]!1; run sendFailurenotice(); goto End;
:: else ->goto End;
fi;
End: skip;
}
Send Agree Response - This activity is activated by the activity Proceed Trad-
ing and will inform the trader to proceed with the trading by sending an agree
message to the requested party.
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proctype sendAgreeresponse()
{ int x
ch[5]?x; /* To receive from proceedTrading */
}
Below is the corresponding PROMELA model description that is translated from
the BPMN diagram in Figure 9.1.
mtype = {None, Passed, Failed, OK, No};
chan ch[6] = [1] of {int};
proctype tradingRequest() {...}
proctype verifyCert(mtype certstatus) {...}
proctype sendFailurenotice() {...}
proctype verifyMembership(mtype memberstatus) {...}
proctype checkReputation(mtype rstatus) {...}
proctype proceedTrading(mtype decision) {...}
proctype sendAgreeresponse() {...}
init { atomic { run tradingRequest(); run verifyCert(Passed); } }
9.5 Properties Verification
To ensure that the processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system satisfy certain
safety properties, this thesis will consider the following properties to be verified using
the SPIN model checker:
1. The first property to be verified is whether the processes in the exchange trading
standing step are free from system deadlock. System deadlock is one example
of the default system safety properties. It is a situation in which two competing
processes are each waiting for the other to complete before proceeding, resulting in
both processes ceasing to function. To verify this property, the setting parameter
within the ”Safety” panel in the SPIN model checker tool (iSpin) is set to ”invalid
end state (deadlock)”. This will check if there is any process that does not reach
the end of its code upon termination (invalid end state). If there is any process
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found to be in that state, an error will be reported. This indicates that there is
a system deadlock.
However, the output within the verification result panel shows that the verifica-
tion is successful (no errors found), as as illustrated in Figure 9.2. This shows
that every instantiated process is in a valid end-state and thus, it verifies the
absence of system deadlock.
Figure 9.2: Verification result for deadlock freedom properties
2. The second property to be verified is that the trading request process will never
accept and reject the same request. To express this property, a global bool variable
trade is used and the following definitions are made:
#define start (trade==false) ; /* when the process starts */
#define accept (trade==true); /* before activity sendAgreeresponse ends */
#define reject (trade==false); /* before activity sendFailurenotice ends */
This property is then expressed in LTL as follows:
! ( <>( accept && reject ) )
To verify this property, the setting parameter within the ”Never Claims” panel
is set to ”use claim”. This will check if the never claim statement is matched. If
it is matched by any system execution, then an error will be reported.
The result of the verification shows that there is no error found, as illustrated in
Figure 9.3. This indicates that this property is successfully verified.
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Figure 9.3: Verification result for second property
3. The third property to be verified is that whenever the trading request process is
invocated, the process will either accept or reject the request. This property can
be formally expressed in LTL as follows:
[ ] ( start -><>( accept x x reject ) )
Similar to the second property, to verify this property, the setting parameter
within the ”Never Claims” panel is set to ”use claim”. The verification result
shows that there is no error reported, as illustrated in Figure 9.4, which indicates
that this property is successfully verified with SPIN.
4. The fourth property to be verified is that it is impossible for a trading request
to be accepted unless the checks on the requested party’s PGP certificate, mem-
bership voucher and reputation are satisfactory. To express this property, the
following definitions are added:
#define cert OK (trade==true) ; /* if certificate check passed */
#define member OK (trade==true) ; /* if membership check passed */
#define reputation OK (trade==true) ; /* if reputation check passed */
This property is expressed in LTL as follows:
[ ] ( ! accept U ( cert OK && member OK && reputation OK ) )
To verify this property, the setting parameter within the ”Never Claims” panel is
again set to ”use claim”. The result of the verification shows that this property
is also successfully verified, as illustrated in Figure 9.5
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Figure 9.4: Verification result for third property
Figure 9.5: Verification result for fourth property
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9.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an approach to verify certain safety properties of ad
hoc m-commerce trading systems, by performing a formal verification of the pro-
cesses of its exchange trading standing step using the SPIN model checker. It has
discussed how the activities involved in the exchange trading standing step can be
translated into a PROMELA model. It also has specified several safety properties
to be verified and discussed how the specified safety properties can be expressed in
LTL statements.
The model checking with SPIN verifies that the ad hoc m-commerce trading system
is free from system deadlock and satisfies the other specified safety properties.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
This chapter discusses this thesis. Section 9.1 summarizes the entire research work.
Section 9.2 discusses the limitations of this research work. Finally, Section 9.3
outlines the future works that can be done to extend or improve this research work.
10.1 Summary
This thesis concludes that ad hoc m-commerce is a new paradigm for conducting
m-commerce wirelessly outside established computer networks and in a pure P2P
architecture. It has argued that reliable security services can be supported under its
constraints which can enforce security to a sufficient degree for trading to be viable
using it. In that way it shows that ad hoc m-commerce is a viable alternative for
mobile e-commerce to standard Internet m-commerce.
Although security analysis of the proposed security services shows that they have
a useful effect in limiting the potential risk and impact of many kinds of fraud
and cheating, they cannot stop fraud and cheating in such a loose ad hoc trading
community. Thus, similar to non-digital marketplaces where traders are usually
wary when dealing with unknown parties, traders in an ad hoc m-commerce also
need to be wary and on the alert in each of their transactions.
10.1.1 Research Challenges
The current implementation of m-commerce predominantly utilizes infrastructure-
based architectures (client/server and hybrid P2P based architectures), where users
make use of a pre-established infrastructure supported by a network service provider.
These kind of architectures are relatively stable, easy to implement and able to sup-
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port a wide range of users and businesses that are located locally or globally. These
architectures usually have better security as they can rely on the security services
provided by a network service provider. However, although there are a variety of
wireless communication standards that can be used by the users to participate in
infrastructure-supported m-commerce, network connectivity cannot be guaranteed
in some places especially in rural areas, and users often have to pay subscription
fees in order to get connected to the network.
An ad hoc architecture has rival attractions by providing a more convenient, flex-
ible and low cost way of enabling m-commerce. With the advancement of mobile
devices that are getting smaller, have longer lasting batteries and more functions,
and also a rapid improvement in wireless communication technologies, there is a
growing potential for this kind of architecture to be an interesting alternative for
traders to perform m-commerce trading. However, the process of designing and de-
veloping ad hoc m-commerce services and applications is inherently more complex
and challenging, as compared to infrastructure-supported m-commerce. This is due
to the fact that they are executed on resource constrained devices and in an environ-
ment that is dynamic and cannot rely on any infrastructure support from a network
service provider or any authority higher than a peer. Thus, careful consideration
is required when designing and developing its supporting services especially with
respect to security.
10.1.2 A Novel Design Framework for Ad hoc M-Commerce
Trading Systems
Chapter 4 of this thesis proposes a novel framework for m-commerce trading that is
conducted online and wirelessly outside established computer networks. It has fea-
tures and characteristics for pure P2P m-commerce. It defines a standard trading
model for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and presents an abstract architec-
ture for an ad hoc m-commerce trading peer that specifies the services required to
support the core functionality of the trading system. In this framework, the ad hoc
m-commerce transactions involve only two main entities (buyers and sellers) that
are peers with a similar role. These two entities communicate and cooperate with
each other using their available resources to carry out m-commerce transactions
and also handle the security services of the trading system without relying on any
infrastructure support from a mobile network operator.
To suit the nature, characteristics and security requirements of an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system, this framework addresses the identified threats in the following ways:
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• Online Identity Establishment - A PGP web of trust scheme is adopted to
let the traders of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system establish their online
identity in a fully self-organised manner, without any mediation of a CA. The
scheme uses a trading pseudonym and a photograph as identity credentials in
a PGP certificate.
• Trust Establishment - A fully distributed reputation system is adopted to
allows traders to share their trading experience with their peers, in order to
foster trust among them.
• Attestation Mechanism - The attestation mechanism is used as a means for
traders to vouch for the validity of other traders’ identity credentials, mem-
bership status and reputation.
• Group Membership Management - The ad hoc m-commerce trading sys-
tem framework employs group membership as a means to constrain the trading
system’s participation to only parties that are regarded as reasonably trust-
worthy by their peers.
• Sanction-backed Mechanism - A sanction-backed mechanism is incorpo-
rated in the reputation system as an incentive for traders to behave in a proper
manner especially in fulfilling their transaction agreement and providing truth-
ful deal evaluations and testimonials.
• Security Warning Scheme - A security warning scheme is used as a means
for traders to report and disseminate suspicious behaviour or suspected secu-
rity violations in the trading system.
10.1.3 Thesis Achievements
This thesis makes the following research contributions:
I. A novel reference model for ad hoc m-commerce has been developed. This
reference model establishes the concept of ad hoc m-commerce and identifies
the characteristics, requirements, main entities and key functional components
of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system. It also outlines the key issues that
need to be addressed in order to realise such a trading system practically. This
reference model is useful to help future researchers to have a better under-
standing of the nature of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, as well as to
grasp the key issues involved in such trading. (Chapter 2)
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II. A threat model for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system has been defined.
The threat model identifies potential threats and vulnerabilities that could sub-
vert the functionality of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system and classifies
them into three main categories, namely identity related-threats, information-
related threats and misbehaviour related-threats. The threat model also iden-
tifies three key security requirements for the design of the security services
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, namely constraining participation,
sharing trading experience and sharing expressions of trust. Possible counter-
measures to address or mitigate each category of threats have been identified,
studied and critically analysed. In addition to that, the ways in which the
appropriate countermeasures can be modified and implemented to suit with
the security requirements, as well as the nature and characteristics of an ad
hoc wireless network have been studied, analysed and evaluated. (Chapter 3)
III. A novel framework for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system has been for-
mulated. This framework defines a standard trading model for an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system and an abstract architecture that specifies the
core services that are required to support the functionality of the trading sys-
tem. It addresses the identified threats in a way that is suitable to the nature,
characteristics and security requirements of an ad hoc m-commerce trading
system. Compared with infrastructure-supported m-commerce architectures,
the ad hoc m-commerce framework provides several advantages in terms of pro-
viding a more convenient, flexible and low cost way of building m-commerce.
(Chapter 4)
IV. A novel identity support scheme for a security and trust service in an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system has been designed and evaluated. This scheme
is designed to allow traders to collaborate with each other to establish their
online identity using PGP digital certificates and handle the attestation and
authentication processes of those certificates in a fully self-organised and P2P
manner, without any mediation of a CA. A security analysis is given on the
proposed design to show that appropriate checks on a trader’s PGP certificate
in the certificate attestation and authentication processes can help traders to
detect misrepresentation of identity credentials in a PGP certificate in a signifi-
cant number of scenarios, or at least be alerted that further checks are required
to verify the validity of such certificates. (Chapter 5)
V. A fully distributed reputation system with high availability, efficient retrieval
and reliable reputation information has been designed and evaluated. A secu-
rity analysis is given on the proposed design to show that it can help traders
detect or mitigate the identified misbehaviour-related threats to a sufficient
degree. (Chapter 6)
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VI. A novel group membership service for constraining traders’ participation into
an ad hoc m-commerce trading system has been designed and evaluated. Based
on the security analysis that has been given on the proposed design, it shows
that appropriate checks on a trader’s membership voucher and votes can mit-
igate the major threats except for those involving extensive collusion among
enough parties to meet the trading forum’s membership support requirements.
(Chapter 7)
VII. A security warning scheme to improve the security of an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system has been proposed. This scheme is designed to alert traders
about potential threats or risks in their transactions. (Chapter 8)
VIII. An ad hoc m-commerce trading model that satisfies certain system safety prop-
erties. A formal verification using the SPIN model checker verifies that the
processes of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system satisfy the specified safety
properties, including the deadlock-freedom property. (Chapter 9)
Table 10.1 summarizes the objectives and achievements of this research.
Research Objectives Outcomes
Objective I Achievement I
A novel reference model for ad hoc m-commerce
Objectives II, III and IV Achievement II
A novel threat model for ad hoc m-commerce
Objective V Achievement III
A novel framework for ad hoc m-commerce
Objective VI Achievement IV
A novel identity support scheme for ad hoc
m-commerce
Achievement V
A fully distributed reputation system for ad hoc
m-commerce
Achievement VI
A novel group membership service for ad hoc
m-commerce
Achievement VII
A security warning scheme for ad hoc m-commerce
Objective VII Achievement VIII
An ad hoc m-commerce trading model that satisfies
the specified safety properties
Table 10.1: Summary of the objectives and achievements of the research
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10.2 Limitations
This research work has some limitations, which include the following:
I. The proposed design of security services only addresses or proposes to mitigate
the most relevant threats in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, which
include identity-related threats, information-related threats and misbehaviour
related threats. Other possible threats arising in relation to the perversion
of the code of ad hoc m-commerce applications, subverting the confidentiality
of network communications and compromising the physical security of mobile
devices are not yet addressed or considered.
II. Only two of the core services that are required to support the functionality
of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, which include a security and trust
service, and membership service have been designed and evaluated, but not
yet implemented. Other core services remain to be designed, implemented
and evaluated, such as discovery service, messaging service and forum decision
making service.
III. The effectiveness of the proposed design of the security and trust service, and
also membership service in addressing the identified threats has been evaluated
based only on an informal proof of security, where the means by which the
reliability of such services can be compromised by ill-intentioned parties were
critically analysed and reviewed. Although this kind of security evaluation has
purported to show that such security services are able to detect and address
nearly all of the identified threats to a sufficient degree, it would be more
credible if a security validation based on experience with a concrete realisation
of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system framework could be carried out to
demonstrate that such security services are able to support the security of
a real ad hoc m-commerce trading system, as well as to identify flaws and
weaknesses in their design components. However, as a full prototype of ad hoc
m-commerce applications has not yet been developed, it is infeasible to carry
out such a security validation.
IV. The proposed design of the identity support scheme has several limitations.
The software checks in both the certificate attestation and authentication pro-
cesses can only detect misrepresentations of identity credentials in a presented
PGP certificate if a copy of that certificate and/or its signatories’ certificates
are available to the user. Also, such checks can only detect attempts by ill-
intentioned parties to create multiple identities or re-enter the trading system
with a new identity if the copy of the certificate for their other identities are
available to the user. Although the trading software will alert traders to check
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around that the party in question is known by his pseudonym and meet that
party in person to verify his physical appearance if a copy of such certificates
is not available locally, there is no guarantee that they will be able to obtain
such information and/or detect that the presenting party is not the real owner
of the presented certificate, or has other identities. This is because the other
trusted parties also may not have the copy of the certificates or they may not
be available during the period when such information is required. In addition
to that, the traders might not be suspicious of the validity of the presented cer-
tificate if the real physical appearance of the presenting party shows some or a
clear resemblance to the photo appearance in the presented certificate. How-
ever, such an alert from the trading software will help to reduce the likelihood
of a successful attempt.
V. As the design of a fully distributed reputation system for an ad hoc m-commerce
trading system only aims at providing an effective way to facilitate trust devel-
opment among traders by addressing the three key design issues as discussed in
Section 6.3, there is no complete scheme for evaluating deals that considers the
nature and characteristics of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system, as well as
the limited capabilities of mobile devices has been designed and implemented.
VI. A prototype for any of the potential ad hoc m-commerce applications has not
yet been developed. The development of such a prototype would require other
core services such as a discovery service, messaging service and a forum decision
making service to be designed and implemented first in order for an ad hoc
m-commerce trading system and its security services to be fully functional. It
would be the first step towards a realization of ad hoc m-commerce trading
systems in the real world. Such a prototype could be used to provide concrete
experience of conducting ad hoc m-commerce trading in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach of its core services, as well as to discover
other as yet unanticipated possible threats or vulnerabilities in such a trading
system.
10.3 Future Work
There are several ways to extend or improve this research and address the limitations
identified in Section 9.2.
I. To complete the implementation of the security services for an ad hoc m-
commerce trading system by addressing other possible threats which relate
to the perversion of the code of ad hoc m-commerce applications, network
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communications and compromised of the physical security of mobile devices.
This would improve the security of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system.
II. To complete the implementation of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system
framework. This might be achieved by designing and implementing the other
core services which include the discovery service, messaging service and also
forum decision making service. These services are important to enable the
traders of an ad hoc m-commerce trading system to communicate and collab-
orate with each other in order to participate in m-commerce transactions and
also handle the security services of the trading system.
III. To address the limitations of the proposed identity support scheme. This might
be achieved by investigating approaches to improve the PGP certificate attesta-
tion and authentication processes and make the process of sharing expressions
of trust among traders in such a loose and dynamic trading system more effec-
tive and reliable.
IV. To design, implement and evaluate a more appropriate scheme for evaluating
deals for a fully distributed reputation system for an ad hoc m-commerce trad-
ing system. The scheme should be at least simple to understand, quick to use,
able to clearly differentiate out different quality aspects and suitable to be used
on resource constrained mobile devices.
V. To develop a complete prototype of a specific ad hoc m-commerce application
so that the functionality and viability of such a trading system can be tested
and the effectiveness of its security services and other core services can be
validated based on concrete experience with the prototype in a more realistic
scenario.
VI. To explore other methods of security validation for a more convincing result and
more credible proof of security. For example, to engage hostile security experts
to do sceptical reviews or give critical evaluations based on their experience
with a concrete implementation of the ad hoc m-commerce trading system
prototype.
VII. To address the other issues at stake that might restrain the development of an
ad hoc m-commerce trading system in order to realise it practically in the real
world, such as mobile device issues, ad hoc wireless network issues, transaction
management issues and so on.
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 Towards a Reference Model for M-
Commerce over Ad Hoc Wireless 
Networks 
Husna Osman, Hamish Taylor  
Abstract — Wireless trading outside established computer networks is an emerging class of mobile application for which 
there seems to be a growing demand. It enables mobile users to wirelessly engage in online trading regardless of time or 
location. However, better understanding of the complex issues at stake is needed before effective systems of this kind can 
be designed and built. Developing a reference model is one way to provide this understanding. M-commerce is defined 
and its elements, requirements and issues are discussed. The characteristics, functional components, application types, 
security requirements and issues of   ad hoc m-commerce are then analyzed and distinguished. 
Index Terms —  e-commerce, mobile computing, spontaneous dealing, wireless trading. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
erforming m-commerce transactions 
over ad hoc wireless networks or ad 
hoc m-commerce can be considered as 
wireless trading outside established computer 
networks. It enables users to engage in m-
commerce transactions by using computing 
resources on nearby devices without the 
need for infrastructure support from a 
network service provider [1]. 
However, to make ad hoc m-commerce a 
reality, it is important to clearly understand ad 
hoc wireless networking as well as m-
commerce concepts, requirements and 
challenges. Therefore, having a reference 
model should help to grasp the key issues 
involved in trading wirelessly among 
computing nodes in the absence of a network 
service provider. It will facilitate discussion on 
distinguishing aspects and issues of ad hoc 
m-commerce as well as be useful in 
identifying and facilitating Research and 
Development (R&D) for a wide range of ad 
hoc m-commerce applications. A reference 
model will: 
1. Establish a taxonomy of terminologies, 
concepts and definitions required for 
describing ad hoc m-commerce. 
2. Identify all the functional elements in 
ad hoc m-commerce systems and 
clarify dependencies among them. 
3. Identify any issues that might restrain 
the development of ad hoc m-
commerce that need to be addressed 
to realise it practically. 
Hence, this paper proposes the elements 
of an ad hoc m-commerce reference model to 
serve as a basis for understanding the nature 
as well as the requirements for performing 
such trading. The rest of this paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
nature of m-commerce, its functional 
components and also requirements. Section 
3 discusses several essential m-commerce 
issues in detail. Section 4 describes ad hoc 
m-commerce and discusses its specific 
issues and possible applications. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2 M-COMMERCE 
2.1 M-Commerce Definition 
The term m-commerce has been defined in a 
variety of ways in different literatures 
[2],[3],[4],[5]. Some of these definitions seem 
to restrict m-commerce to business 
transactions that are conducted solely over a 
mobile telecommunication network and 
involve the transfer of monetary values. 
However, m-commerce transactions do not 
necessarily involve the transfer of money and 
can be conducted over other means of 
wireless communication. Furthermore, all 
commercial transaction steps need not be 
carried out electronically. While some 
transactions are initiated and completed 
electronically, some transactions may be 
initiated electronically but completed off-line. 
Therefore, in this paper, m-commerce is 
defined as a set of activities relating to the 
exchange of information, services and goods 
for either money or other information, 
services and goods, which is conducted fully 
or partly online over wireless technology 
using mobile devices. In a fully online 
transaction, all transaction processes, which 
include the advertising, negotiating, ordering, 
payment and delivery processes, are 
conducted electronically. In a partly online 
transaction, the transaction may be initiated 
P 
H. OSMAN AND H. TAYLOR: TOWARDS A REFERENCE MODEL FOR M-COMMERCE OVER AD HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS 
 
- 2 - 
electronically but not completed 
electronically. Steps like the advertising, 
negotiating and ordering processes may be 
done online but other steps like payment and 
delivery processes may be done off-line.  
M-commerce has several unique 
characteristics. Based upon different 
literatures [6],[7],[8] m-commerce’s 
distinguishing characteristics can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Location and Motion Independence 
 The portability of mobile devices, the 
pervasiveness of mobile network 
access and widespread m-commerce 
service availability makes m-
commerce transactions possible 
irrespective of where the user is or 
whether the user is moving. 
2. Localizability 
 Technologies like Global Positioning 
System (GPS) enable users and 
mobile network operators to locate 
each other and to make access to 
commerce services specific to their 
location. 
3. Personalisation 
 Mobile devices are usually not shared 
among users. This enables users to  
customise these devices to their  
individual commerce service 
requirements.  
2.2 M-Commerce Functional Components 
M-commerce systems involves various 
disciplines and technologies [9]. In order to 
have a clear understanding of m-commerce 
systems, it is essential to identify their 
components as well as to recognize their 
functions and dependencies with one 
another. We follow [9] in dividing m-
commerce systems into six components. 
1. Mobile Commerce Applications  
 There are a wide variety of existing 
and potential m-commerce 
applications. These applications can 
be classified into several classes as 
listed in table 1. 
 
2. Mobile Stations or Devices 
 Mobile devices with sufficient power in 
terms of memory, display and 
communications functionalities enable 
consumers to engage in m-commerce 
transactions regardless of time or 
location.  
3. Mobile Middleware 
 Mobile middleware can be defined as 
an enabling layer of software that joins 
together different mobile applications, 
networks and technologies via a 
common set of interfaces [10]. It 
enables m-commerce applications to 
function with greater reliability as well 
as to provide better response times.  
4. Wireless Networks 
 In addition to mobile devices and 
middleware, networking support from 
wireless networks plays an essential 
role in realizing m-commerce 
applications. Wireless networking 
technology available to support m-
commerce includes operator-driven 
networks like GPRS and UMTS, 
wireless LAN via Wi-Fi (Infrastructure 
and Mobile Ad Hoc Wireless Network) 
and wireless PAN via Bluetooth. 
5. Wired Networks 
 Although this component is an option, 
most computers or servers that are 
used to execute transaction processes 
and store all the transaction 
information usually reside on wired 
networks. 
6. Host Computers 
 Host computers are used to process 
and store m-commerce transaction 
related information such as Web 
servers and database servers.  
2.3 Main Entities in M-Commerce System 
Generally, there are four main entities in m-
commerce systems [11]. 
1. Customer 
 The person who is mainly mobile and 
makes use of the m-commerce system 
for the purpose of obtaining and 
paying for contents, products or 
services offered by merchants or 
content/service providers. 
2. Merchant or Content/Service Provider 
 The entity that provides the contents, 
products and services to customers 
either directly or through a mobile 
network operator. 
3. Mobile Network Operator 
 The entity that provides the network 
connectivity that links customers, 
merchants and financial institutions. 
4. Financial Institution 
TABLE 1 
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 The entity that provides the payment 
mechanism such as EFTPOS or ATM 
service. 
2.4 Entities Relationships in the M-
Commerce Value Chain 
Entity relationships in an m-commerce value 
chain can vary depending on the types of 
transactions. For example, a relatively simple 
transaction such as buying a soft drink from a 
vending machine would only involve a 
customer, mobile network operator and its 
vending machine that supplies soft drinks  
[11]. In this scenario, the customer has 
relationships with both the mobile network 
operator and the vending machine. The 
mobile network operator charges the 
customer for using its service to purchase the 
soft drink by adding the cost of the soft drink 
to the customer’s mobile phone bill. 
A more complex m-commerce transaction 
might involve a financial institution. In this 
scenario, the customer has a relationship 
with the mobile network operator, the 
financial institution and also the merchant 
[11]. The mobile network operator enables 
the transaction to take place by providing 
mobile services to the customer. To purchase 
products, the customer needs a relationship 
with the financial institution that handles the 
transaction payments. The customer will also 
need a relationship with the merchant for the 
goods purchased.  
Another scenario is a relationship between 
a customer and mobile network operator and 
also a relationship between a network 
operator and content provider [12]. The 
customer obtains the content or service from 
its provider through its mobile network 
operator and pays the operator who 
remunerates the content or service provider 
in turn. 
2.5 M-Commerce Requirements 
Although different m-commerce applications 
have different requirements, in general m-
commerce applications have the following 
requirements: 
1. Adequate quality of service in the 
wireless network to avoid delays that 
may affect the performance of m-
commerce applications. 
2. Reliability in the wireless network so 
that users can access m-commerce 
applications, even under varying 
degrees of network failure. 
3. Ability to roam across multiple 
heterogeneous networks so that users 
can access m-commerce applications 
from anywhere. 
4. End-to-end security supported so that 
trading parties can trust the other 
trading parties to provide their service 
at an acceptable level of risk. 
5. Convenience and usability so that 
users can perform m-commerce 
transactions easily and 
unproblematically. 
3 M-COMMERCE ISSUES 
3.1 Mobile Devices 
Mobile devices have limitations in terms of 
battery life, resources and display 
capabilities. 
1. Battery life 
 Mobile devices have limited battery 
lifetimes during which they can 
operate without recharging their 
energy resources. This limitation 
restricts mobile devices from 
performing much complex and energy 
intensive computations. Moreover, the 
use of a wireless medium for data 
transmission can make the battery life 
shorter as it consumes significant 
energy [3]. Therefore, mobile devices 
cannot be expected to be always 
available in a network like stationary 
computing devices. Users may cut 
their wireless connection to the 
network to reduce power consumption 
or the battery may suddenly become 
flat. 
2. Limited resources 
 Mobile devices have limited resources 
in terms of CPU capacity, storage 
capacity and processing space due to 
their small size and portability. These 
limitations restrict the amount of 
computation performed and also the 
amount of data stored on these 
devices.  
3. Small screen and keypad 
 The small screens and limited text 
input capabilities of mobile devices 
limit the size of information that can be 
displayed and make data entry more 
difficult. Also, they limit capabilities for 
use of high quality graphics [3]. 
3.2 Wireless Networks 
Wireless networks have limited bandwidth. 
Although they may come to have higher bit 
rates, the transmission rates in many wireless 
networks such as in cellular or satellite 
networks are still low as compared to wired 
networks [3]. This is partly because wireless 
communications are rather more error prone 
and require much redundancy in the channel 
coding of the payload [3]. 
In addition to that,wireless networks are 
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less reliable due to frequent network 
disconnections. Factors that cause network 
disconnections include lack of network 
coverage, cell interference, changes in the 
signal strength and limited battery lifetime of 
mobile devices. In some m-commerce 
applications such as online trading or 
entertainment, continued network 
connectivity is an important requirements as 
discontinued connections may affect the 
result of transactions. 
Furthermore, channels in wireless 
networks may be asymmetric [13]. The 
bandwidth available for uploading data may 
be rather lower than the bandwidth available 
for downloading data. 
Also, different networks have different 
network access charges. In some networks, 
access is charged per connection-time for 
example in cellular telephones, while in some 
others, it is charged per message or per 
session [3]. 
3.3 Security 
There are at least three aspects of security 
that need to be considered: the security of 
mobile devices, the radio interface and 
payment systems.  
1. Mobile devices  
 Due to their small size and portability, 
mobile devices are prone to be stolen, 
lost or accidentally damaged. Since 
these devices are highly personalized 
and are often used to store 
confidential user information, it is 
important to protect not only the data 
that is transmitted through the network 
but also the data on the device itself. 
However, their limited computation 
capabilities and memory size make it 
difficult to use high level security 
schemes. 
2. The radio interface  
 Performing electronic transactions 
over wireless networks is inherently 
insecure as compared to wired 
networks [12]. A radio interface 
introduces additional security 
vulnerabilities. Its broadcast nature 
makes it easier for attackers to 
intercept and spoof on going traffic if 
no security mechanisms such as 
communication encryption are 
employed. There are three common 
types of attacks: disclosure attacks, 
integrity attacks and denial of service 
attacks [14]. Disclosure attacks are 
where the confidentiality of data 
transmitted over the network is 
compromised by its contents being 
revealed to other parties that are not 
involved in the communication by 
means such as eavesdropping, 
masquerading, traffic analysis and so 
on. Integrity attacks are where the 
contents of a message being 
transferred over the network is illegally 
altered or deleted or reused without 
permission. In a denial of service 
attack, access to the network is made 
impossible by flooding and overloading 
the network with messages. In addition 
to security attacks, frequent handoffs 
and disconnections due to path loss, 
fading and interference can degrade 
the service levels of security services. 
Also, the mobility of mobile devices 
introduces an additional difficulty in 
identifying and authenticating devices 
in the network.  
3. Payment System 
 M-commerce applications, especially 
those involving mobile payments 
require secure information exchange 
as well as safe electronic financial 
transactions. Without a secure 
payment system, neither customers 
nor merchants may be prepared to 
engage in monetary m-commerce 
transactions. For instance, both parties 
that are involved in a financial 
transaction would want to authenticate 
each other before committing to any 
payment. Also, they would want 
assurance on the confidentiality and 
integrity of the sent payment 
information as well as effective support 
for non-repudiation to prove that a 
transaction has happened. 
3.4 Social, Ethical and Legal Issues 
To avoid risks such as legal actions, brand 
infringement and so on, entities that are 
involved in m-commerce transactions must 
ensure that all m-commerce activities such as 
services, transactions, payments and so on, 
comply with government and industry 
regulations. Regulatory issues that need to 
be addressed include: 
1. Data protection and data breaches 
 Regulations related to the protection of 
subscriber data, identity theft and the 
reporting of data breaches. 
2. Digital rights 
 Digital content such as music, clip art, 
videos and so on are subject to 
intellectual property (IP) constraints 
such as copyright, trademarks and 
patents. 
3. End-user privacy 
 Regulations related to consumer 
protection and privacy laws to ensure 
consumer privacy is not violated. 
4. Child protection 
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 Regulations related to offering, 
accessing and purchasing of adult 
related content, products and services. 
Age verification may be required 
before any adult related content, 
products or services are obtained. 
5. Money laundering and gambling 
 Regulations related to electronic 
money transfers, money trafficking 
issues and so on. 
4 M-COMMERCE OVER AD HOC WIRELESS 
NETWORKS OR AD HOC M-COMMERCE 
Unlike infrastructure-supported m-commerce, 
ad hoc m-commerce takes place between 2 
or more mobile devices that are peers and in 
the vicinity of each other. To accomplish a 
transaction, these devices communicate and 
cooperate with each other by utilizing their 
local resources and also their neighbours’, 
without relying on any support provided by a 
network service provider. Thus, ad hoc m-
commerce can be said to have the following 
characteristics: 
1. No network service provider 
 Because ad hoc wireless networks 
lack a network service infrastructure 
and are self-organized, a network 
service provider cannot be relied upon 
to be present to provide other security 
or payment services whenever nodes 
engage in m-commerce transactions.  
2. Limited communications scope 
 IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and Bluetooth 
have limited communication ranges 
[15],[16]. Therefore, such networks are 
suitable for short range node to node 
communication. While nodes can 
bridge gaps by routing information 
over multiple hops via nodes in 
between themselves and so extend 
the range of such networks, those ad 
hoc connections via intermediaries 
may not be long lasting and may not 
be available much of the time.  
3. Limited time online 
 Due to limited battery lifetimes and the 
mobility of mobile devices as well as 
frequent network disconnections, there 
is a limited time during which these 
devices can be online, which restricts 
them from engaging in lengthy and 
complex transaction processes. This 
means that transactions need to be 
completed in a fairly short period and 
only comprise a few simple stages if 
they are to have a good chance of 
success. Therefore, realistic 
transactions must not involve long 
sessions or complex processes. Since 
mobile devices are peers and these 
devices themselves can become the 
service or information provider as well 
as the consumer, the limited time 
online restricts a trusted service or 
information provider from providing 
ubiquitous services such as payment 
processing, or information such as a 
good trading history to other devices in 
the network. 
4. Spontaneous decisions in Ad Hoc 
Settings 
 The self-organizing characteristic of an 
ad hoc wireless network allows users 
that are equipped with mobile devices 
to spontaneously engage in m-
commerce transactions when the need 
arises while they are on the move. For 
example, passengers in two cars near 
each other in slow traffic can establish 
an ad hoc wireless network connection 
and exchange video clips while within 
range of each other.  
5. Low cost 
 An ad hoc wireless network provides a 
low cost wireless connection for users 
to engage in m-commerce 
transactions. No additional device is 
required to perform ad hoc m-
commerce as mobile devices that form 
the network will utilize their local 
resources and also resources on other 
devices in their proximity area in order 
to accomplish the transactions. The 
cost of purchasing or renting additional 
devices such as special server(s) that 
are used to process the transaction as 
well as to store transaction information 
is eliminated. Also, buyers or traders 
save on network access charges. 
6. Confidentiality 
 Because no third party needs to be 
involved to realise network 
communication, the range of wireless 
communication is limited, and can be 
conducted on the move, ad hoc m-
commerce is suitable for confidential 
commercial exchanges where the 
trading parties do not wish their 
exchange to be known or guessed at 
by external parties. For example, two 
or more parties may exchange their 
confidential information while they 
encounter or merely pass close by 
each other.  
4.1 Functional Components 
Only the first four functional components 
discussed in section 2.2  may be required to 
construct an ad hoc m-commerce system 
because the network may be spontaneously 
and temporarily created when the need 
arises among mobile devices in close 
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proximity to each other. However, there is a 
slight difference in the fourth component 
where an ad hoc wireless network like mobile 
ad hoc network (MANET) or Bluetooth is 
used as a medium to carry out the 
transactions as shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Therefore, the design and development of 
m-commerce applications as well as mobile 
middleware must consider the unique 
characteristics of an ad hoc wireless network. 
4.2 Main Entities 
Since the transactions involve only mobile 
devices that are peers and have no 
guarantee of infrastructure support from a 
network service provider, there are only two 
essential entities involved in ad hoc m-
commerce. 
1) Customer or Trader 
 The person who is mainly mobile and 
make use of the ad hoc wireless 
network to buy the digital contents, 
products or services offered by the 
seller or to trade contents, products or 
services for others. 
2) Seller or Trader 
 The person or entity that provides the 
digital contents, products or services 
directly to customers via ad hoc 
wireless networks for money or who 
trades contents, products or services 
for others.  
Nevertheless, as different types of 
transactions would have different entity 
relationships, there are several possible 
essential entity relationships in the ad hoc m-
commerce value chain. A relatively simple 
transaction might involve two mobile devices. 
For example, two people who are commuting 
in a train agree to exchange their e-
magazines while they are within transmission 
range of each other. In a more complicated 
scenario where more than two mobile 
devices are involved in a transaction such as 
an auction, the entity relationship can be 
illustrated as below.  
 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate two scenarios 
involving the formation of an ad hoc trading 
consortium among mobile users who are in 
the vicinity of each other and agree to band 
together for a specific purpose, for example 
to make a collective purchase (Fig. 3) or to 
engage in  group trading (Fig. 4). 
 
Fig. 5 shows a delegated trading scenario 
where an electronic I Owe U (IOU) is used to 
acknowledge debt between two parties 
trading via an ad hoc wireless network. It 
illustrates a scenario in a local community 
where Trader 1, who has a toaster, wants to 
trade it for an electric kettle. Trader 2, who is 
within Trader 1’s communication range and 
owns an electric kettle, agrees to trade his 
electric kettle with Trader 1 but does not want 
a toaster. So, Trader 1 issues an electronic 
IOU signed by himself to Trader 2 as an 
acknowledgement of his debt to Trader 2. 
Trader 2 can later use that electronic IOU to 
trade for another item such as a pram that 
she wants with Trader 3, who wants a toaster. 
Trader 3 will then use the electronic IOU 
signed by both Trader 1 and Trader 2 to settle 
with Trader 1 for his toaster. 
                     
Fig.1. Four main functional components in an ad hoc m-
commerce system. 
 
     
Fig.2. Transactions involving more than two mobile 
devices. 
 
 
Fig.3. A group of individuals forming a  consortium for 
trading. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Trading between two consortiums. 
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To represent various entity relationships in 
the ad hoc m-commerce value chain, a 
generic view of ad hoc m-commerce 
transactions is provided as Fig. 6. 
4.3 Types of Applications 
There are several distinct types of m-
commerce transactions that can be carried 
out over ad hoc wireless networks: 
1. Swapping of digital resources 
 Swapping of digital resources such as 
ebooks, videos, music files etc. For 
example, two people who meet by 
chance at an airport may agree to 
exchange an MP3 pop song for an 
amusing video clip. 
2. Mobile Auction 
 The process of buying or selling 
certain items could be realised by an 
auction among a local group of people. 
An auction process can be created 
anywhere as soon as a group of at 
least three persons with mobile 
devices and shared software agree to 
participate. This type of activity is 
amenable to short term participation by 
individuals and a rapid turnover in its 
membership as long as enough are 
usually present to create a critical 
mass of bidders. Multicasting among 
participants can disseminate bids and 
information about what is on offer.  
3. Mobile Entertainment 
 Interactive gaming and gambling 
among small groups of people is 
another kind of application suited to ad 
hoc networking. Applications running 
on mobile devices realise the game or 
gambling scenario, manage its 
communications and handle the 
turnover in participants. For example, 
people play blackjack over a mobile ad 
hoc wireless network using mobile 
devices like laptop computers, PDAs 
or computers in cars. 
4. Transacting with Machines 
 Transactions that use mobile devices 
that are preloaded with E-cash to 
make payment at a vending machine, 
point of sales (POS), parking tolls and 
so on via technologies such as Wi-Fi 
and Bluetooth.  
5. Confidential Exchanges 
 Two or more parties who meet at a 
certain place or pass in the vicinity of 
each other may agree to exchange 
their confidential information resources 
or services for a specific purpose. 
6. Consortium Trading 
 A group of individuals who are in the 
vicinity of each other and equipped 
with mobile devices could 
spontaneously and temporarily form a 
consortium for a specific purpose. For 
example, a group of football fans at a 
football ground might band together as 
a single buyer to purchase a 
discounted group ticket in order to get 
a cheaper ticket for each of them to 
watch a match. Another example 
would be a group of football fans who 
form a consortium during a football 
match to engage in betting on the 
outcome with another group of football 
fans.  
7. Electronic IOUs  
 ‘I Owe U’ or its abbreviation ‘IOU’ is an 
established means to acknowledge a 
small debt usually among friends or 
family members. This form of 
acknowledgement can be passed 
electronically via an ad hoc wireless 
network among trading parties. It can 
be signed to verify its authenticity and 
the identities of all handling parties. 
4.4 Issues 
Performing m-commerce transactions over 
ad hoc wireless networks introduces 
additional issues and challenges. In addition 
to the above issues, ad hoc wireless 
networks have specific issues that need to be 
considered. However, issues related to 
 
Fig. 5. A delegated trading scenario. 
 
Fig. 6. A generic view of ad hoc m-commerce 
transactions. The ad hoc m-commerce store will held 
certificates, attestations, offers, IOUs, deals and so on. 
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variant tariffs are not applicable to ad hoc 
wireless networks as no access fee is 
required to access the network. Other issues 
that need to be considered when performing 
ad hoc m-commerce: 
1. Transaction management 
 Due to its nature such as lack of 
infrastructure, having a dynamic 
network topology and using resource 
constrained devices, it is a challenge 
to implement efficient transaction 
processing and updates in   purely ad 
hoc wireless networks. Most solutions 
used in infrastructure based m-
commerce depend on a client/server 
model where data is primarily placed 
on servers located within the wired 
network and mobile devices act as 
clients accessing the services 
provided by the servers [17]. However, 
in ad hoc wireless networks, all 
devices are peers and normally have 
similar constraints on their resources. 
Thus, those devices act as both 
servers and clients. The mobility of 
mobile devices that provide services 
(servers) to other devices is an 
important issue as the services are 
prone to becoming unavailable due to 
network disconnections. Also, the 
atomicity of a transaction can be 
difficult to enforce as network 
disconnections can cause a particular 
service in a transaction sequence to 
fail and thus the transaction would be 
considered incomplete and be aborted 
[17]. 
2. Service Discovery and Delivery 
 A service discovery and delivery 
protocol enables devices to advertise 
their services to other devices as well 
as to discover services offered by 
other devices in the network. However, 
due to the unique characteristics and 
complexities of an ad hoc wireless 
network, existing service discovery 
and delivery protocols do not seem to 
suit the needs of an ad hoc wireless 
network, making them unsuitable for 
m-commerce oriented scenarios. 
Service advertisements and deliveries 
may need to be disseminated by a mix 
of a store and forward strategy as well 
as local multicasting to cope with 
intermittent online connectivity. 
3. Trust 
 Trust is essential in any online 
transactions as it helps the 
participating parties to feel confident 
enough  to engage in such 
transactions by mitigating uncertainty 
and risks involved in the transactions, 
such as uncertainty about trading 
partners’ behaviour in fulfilling the 
transaction agreements [18]. However, 
as ad hoc m-commerce cannot rely on 
a network service provider to provide 
security services such as certification 
authority (CA) that can help to 
establish trust among nodes in the 
network, nodes have to rely on their 
peers in the network to provide trust 
evidence in order to evaluate other 
nodes’ trustworthiness. Yet, the nature 
of an ad hoc wireless network such as 
lack of infrastructure services, having 
a dynamic network topology, using 
resources constrained devices and so 
on,  makes trust establishment in this 
network difficult to achieve. 
4.5 Security Requirements 
To create a sufficiently secure and trusted 
environment for a transaction to take place as 
well as to give confidence to trading parties to 
engage in a transaction, the following security 
services are essential. 
1. Confidentiality 
 Confidentiality ensures that transaction 
information sent across the network is 
unreadable by unauthorized third 
parties such as eavesdroppers or 
peers acting only as communication 
relays. 
2. Authentication 
 Authentication enables trading parties 
involved in m-commerce transactions 
to confirm the identity of each other 
before any transactions are made 
among them. This service provides 
assurance that an unauthorized third 
party is not masquerading as a 
legitimate party. 
3. Integrity 
 Integrity guarantees that a message 
being transferred is not illicitly altered 
or destroyed during the transmission 
without this being detectable at the 
receiving end of an m-commerce 
system. 
4. Non-repudiation 
 Non-repudiation ensures that if an 
entity sends a message, it cannot get 
away with denying having sent the 
message. In m-commerce 
transactions, neither sender nor 
receiver should credibly be able to 
repudiate offers or bargains struck 
between them. The sender should not 
be able credibly to deny having sent 
the transaction message and the 
receiver should be able to prove that 
the transaction message can only 
have been sent by the specified 
sender and thus able to prove that a 
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transaction has taken place between 
them. 
In addition to the above, as m-commerce 
transactions involve the risk of misbehaviour 
among the trading parties, they need support 
in gauging the level of trustworthiness of 
other trading parties. Hence, attestation is 
another important security service for ad hoc 
m-commerce. 
5. Attestation 
 Attestation enables ad hoc m-
commerce peers to vouch for the 
identity, trading history or transaction 
reputation of other peers. It helps 
mitigate risks in transacting with 
previously unknown parties.  
5 CONCLUSION 
An ad hoc wireless network can be an 
alternative to operator-driven GPRS/UMTS 
networks that provide  networking support for 
m-commerce transactions, particularly in 
supporting spontaneous and low value 
transactions in ad hoc settings among 
unacquainted parties. It seems most suited to 
fully online resource swapping that does not 
require complex and lengthy processes and 
also to online launched trading in local 
communities where parties can easily meet to 
transfer goods and payment as agreed. 
We believe that the elements of an ad hoc 
m-commerce reference model presented in 
this paper  will be  useful in designing and 
developing a wide range of ad hoc m-
commerce applications and also valuable as 
a basis for future research in various aspects 
of ad hoc m-commerce. Our future work will 
be focusing on the issue of trust in ad hoc m-
commerce. We will be developing a trust 
model that will enhance the security of an ad 
hoc wireless network as well as mitigate risks 
and uncertainties involved in the transactions, 
to make an ad hoc wireless network a 
sufficiently commercial secure and trusted 
medium for  transactions to be able to take 
place. Simulation processes and experiments 
will be conducted to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the trust model. 
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Abstract—Managing group membership in an ad hoc 
m-commerce trading forum is a challenging task as 
peers may only have partial knowledge of the current 
membership due to frequent network disconnections, 
infrequent participation and delays in communication 
via intermediaries among them. The absence of a 
centralized network infrastructure adds more 
complexity to this problem. This paper presents a 
fully distributed and self-organizing approach to 
managing group membership in such a loose trading 
community. It is designed to suit the dynamic nature 
of ad hoc wireless networking and the social 
characteristics of ad hoc m-commerce. 
Keywords-self-organized group; wireless trading; 
ad-hoc community; peer-to-peer 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A basic concept in ad hoc m-commerce trading 
systems is the formation of a trading forum by two 
or more peers that are in the vicinity of each other 
and run an appropriate software application. This 
trading forum defines the rules of trading and 
provides the context for mobile users to engage in 
mobile commerce using ad hoc wireless 
networking [1]. It is a self-organized and self-
configured m-commerce domain that can be 
initiated by any peer with suitable networking 
capability and does not require any centralized 
infrastructure to manage it. Its participants 
communicate and cooperate with each other by 
utilizing their local resources and also their 
neighbours’ to accomplish the following tasks:- 
1) Engage in ad hoc m-commerce transactions 
such as swapping of digital resources, buying or 
selling items, mobile auctions, consortium trading 
and so on [1].  
2) Give recommendations about other 
members’ identities, trading histories and 
reputations. 
3) Attest other members’ digital certificates 
that bind together their identity information with 
their public keys. 
4) Evaluate each other by providing deal 
evaluations of transactions.  
5) Share negative evaluations about their 
trading partners with other members in the forum. 
6) Sanction those members who misbehave or 
have a history of being given poor evaluations of 
their trades. 
As an example, a group of peers with wireless 
networking capability and a mobile auction 
application installed on each device comes into 
communication range with each other. One of the 
peers reestablishes a trading forum that offers 
auction services and advertises it for other peers 
with similar interests to join. Peers able to join the 
trading forum session can then participate in the 
auction activities as sellers or bidders. The mobile 
auction application that runs on each peer’s device 
handles all the auction processes and provides a 
graphical interface to the users. After the 
completion of each transaction, peers can provide 
deal evaluations to each other.  Positive evaluations 
will increase a peer’s reputation and thus increase 
other peers’ trust and willingness to trade with that 
party in future transactions, while negative 
evaluations reduce other peers’ confidence to 
transact with the peer and open that peer to the risk 
of sanctions from its trading forum. 
One of the major security concerns in such 
trading systems is to establish sufficient trust 
among participating parties in a trading forum in 
order to mitigate the uncertainty and risks involved 
in its transactions. While some trading forums will 
choose to remain open to all comers, others will 
choose to use membership as a means for 
establishing greater trust and more secure 
interactions among its group members. As new 
parties may apply to join and existing members 
may have to be excluded, the management and 
maintenance of such trading forums entails support 
for a service to handle group membership.  
The function of a group membership service is 
to track membership changes in a trading forum 
and help determine whether a peer is currently a 
member of a particular trading forum [2]. It 
consists of mechanisms for peers to join and be 
excluded from the trading forum, as well as to 
verify membership. However, to manage group 
membership in such a loose ad hoc m-commerce 
community with frequent and unpredictable 
network disconnections, infrequent communication 
among group members and in the absence of a 
centralized network infrastructure is a challenging 
task as each member cannot be expected to have a 
complete or mutually compatible view of group 
membership. 
Hence, this paper proposes a fully distributed 
and self-organizing approach for managing group 
membership in ad hoc m-commerce trading 
forums, which is based on membership vouchers, 
quorate decisions by some group members, partial 
membership lists and the use of digital signatures.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II describes solution requirements and 
assumptions. Section III gives a brief overview of 
related work. Section IV presents the details of 
each mechanism in our approach. Section V 
demonstrates a number of reference scenarios and 
finally, Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. REQUIREMENTS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Due to the challenges posed by the nature of ad 
hoc wireless networking and the social 
characteristics of ad hoc m-commerce [1], the 
following requirements for managing a trading 
forum’s group membership will be needed on top 
of the usual requirements for interactive m-
commerce software such as adequate quality of 
service and reliability in the wireless network, end-
to-end security and so on:  
1) Resource-limited 
The processes and operating costs of group 
membership management should be affordable for 
resource-constrained devices. 
2) Dynamic 
Group membership management should be able 
to handle dynamic membership changes without 
having to reconstitute the group. 
3) Absence of Authority 
The responsibility for managing the group 
membership has to be devolved among members 
without recourse to trusted parties with delegated 
authority as the presence of no party can be 
guaranteed in any live trading context. 
4) Robustness 
Intermittent participation by members, 
unreliable means of communication and the 
absence of dependable enduring infrastructure 
services requires failure tolerance throughout 
support for system services. 
5) Convenience 
The management of group membership should 
not involve users in complicated and time 
consuming activities nor should making changes in 
membership status take very long periods. 
We assume that support for group members’ 
identity establishment and verification is provided 
by a security and trust service. Details and 
discussion of this are part of ongoing work and will 
be published later. We illustrate in Fig. 1 below an 
abstract architecture for each trading peer in an ad 
hoc m-commerce trading forum. The first two 
layers sequentially include a mobile device and an 
operating system required for operating the 
applications. The Service layer provides services 
that are required to support the core functionality of 
the trading system which include the following: 
 
 
Figure 1. An abstract architecture for an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading peer. 
 Discovery Service 
Provides the ability for peers to search and 
discover available trading forums, 
advertisements and other peers in the 
network 
 
 Membership Service 
Provides the ability for peers to organize 
themselves into a trading forum, which 
includes the ability to join, renew 
membership and also to exclude a member 
from a trading forum.  
 Forum Decision Making Service 
To facilitate any decision making processes 
by fostering effective communication among 
forum members. 
 Messaging Service 
Provides support for message delivery over 
the network. This includes specifications for 
routing, relaying and propagating messages 
as well as the message structure and so on. 
 Security and Trust Service 
Provides support for identity establishment, 
trust establishment as well as message 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality and 
non-repudiation. This service will also 
provide security advice to make 
participating users understand the issues and 
their responsibilities in securing ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems. 
The Application layer is the implementation of 
ad hoc m-commerce applications such as mobile 
auctions, swapping of digital resources, buying or 
selling items and so on.  
III. RELATED WORK 
Several relevant papers have been published in 
the area of group membership in ad hoc wireless 
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networks such as [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16]. The main focus of most of the work is 
to provide secure communications among group 
members, in which some of the solutions proposed 
are based on group key agreements. Maki, Aura 
and Hietalahi in [5] have proposed a distributed 
certificate-based system to establish secure 
communications among members in ad hoc groups, 
where a certificate that is signed by a group key is 
used to indicate the membership of each member. 
The group key is used as the identifier of the group 
and is generated by a group leader who is 
responsible for managing the group membership. 
To avoid a single point of failure, a group leader’s 
authority is distributed to multiple sub-leaders. 
Thus, a group can have one or more group leaders 
or sub-leaders. A similar approach is used by 
Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner in [6] to address the 
issue of secure group communications in dynamic 
peer groups. They have proposed a protocol called 
CLIQUES which is based on a multiparty 
extension of Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In this 
protocol, all members contribute to the 
establishment of a group key. Whenever there is a 
membership change, the group key is 
reconstructed. This approach also depends on 
having a group controller to manage the group 
membership. Liu, Sacchetti, Sailhan and Issarny 
[13] in their design of a generic group management 
service for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) have 
also proposed a group leader for managing the 
group dynamics. In their approach, the group 
leader’s role is rotated from one member to another 
in order to distribute the load of group management 
among members and also to address the issue of 
group leaders dropping out of participation. The 
selection of the group leader is based on a number 
of criteria that have been defined [13]. 
Another approach is a virtual partitioning (VP) 
based group membership algorithm by Pradan and 
Helal [10]. This approach requires each group 
member to maintain a complete and consistent 
view of group membership. Roman, Huang and 
Hazemi in [4] have also proposed an algorithm to 
maintain a consistent view of group membership in 
ad hoc wireless networks based on location 
information. 
Group key agreement does not seem to be 
workable for ad hoc m-commerce trading forums. 
Participation by all members on a regular and 
frequent basis would be required in order that new 
group keys could be constructed in a timely way 
for each membership change and also for each 
member to get access to the new group keys every 
time they are reconstructed. However, casual local 
online trading is likely to involve a mixture of 
frequent and infrequent participants and quite an 
amount of irregular participation. Thus, it may not 
be possible for a new group key to be constructed 
in a timely way for each membership change on 
each occasion that requires contribution by all 
group members. It will take unpredictable periods 
of time for all members to be available for the 
reconstruction process to happen. This might delay 
the first opportunity for a new member to 
participate in the group communications as well as 
other activities of the trading forum. This might 
also give an opportunity for a member subject to 
exclusion proceedings to remain as a member for a 
longer period of time. On other occasions, the 
unavailability of some members during the 
reconstruction of the group key might cause them 
to be unable to get access to the new group key and 
thus might lead to the group shrinking as a subset 
of the members reconstruct the group key among 
themselves. The reacceptance of these unavailable 
members in the trading forum would demand the 
group key be reconstructed again. This might lead 
to endless reconstruction of group keys as frequent 
and regular participation by all group members 
cannot be guaranteed in ad hoc m-commerce 
trading forums. 
A hierarchical structure where one or more 
group leaders are responsible for managing the 
group membership also does not seem to be 
workable for our work as the presence of such 
authority in the current group context cannot be 
guaranteed all the time. Furthermore, the loose 
nature of relationships in casual local trading 
networks does not support the assumption of a core 
of well trusted parties around which the rest of the 
trading community is constituted. Thus, a flat 
structure where all members are given equal 
responsibility to manage the group membership 
would seem to be more appropriate. 
The requirement for each member to maintain a 
complete and consistent view of current group 
membership is also not realistic for ad hoc m-
commerce trading forums.  Communication among 
members will often involve intermediaries, be 
subject to frequent disconnections and take 
unpredictable periods of time from minutes to 
several days or weeks with infrequent participants. 
Getting all group members to participate in every 
membership decision will take too long to be 
practical. So membership decision making needs to 
be delegated to subsets of the membership and 
other members will have to accept their decision 
making when it is eventually communicated to 
them. That in turn means that every member will 
only have a partial view of the membership. 
IV. APPROACH 
In this section, we describe our approach for 
managing group membership in ad hoc m-
commerce trading forums. 
A. Membership Voucher 
A membership voucher serves as a credential 
that can be used by forum members to prove their 
membership to other members of the forum. It 
contains the following information as a minimum:- 
 The trading forum name and ID. 
 Its holder’s trading pseudonym or ID. 
 The collection of approvals and any vetoes 
among verified votes. Each vote will 
consists of the voter’s trading pseudonym 
or ID, the subject of the vote either a 
joining request or membership renewal 
request, the requestor’s trading pseudonym 
or ID, voter’s agree or disagree statement, 
time and date as well as the digital 
signature of the voter. 
 Digital signature of its issuer. 
 A validity period. 
To be recognised as a member of a trading 
forum, each peer must possess a membership 
voucher that is digitally signed by other group 
members who are expected to be recognised. A 
recognised member is a member whose 
membership voucher has been verified as having 
the following:- 
 Its validity period has not expired. 
 Has been issued and signed by parties who 
are recognised as members at the time the 
membership voucher is issued. 
 Has sufficient number of votes from 
parties who are recognised as members at 
the time they participated in the vote.  
Peers present the voucher and their certificate to 
attest their membership and receiving peers use the 
resources available to them such as personal 
records of previously known members of the forum 
to decide whether to accept the claim. Members 
exchange these records with other trusted members 
to widen and update their views of the scope of 
membership. However, as the judgments are made 
independently by each peer based on their partial 
membership views without involving any authority 
higher than a peer, membership claims cannot 
always be settled to the satisfaction of all 
reasonable peers.  It will depend on the level of 
trust that the receiving peers have in the issuer and 
the voters of the presenting peers’ membership 
voucher as well as the parties that attest their 
membership vouchers. If the receiving peers trust 
those parties, it is expected that they will accept the 
presenting peer’s membership claim.  
The validity period of the voucher is used as a 
regular way to review the membership status of 
each member. After its expiry date has elapsed, the 
voucher is no longer applicable to prove a peer’s 
membership. Thus, to remain as a current member 
of a particular trading forum, each peer needs 
periodically to renew their membership voucher 
when the existing voucher expires.  
B. Quorate Decisions 
As members of a trading forum are peers that 
have similar constraints on their devices and are 
offline most of the time, it is not realistic to expect 
to have a trusted peer or unbroken chain of trusted 
peers to be responsible for managing the group 
membership that is reachable all the time. All peers 
are given equal responsibility in order to avoid 
circumstances where decisions cannot be made due 
to the unavailability of an appropriate authority. 
Therefore, in this work, the decisions to accept new 
members, exclude misbehaving members and also 
renew existing members’ membership vouchers are 
distributed to any sufficiently large subset of 
existing group members. How many members need 
to agree and the maximum number of members 
allowed to disagree in order to elicit a quorate 
decision will depend on each trading forum’s 
decision making policies. 
A trading forum’s decision making policy can 
be made simpler or more stringent depending on 
the type of ad hoc m-commerce trading. A simple 
policy is probably more desirable for circumstances 
that entail fast decision making, such as in the 
admission process. It may require only a small 
number of approval replies and no vetoes. For 
example, a trading forum with 30 current members 
may require only a small fraction of currently 
active and connected members to agree and none to 
disagree, in order to obtain a quorate decision 
whether to accept or reject the application of a new 
member. By having such a policy, new admissions 
could take place rapidly. On the other hand, to 
obtain a quorate decision for a more stringent 
decision making policy might require a definite 
higher number of approvals and less than a 
threshold number of vetoes. This may involve 
currently offline members as the replies from 
currently connected members may not be sufficient 
to obtain a quorate decision. However, to elicit the 
required number of members’ votes may take some 
time as many members may not be reachable for 
significant periods or may not participate 
frequently in group communications. Thus, this 
type of policy might be more appropriate for 
circumstances that do not require rapid decision 
making such as in the membership renewal process 
or exclusion of members, which require more 
careful consideration. For example, to exclude a 
member from a trading forum of 40 current 
members might require at least 20 members to 
agree and less than 5 members disagree with the 
exclusion proposal.  
C. Membership Lists 
A membership list contains records about 
sometime members of a trading forum. It also 
provides information about the status of each 
member as to whether a member is a current 
member or former member or has been excluded. A 
complete membership list would keep members 
updated with the current membership of a 
particular group [10]. 
However, all members of an ad hoc m-
commerce trading forum cannot be expected to 
have a complete and consistent view of 
membership as some of them may be offline or 
unreachable or may not participate in group 
communications regularly or may be active but not 
yet have had messages passed on to them about 
decisions taken by other members. Instead, 
members of an ad hoc m-commerce trading forum 
will each maintain a partial list of members and 
exclusions that they know about and accept in their 
local storage and exchange it with other members 
to update and widen their view of membership 
every time they participate in the trading forum.  
D. Digital Signature 
A digital signature is used to guarantee the 
authenticity and integrity of a message or document 
sent by a peer as well as to ensure that the sender 
cannot get away with denying having sent the 
message or document. In ad hoc m-commerce 
trading forums, messages and documents such as 
membership requests, votes, membership vouchers, 
exclusion proposals and also exclusion orders are 
digitally signed by their sender in order to give 
assurance to the receiving peers that those 
messages or documents were actually sent by the 
specified sender and were not altered during 
transmission and also so that the sender will not be 
able to credibly deny having sent the message.  
E. Join Mechanism 
For a new member to join a trading forum, he 
must first discover a member of the forum and then 
send a join request. The following steps are 
involved:- 
1) Sending a request to join  
A new member (Mnew) sends a join request 
message together with his digital certificate to at 
least one member of the trading forum. The 
certificate must be self-signed but may also be 
signed by other parties. The join request message 
will contain the following information as a 
minimum:- 
 The target trading forum name and ID 
 Mnew’s trading pseudonym or ID 
 Digital signature of Mnew 
2) Propagate Join Request 
Upon receiving the join request message, the 
contacted member (Mcontact) will then propagate it 
to other members of the forum in order to obtain a 
quorate decision whether to accept or reject the 
application. The propagated message will have a 
time limit (TTL) in order to limit the voting period. 
However, Mcontact may consider having extra rounds 
of voting if the verified votes received are not 
sufficient to obtain a quorate decision after the 
voting period limit has expired.  
3) Quorate decision by other members  
Other members of the forum with views on the 
proposal are then expected to reply with either a 
signed agree or disagree message to Mcontact, 
accompanied by their membership voucher as a 
proof of their membership.  
4) Issuance of membership voucher 
Upon receiving the replies, Mcontact will verify 
the voters’ membership vouchers as not having 
expired and as being of members Mcontact recognises 
as members or having sufficient signatures of 
parties Mcontact recognises as members at the time 
the membership vouchers were issued. Fig. 2 below 
depicts the steps involved in the verification 
process. Votes that are not verified or are received 
after the time limit are discarded. Then the forum’s 
admissions policy is applied to the verified votes. If 
there are sufficient acceptances and less than 
sufficient vetoes, Mcontact will send a signed 
standard membership voucher to Mnew. In addition 
to a membership voucher, Mcontact will also send his 
local partial lists of known members and known 
members to be excluded to Mnew.   
5) Update membership list 
Mnew will then notify other members about his 
new membership by multicasting a Hello message 
accompanied by his membership voucher to all 
currently active and connected members of the 
group. They will pass the multicast on during 
further group interactions until the multicast 
message’s liveness expires. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Voter’s membership voucher verification steps. 
F. Exclusion Mechanism 
To induce participating parties in ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems to act honestly and in a 
trustworthy way, it is valuable to have a 
mechanism to sanction forum members that 
misbehave or have a history of being given poor 
evaluations of their trades. One of the appropriate 
ways to do this is exclusion from membership. By 
having a mechanism to exclude misbehaving 
members, a group membership service can provide 
a degree of assurance about forum members’ 
trustworthiness and reputations. It will sit alongside 
the reputation system, which is one of the elements 
in our security and trust service, and serves as the 
primary service to help assess the behavior and also 
the trustworthiness of each member.  
Similar to the join process, to exclude an 
existing member requires a quorate decision from 
other members of the trading forum. The following 
steps involved:- 
 
Upon receiving the votes, Mcontact will execute the following 
algorithm:- 
Check whether the validity period of the voter’s membership 
voucher is still applicable 
If yes  
Check whether the voter is a recognised member in his 
membership lists 
If yes 
 Accept vote 
Else 
Check whether the voter’s membership voucher is 
issued and signed by a recognised member at the time it 
is issued and has sufficient votes from recognised 
members at the time they participated in the vote 
If yes 
Accept vote 
 Else  
Check whether the membership voucher of the 
unrecognised issuer and voters are issued and signed 
by a recognised member at the time it is issued and 
has sufficient votes from recognised members at the 
time they participated in the vote 
If yes 
Accept vote 
Else 
Discard vote 
Else 
Discard Vote 
1) Multicasting a proposal to exclude 
An existing member (Mpropose) can propose to 
exclude a misbehaving member or a member with 
poor evaluations from a trading forum by 
multicasting a proposal to exclude message to other 
forum members except the target member (Mtarget). 
The message will consist of the following 
information:- 
 The target member’s ID or trading 
pseudonym. 
 Mpropose digital signature  
In addition to that, an accompanying note 
giving brief reasons for the exclusion might also be 
expected. 
2) Quorate decision by other members 
If other forum members agree or disagree with 
the exclusion proposal, they will reply with a 
signed agree or disagree message to Mpropose within 
the required time period. The message will consist 
of similar contents as in the votes for joining and 
membership renewal request as mentioned in 
section IV (A) above, except that the message 
subject will be the exclusion proposal. In addition 
to that, the trading pseudonym or ID of the 
proposed member to be excluded will also be 
included in the message. 
3) Multicasting  an exclusion order 
Once enough replies from validated members 
are collected within the voting time period limit 
and the forum’s exclusion criteria are satisfied, 
Mpropose will then multicast an exclusion order to 
other currently connected members. The exclusion 
order will have the following details:-  
 The target’s trading pseudonym or ID 
 The collection of signed messages 
approving and disapproving the target’s 
exclusion.  
 Digital signature of Mpropose. 
 Exclusion period 
In this case, forum members are expected to 
refrain from issuing a new membership voucher to 
the target member after the validity period of his 
current membership voucher has expired until the 
exclusion period has ended. Also, any votes or 
membership vouchers issued by the target member 
will not be considered as valid. Furthermore, forum 
members are also expected to not participate in any 
transactions with that member.  
G. Membership Renewal Mechanism 
To remain as a member of a trading forum, 
each member should renew their membership near 
the end or after the validity period of their current 
membership voucher expires. The following steps 
are involved:- 
1) Sending a membership renewal request 
A member who holds an expired or soon to 
expire membership voucher sends a membership 
renewal request together with his old or current 
membership voucher to at least one of the current 
members of the trading forum (Mcontact). 
2) Propagate Renewal Request 
Similar to the join and exclusion mechanisms, 
to renew a membership voucher also requires a 
quorate decision from other forum members. Thus, 
upon receiving the membership renewal request, 
Mcontact will then propagate it to other forum 
members in order to obtain a quorate decision 
whether to accept or reject the renewal request. 
3) Quorate decision by other members 
In this situation, other members are expected to 
check whether any non-expired order has been 
issued to exclude the requesting member from the 
trading forum before they each reply with either a 
digitally signed agree or disagree message together 
with their valid membership voucher to Mcontact.  
4) Collate agree messages 
Once enough replies from validated members 
are collected within the voting period limit and the 
forum’s membership renewal criteria are satisfied, 
Mcontact then collates the replies and sends them 
together with a new membership voucher to the 
requesting member. The voucher is signed by 
Mcontact as an accurate record of the vote. 
H. Message Propagation 
In this work, each message is associated with a 
unique identifier and a time to live (TTL). To 
ensure reliable message propagation, each time a 
peer receives a message for the first time, it will 
accept the message, store it and also forward it 
once to each of its directly connected neighbours 
except the sender during the period of its lifetime. 
To prevent duplicate propagation, each time a peer 
receives the same message more than once, the 
message will be discarded. As all of the 
mechanisms discussed above require sufficient 
members’ votes to obtain a quorate decision, it is 
important for each voting activity to have an expiry 
time. Therefore, the use of a TTL will ensure that 
each propagated message is discarded after its time 
limit has expired. 
V. REFERENCE SCENARIOS 
We demonstrate each of the above mechanisms 
in a series of scenarios below.  
A. Scenario 1 – Joining 
A trading forum A consists of 5 members M1, 
M2, M3, M4 and M5. All members are online during 
communication period t1. It is assumed that:- 
 Each of them possesses a current 
membership voucher 
 Each member’s local membership list 
contains the membership records of other 
members as follows:  
M1 (M2, M3, M4, M5) 
M2 (M1, M3, M4, M5) 
M3 (M1, M2, M4, M5) 
M4 (M1, M2, M3, M5) 
M5 (M1, M2, M3, M4) 
 No member has any knowledge of parties 
to be excluded. 
 This trading forum applies a simple 
admissions policy that requires at least 
three members agree with the new 
application and none disagrees while votes 
are being gathered. 
A new member M6 comes into their 
communication range and sends a join request to 
M2 together with his self-signed digital certificate. 
M2 then propagates the request to other members. It 
is assumed that all members agree to accept the 
new application from M6. They then each reply to 
M2 with their digitally signed agree message 
together with their membership voucher. Upon 
receiving the replies, M2 will then verify each of 
the voters’ membership vouchers. In this case, all 
votes are accepted as each of the voters possesses a 
current membership voucher and M2 recognises 
them all as members in his membership lists. M2 
then applies the trading forum’s admissions policy 
to the verified votes and sends a signed standard 
membership voucher containing the four signed 
approvals and its local membership list to M6. M6 
then sends a hello message together with his 
membership voucher to other connected members 
in order to notify them of his new membership. 
Upon receiving M6’s hello message and 
membership voucher, other connected members 
will independently verify M6’s membership 
voucher before accepting the new membership and 
update their local membership list. This scenario is 
illustrated in Fig. 3 below. At the end of 
communication period t1, the local membership list 
of each member will be as follows:- 
M1 (M2, M3, M4, M5, M6) 
M2 (M1, M3, M4, M5, M6) 
M3 (M1, M2, M4, M5, M6) 
M4 (M1, M2, M3, M5, M6) 
M5 (M1, M2, M3, M4, M6) 
M6 (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5) 
B. Scenario 2 – Exclusion 
This scenario takes place after the earlier one. It 
is assumed that: 
 During this communication period, trading 
forum A consists of 20 parties (M1, M2, 
……, M19 and M20 ) that possess a current 
membership voucher. However, only M1, 
M2, M3, M4, M8, M10, M15, M16, M17 and M19 
are online while the others have gone 
offline. 
 This trading forum applies an exclusion 
policy that requires at least 7 members to 
agree with the exclusion and less than 3 
vetoes before any member can be excluded. 
 The local membership list of each currently 
connected member contains the 
membership record of other connected 
members as each of them needs to send a 
hello message together with their 
membership voucher to all connected 
members in order to rejoin the trading 
forum after being offline or disconnected 
from the network. 
 
Figure 3.  A join scenario with five members (all online). 
M2 multicasts a proposal to exclude M8 to all 
currently connected members of the forum except 
M8. It is assumed that all reply and only M1, M3, M4, 
M10, M15 and M19 agree with the exclusion proposal 
while the others disagree, and M2 receives their 
digitally signed votes within the voting period limit. 
Upon receiving the votes, M2 then verifies the 
voters’ membership voucher and accepts their 
votes as the validity period on their membership 
vouchers are still applicable and M2 recognises 
them all as members in his local membership list. 
After adding his own approval vote and the 
forum’s exclusion policy is applied, there are 
sufficient number of approvals (7 approvals) and 
less than sufficient vetoes (2 vetoes) for M2 to 
obtain a quorate decision to issue an exclusion 
order.  M2 then multicasts the exclusion order to all 
connected members except M8. This scenario is 
illustrated in Fig. 4 below.  
C. Scenario 3 - Renewal 
In this scenario, trading forum A consists of 25 
current members (M1, M2, .…M7, M9, ……, M25) and 
it is assumed that:  
 In the beginning, only M1, M4, M6, M7, M9 
and M10 are online while the others are 
offline. 
 M1’s membership voucher is nearly 
expired. 
 Renewal policy requires at least 7 members 
to agree with the renewal request and no 
vetoes before any new membership 
voucher can be issued to the requesting 
member. 
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Figure 4. An exclusion scenario  
M1 sends a membership renewal request 
together with his current membership voucher to 
M9 who then propagates the request to other 
currently connected members. It is assumed that 
only M4, M6 and M7 agree with the request and 
reply with a digitally signed agree message 
together with their membership voucher to M9 as 
depicted in Fig. 5 below. It is assumed that M10 
received the propagated message but decided not to 
participate in the vote.  Upon receiving the agree 
replies, M9 then verifies M4, M6 and M7s’ 
membership vouchers and accepts their votes as the 
validity period on their membership voucher is still 
applicable and M9 recognises them as members in 
his local membership list. However, in this 
situation, the number of approval replies is still not 
sufficient for M9 to obtain a quorate decision to 
issue a new membership voucher to M1.  Thus, M9 
has to wait until the voting period limit expires 
before he can consider a second round of voting. 
 
Figure 5. A renewal scenario  
After some further time has elapsed within the 
same voting period limit, it is assumed that M4, M6, 
M7 and M10 have gone offline while M2, M5, M20, 
M23, and M25 come into communication range with 
M1 and M9. The others remain offline. M9 then 
propagates the membership renewal request to M2, 
M5, M20, and M23 after receiving their Hello 
Message and verifies their membership voucher. In 
this case, it is assumed that M9 did not accept M25’s 
membership claim as he did not recognise either 
the issuer of M25’s membership voucher or the 
issuer and voters of that issuer as members in his 
membership list. Thus, the renewal request is not 
propagated to M25.  M2, M5, M20, and M23 agree with 
the request and they each reply with a digitally 
signed agree message together with their 
membership voucher to M9 within the voting period 
limit. M9 then validates their votes. Validated votes 
from M2, M5, M20, and M23 as shown in Fig. 6 below 
now enable M9 to obtain a quorate decision to issue 
a new membership voucher to M1. 
Figure 6.  Issuance of a new membership voucher. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have argued for the value of 
having a group membership service in ad hoc m-
commerce trading forums in order to establish 
greater trust and more secure interactions among its 
group members.  
Our approach does not rely on a complete 
knowledge of the current group membership to 
determine whether a peer is a member of a 
particular trading forum. Furthermore, it does not 
demand all group members to participate in group 
communications frequently and regularly in order 
for a quorate decision for group membership 
management to be able to be obtained. However, as 
the attestation process does not involve any 
authority higher than a peer and is done 
independently by each peer based on their partial 
knowledge of group membership, membership 
claims acceptable to a sufficient number of peers to 
qualify may not be found acceptable by every other 
reasonable peer. 
With this work, we aim to improve the security 
of ad hoc m-commerce trading systems by 
restricting participation to parties regarded as 
trustworthy by their peers. Our future work will be 
to implement and validate the proposed 
mechanisms with some experimental results. 
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Abstract – Ad hoc m-commerce is an emerging way of 
conducting online trading wirelessly within dynamic 
network communities. However, participants in such 
systems are vulnerable to attacks on identity 
establishment such as spoofing and whitewashing as 
part of fraudulent and unfair trading practices. This 
paper presents a scheme for identity support using PGP 
certificates in a fully self-organised manner, where a 
trading pseudonym and photograph are used as identity 
credentials. It lets participating parties collaborate in a 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) way to establish their online identity 
in a manner that is resistant to such attacks without any 
mediation of a Certification Authority (CA). It also lets 
participating parties handle the security settings of the 
trading system as well as share knowledge about fellow 
participants’ trading behaviour without relying on 
support from a network service provider. 
Keywords – casual local trading, collaborative 
service, ad hoc community, infrastructure-less service, 
PGP 
I. INTRODUCTION  
An ad hoc m-commerce trading system is a type 
of casual local trading facility conducted online and 
wirelessly outside established computer networks. It 
enables mobile users to organise themselves into a 
trading forum regardless of time or location without 
relying on any infrastructure support from a network 
service provider [1]. Members of a trading forum will 
utilize available computing resources to communicate 
and participate in activities such as m-commerce 
transactions, membership management, attestation 
processes and so on. However, since such activities 
are carried out over ad hoc wireless networks and as 
no network service provider can be relied upon to 
provide security services, this type of trading system 
is vulnerable to various types of attacks that 
undermine its functionality and dependability. These 
include identity spoofing, Sybil attacks, man-in-the-
middle attacks, unfair evaluations, collusions and 
misleading trade descriptions.  
Public key cryptography provides a variety of 
techniques for online identification, which can be 
used to protect traders against attempts to 
misrepresent identity. Such identity support can be 
used as part of a security and trust service to protect 
the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and non-
repudiation of information being exchanged, as well 
as to establish a tight binding between a trader’s 
identity and its reputation and membership 
information.  The identity-reputation binding enables 
traders to assess the trustworthiness of other traders. 
The identity-membership information binding helps 
traders to determine the validity of each member’s 
membership voucher and also each vote made by 
participating parties in collaborative decision making 
processes for membership management. In ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems, a membership service 
could keep track of a trading forum’s membership 
and help determine the current membership status of 
each participant. It would consist of mechanisms for 
traders to join, to verify other parties’ membership 
and to exclude those that do not adhere to the trading 
forum’s norms. Our scheme proposes that to be 
recognised as a member of a trading forum, a trader 
must possess a valid membership voucher that has a 
sufficient number of votes from recognised members 
of the forum, is digitally signed by a recognised 
member that issues it and its validity period must not 
have expired [2].  
However, ad hoc m-commerce trading systems 
lack infrastructure services to support public key 
cryptographic mechanisms that rely on a trusted CA. 
They also cannot support self-organised substitutes 
that require one or more parties to be the certification 
authority for other peers as participation by those 
parties on a regular basis cannot be guaranteed in 
such a dynamic trading community. Identity 
establishment in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems 
requires a scheme that is peer to peer, independent of 
a pre-established network infrastructure and able to 
support infrequent communications among traders.  
This paper presents such a scheme for identity 
support for a security and trust service. It lets traders 
in an ad hoc m-commerce trading system establish 
their own online identity using Pretty Good Privacy 
(PGP) technology that uses a trading pseudonym and 
photograph as identity credentials in PGP certificates 
and supports a self-revocation mechanism. It also lets 
the traders collaborate in a P2P manner to handle the 
attestation process of those identities as well as to 
control other security elements of the trading system. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 
Section II discusses possible security threats and 
attacks on ad hoc m-commerce and their impact on 
trading systems.  Section III describes the essential 
elements in security and trust services for such 
systems.  Section IV discusses the notion of online 
identity. Section V critically assesses related work. 
Section VI presents our approach for identity 
establishment in ad hoc m-commerce trading 
systems. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. POSSIBLE THREATS AND ATTACKS  
There are several possible threats and attacks that 
can subvert the security of an ad hoc m-commerce 
trading system. We only focus on addressing the 
most common ones that significantly impact the 
functionality and dependability of such systems. We 
identify those threats and attacks and classify them 
into three categories: 
A. Identity-related issues 
Traders in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems 
are represented by their online identity, which we 
propose to handle with trading pseudonyms. Using 
pseudonyms to participate in online transactions in 
such a loose ad hoc community exposes them to the 
following security attacks. 
1) Identity spoofing (masquerade)  
Identity spoofing is where a party tries to pass 
himself off as someone else. The prime risk is that he 
may use that spoofed identity to defraud others. 
2) Sybil Attacks 
Sybil attack is where a party creates multiple 
identities to cheat collective decision making 
processes to subvert the trading system. 
3) Whitewashing 
A whitewasher is a party who leaves a particular 
forum and then re-enters with a new identity to hide 
his bad reputation. 
B. Information-related issues 
As exchanges of information in ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems are conducted solely over 
insecure ad hoc wireless networks and may involve 
intermediaries, participants in such trading systems 
are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Such an 
attack occurs when a party intercepts 
communications between two other parties and then 
tampers with or omits messages being transferred 
without the knowledge of either sender or recipient. 
C. Misbehaviour-related issues 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, it is to be 
expected that traders will often engage in transactions 
with unfamiliar parties. This will make them 
susceptible to subversive behaviour by their trading 
counterparties such as: 
1) Trade Misdescriptions 
A party may cheat other traders by offering fake 
items as real or by trading items that are not as 
described in the offer. 
2) Unfair Deal Evaluations 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, traders 
could be required to evaluate each other after the 
completion of each transaction by means of deal 
evaluations. They could be used to assess each 
trader’s reputation and could consist of at least the 
following information. 
a) The evaluator’s trading pseudonym. 
b) Transaction contract which is digitally 
signed by both parties and has a timestamp as a proof 
of a transaction. 
c) Evaluation result that records the amount of 
satisfaction the evaluator receives from the trade. 
d) The evaluator’s digital signature. 
If a transaction concludes positively, traders could 
be required to express their satisfaction in the deal 
evaluation, digitally sign it and then send it to their 
trading counterpart. Otherwise, they could share their 
bad evaluation with other traders in the trading 
forum. However, an ill-intentioned trader might 
manipulate the reputation of other traders by giving 
unfair deal evaluations. There are at least two types 
of unfair evaluations; overstatements and slanders. 
Overstatements give inaccurate positive evaluations 
to increase the reputation of a particular party while 
slanders attack the reputation of trading 
counterparties by giving inaccurate negative 
evaluations to lower their reputation. 
3) Repudiation Misbehaviour 
Repudiation misbehaviour occurs when a trader 
performs a particular action and then denies having 
performed it. There are at least two significant types 
of such misbehaviour; data and contract repudiations. 
Data repudiation occurs when a trader sends a 
message or document and then denies having sent it. 
Contract repudiation occurs when one party initiates 
a transaction or agrees on a transaction contract and 
then denies having initiated the transaction or having 
made the contract.  
4) Collusions 
Collusion is where multiple parties or a party with 
multiple identities conspire to influence their own or 
other traders’ reputation, group decision making 
processes, attestation processes and so on.  
The significant impact that these attacks have on 
the security of the trading systems is that they can 
undermine the reliability of the following: 
a) The reputation service, e.g. a trader may 
conspire with associates to influence his own or other 
traders’ reputations by providing unfair deal 
evaluations, which lead other traders into making 
incorrect trust decisions that result in unsatisfactory 
transactions. 
b) Group membership management, e.g. 
multiple traders may collude to subvert collaborative 
decision making for group membership management 
or an intermediary may discard or alter a vote that is 
sent via his node without being detected by the end 
parties 
c) Attestation processes, e.g. a trader may 
create multiple identities to provide bogus support for 
certificates. 
d) Transaction activities, e.g. a trader may 
undertake a contract and then deny having made it. 
III. SECURITY AND TRUST SERVICE  
To create a sufficiently secure and trusted 
environment for traders to trade within ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems, its security and trust 
service needs support for: 
A. Identity  
Identity support is probably the most crucial 
element in a security and trust service for an ad hoc 
m-commerce trading system. Robust means of 
identification will not only protect traders from 
attacks aimed at identity disguise, but also lets other 
elements of a security and trust service function 
properly and effectively.  It provides a kind of 
security assurance for traders to communicate, 
collaborate, carry out transactions, manage 
membership and establish trust relationships with 
known other parties. 
B. Message authenticity,  integrity, confidentiality 
and non-repudiation 
Support for message authenticity, integrity and 
non-repudiation is important to give assurance to 
participating parties that messages or documents 
being exchanged among them originated with their 
specified sender and were not altered in transit. Also, 
the recipients can be assured that the sender cannot 
credibly deny having sent them. Confidentiality will 
ensure that they are unreadable by eavesdroppers or 
intermediaries. Having these elements in the security 
and trust service will protect traders from man-in-the-
middle attacks and repudiation misbehaviour. 
C. Trust  
The development of trust relationships among 
traders is vital to mitigate uncertainty and risks 
involved in the transactions. Parkhe in [4], describes 
uncertainty in online transactions as uncertainty 
about future transactions and about potential trading 
partners’ behaviour in fulfilling their transaction 
agreements. These uncertainties create a perception 
of significant risk that might discourage traders from 
trading.  A trust relationship established between two 
traders lets them believe that their counterpart is a 
sufficiently reliable and honest party to trade with 
and that the downside risks are low enough for them 
to expose themselves to. Thus, by having support for 
trust in the security and trust service, security issues 
related to potential misbehaviour can be mitigated.  
D. Attestation 
Attestation is significant as it provides a means 
for traders to vouch for other parties’ credentials such 
as their digital certificates, membership status and 
reputation reports. It also helps to mitigate 
transaction risks, especially in situations that involve 
dealing with unfamiliar traders. 
IV. THE NOTION OF ONLINE IDENTITY 
In online trading, traders are represented by 
online identities. An online identity refers to a social 
identity that is established by users as a means to 
represent themselves in online communities. The 
main choice here seems to be between using their real 
identities such as their legal name, date of birth and 
home address or a trading pseudonym to represent 
themselves online. The use of a trading pseudonym 
would enable traders to participate in online trading 
incognito. It would also allow traders to keep their 
trading behaviour to a certain degree private. 
Furthermore, it would enable traders to project a 
distinctive trading persona that reinforces a 
reputation they wish to maintain. The real identity of 
a trader in terms of their legal name, date of birth and 
home address is not normally a relevant issue in 
online trading. The reputation of a trading 
pseudonym can be compromised just as easily as the 
reputation associated with a real identity. So the 
value of maintaining that reputation can act as a 
strong disincentive to abusing a trading pseudonym. 
By linking together reputation to a trader’s 
pseudonym, the trustworthiness as well as future 
behaviour of that trader can be evaluated and 
predicted as long as a persistent identity is used. 
Pseudonyms make things harder where parties seek 
legal redress against criminal trading practices or 
contract violations. However, in casual local trading 
such recourses to law are rare and anyway the 
problem of converting a trading pseudonym to the 
real identity behind it needed in legal cases is not 
insuperable. 
In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, using 
real identities would create a problem of verification 
as no CA can be relied upon to have checked a 
trader’s real identity credentials such as his identity 
card or passport to verify his identity. Attestors of 
such identities would have to assure themselves that a 
trader was entitled to call himself by his purported 
legal name, was actually born on the stipulated date 
and genuinely resided at the stated address which is 
hard for other traders to be sure of. However, in 
practice casual trading attestors want to attest an 
identity established by a recognised appearance and a 
recognised form of address for trading purposes. 
What the subjects are really called or when they were 
born or where they really live is beside the point. 
Also, using real identities can make it harder for 
traders to maintain secrecy about their engaging in 
particular transactions. Lack of secrecy can threaten a 
trader’s privacy, put them at risk of harm from hostile 
competitors or even compromise the profitability of 
deals that they undertake. However, allowing 
pseudonyms raises the issue of whether it allows 
traders to create multiple identities or change their 
presented identity too easily. Traders might also try 
to hide their relation to a particular action like an 
attestation or vote and thus avoid being held 
accountable for that action. To prevent these issues in 
ad hoc m-commerce trading systems requires robust 
identification of traders. We propose doing this with 
digital certificates in a manner to be described in 
Section VI. 
V. RELATED WORK 
A significant amount of research has been done in 
the area of public key management in ad hoc wireless 
networks and several solutions have been proposed in 
the literature [5-18]. This section will discuss briefly 
those which are relevant to our work. Rahman [11] 
has proposed using the PGP Trust Model to let users 
generate their own asymmetric key pairs as well as to 
function as independent CAs. Thus, any user in the 
network can sign and verify any other user’s public 
key. These signatures progressively form a set of 
interconnected links of individual public keys or 
“Web of Trust” [9, 10]. The main interest in this 
approach is that it does not require a communal 
certification authority to vouch for a user’s public 
key. However, Rahman’s scheme requires a central 
key server to maintain a database of public keys 
which makes his approach unsuitable for ad hoc m-
commerce trading systems as the responsibility for 
hosting the key server will be problematic in such a 
loose trading community. It will be difficult or 
impossible to resolve who would be responsible for 
providing and paying for the server and also whether 
all users would trust them to do that. Furthermore, 
uninterrupted connectivity with such a key server 
could not be guaranteed in such a network.  
Capkun et al. [12] have proposed a fully self-
organized approach to public key management that 
does not rely on any trusted authority or centralized 
infrastructure. It lets users generate their own public 
key pairs, issue digital certificates to others and 
authenticate each other by merging their local 
certificate repositories and then evaluate the 
authenticity of a public key based on the certificates 
available in the merged repository. Interesting aspects 
of this approach are that it enables users to distribute 
control of the security settings of the system and also 
to perform key authentication based on the available 
information in each user’s local repository. It also 
does not require participation by all users during the 
authentication process. This approach seems to be 
suitable for our work due to its self-organised 
characteristic. However, its certificate renewal 
mechanism requires the same issuer to update a 
user’s certificate and would not be appropriate in our 
work as regular participation by trading parties 
cannot be guaranteed. Traders with expired 
certificates would be at serious risk of having to wait 
for a long time to get in contact with their certificate 
issuer or never succeed if the issuer is no longer 
active or has been excluded from the trading forum. 
Another fully self-organised approach has been 
described by Rachedi and Benslimane [13]. In their 
approach, they propose a distributed clustering 
algorithm to select a cluster head in each cluster, 
which is based on a trust value and mobility metric. 
The cluster head then becomes the CA in its cluster. 
The status of a CA node will change if other nodes do 
not receive any beacon from its node for a pre-
defined period of time and a new CA will be elected. 
This approach does not seem to be workable either in 
ad hoc m-commerce trading systems as frequent 
changes in the CA role will make the attestation 
process unreliable. Furthermore, the role of a cluster 
head does not seem to be appropriate in a community 
of equals. Also, it cannot be expected that any 
prospective cluster head will be sufficiently trusted 
by all other traders in that cluster. While some parties 
will be trusted more than others by their fellow 
traders, many trading communities lack any prospect 
of achieving a consensus about which parties among 
them are worthy of enhanced trust. 
VI. OUR APPROACH 
The motivation for our approach comes from 
acknowledging the self-organizing and infrastructure-
less nature of ad hoc wireless networks and allowing 
participants in ad hoc m-commerce trading systems 
to control their security settings. Support for identity 
establishment will include generating public and 
private key pairs, generating, signing and verifying 
PGP certificates as well as revoking compromised 
certificates. The verification process will be done in a 
P2P manner without the intervention of a CA. All 
participants will play a similar role. We assume that:  
a) Each trader maintains their own local 
certificate repository that contains their and other 
traders’ certificates that they have attested or 
acquired. 
b) Each trader creates their own trading 
pseudonym. To minimise the risk of more than one 
trader using the same pseudonym, traders are 
expected to check for this possibility against all 
trading pseudonyms that they have heard of. 
c) Traders verify other traders’ certificates 
based on their knowledge and recommendations from 
their trusted peers as detailed later in this section. 
d) The trading software that is jointly used by 
traders to carry out transactions comes from a 
trustworthy source. 
A. The creation of public/private key pairs 
Using PGP technology [9, 10], each trader will 
create their own private-public key pairs locally. 
B. The generation of digital certificates 
Traders will also generate their own self-signed 
digital certificates locally. The format of the 
certificates will be in the form of PGP certificates. 
Each certificate will contain at least the following 
information:- 
1) The certificate holder’s public key.  
2) The certificate holder’s identity credentials. We 
propose using the holder’s trading pseudonym and a 
photograph as their identity credentials. To do the 
verification, attestors can check the photograph 
against the appearance of party who asserts the 
enclosing certificate identifies them. One way to do 
the checking is by having a physical encounter which 
should be easy as traders trading via ad hoc 
networking are likely to be in close proximity with 
each other. A photograph helps defend against Sybil 
attacks and whitewashing as traders cannot easily 
change their physical appearance and it will be 
detectable when multiple identities have similar 
photographic appearances. 
3) The digital signature of the certificate owner. 
4) The certificate’s validity period. Each certificate 
will be issued with a standard limited validity period. 
Traders will have to generate a new self-signed 
certificate before the existing one expires and then 
send the newly generated certificate together with 
their current certificate to any forum members that 
they believe to be trustworthy for certificate 
verification. Certificates need to be time limited to 
some degree such as 5 years because aging changes 
physical appearance creating a mismatch with a 
photo.  
5) The digital signature(s) of the certificate’s 
attestor(s) and their certificate identifiers. Multiple 
recognised signatures on a single certificate give 
more assurance to the relying parties that the 
photograph and trading pseudonym in the certificate 
accurately identify a party with knowledge of the 
corresponding private key.  
C. The verification of digital certificates 
Since there is no inherent association between a 
public key and the identity credentials listed in the 
self-signed digital certificates, the validity of such 
certificates need to be attested by other parties to 
avoid an-ill intentioned trader from masquerading as 
others. In ad hoc m-commerce trading systems, as 
participating parties are peers who consider each 
other as equals, any peer can vouch for another peer’s 
digital certificate. However, the validity of such a 
certificate will only be accepted if the relying party 
recognises a party who has vouched for the certificate 
as a trusted party. This process is based on the 
concept of a web-of-trust [9-11]. For example, if peer 
A trusts peer B sufficiently as an attestor, it is 
expected that peer A will accept the validity of peer 
C’s digital certificate that is vouched by peer B. 
Anyone who trusts the attestor as an attestor, will 
consider any certificates signed by the attestor to be 
valid to the extent of that trust. To lessen the risk that 
any one certificate signatory is unknown or untrusted 
as an attestor, multiple signatories will usually be 
required. 
D. Certificate Revocation 
A certificate that has been compromised can only 
be revoked by its owner by performing the following 
steps: 
1) First, generate a new private-public key pair. 
2) Then, generate a new self-signed certificate that 
binds their identity credentials with the newly created 
public key. Traders are expected to use the same 
trading pseudonym for their identity credentials in 
order to maintain a persistent identity, so that their 
reputation can be retained. 
3) Next, send the newly-generated certificate to 
members of the trading forum prepared to attest the 
validity of the certificate. Also they need to send their 
old certificate with it in order to use the same trading 
pseudonym.  
4) Finally, multicast a revocation message that is 
signed by the new and old private keys together with 
the new and old certificates to other members of the 
forum. The receiving parties will update their local 
certificate repository by marking the old certificate as 
“compromised” and adding the new certificate to the 
list, if the signatures on the revocation message check 
out and their photos correspond. Otherwise the 
message and new certificate will be ignored. 
To assure themselves that identity credentials in a 
PGP certificate really belong to the party that 
presents them, a trader can perform the following 
steps upon receiving a PGP certificate from 
unfamiliar traders. Some may require further checks 
depending on the outcome of the check or how 
careful the recipient is. Some may only be important 
if the currently proposed transaction has significant 
downside risks and the receiving parties want to be 
assured that the presenting party has a good trading 
history. 
1) Check the trading pseudonym in the certificate 
against their store of certificates to see if a different 
certificate uses the same trading pseudonym. This 
step helps the recipient to discover attempts by an 
attacker to spoof the identity in that certificate. In this 
situation, the recipient should reject the presented 
identity as bogus if there is another certificate in his 
local certificate repository that use the same trading 
pseudonym yet has a photo of an obviously different 
person. 
2) Check the self signature against the certificate’s 
public key to ensure that the presenting party has not 
altered the contents of the certificate like the 
certificate’s validity period or its owner’s 
photograph. This step will protect against man-in-the-
middle attacks. 
3) Check the photo against the appearance of the 
subject when they are in a close proximity with each 
other. This step enables the recipient to check against 
an attempt by the subject to spoof another party’s 
identity after discovering that party’s private key.  
4) Check the photo against their store of 
certificates to see if that appearance is used with a 
different identity. This enables the recipient to detect 
any attempt by the presenting party to be a 
whitewasher or to create multiple identities.  
5) Check that a certificate with that public key is 
not recorded as ‘compromised’ in his local certificate 
repository. This will prevent the attacker from further 
abusing a spoofed identity. It could also be used as 
evidence to exclude the presenter from a trading 
forum’s membership for conducting himself 
inappropriately. 
6) Check whether the certificates of any trusted 
third parties that have signed the presented certificate 
are available in his local certificate repository. They 
can provide reassurance that the presenting party with 
the given appearance is entitled to use the trading 
pseudonym. Any attempt by those third parties to 
attest a false identity of the presenting party could 
expose them to the risk of being excluded from a 
trading forum’s membership. This provides a 
modicum of accountability for subversive behaviour. 
7) Check that the photo appearance is not very 
similar to that of anyone that there have been 
broadcast warnings about or about whom an 
exclusion proposal has been issued. This will give 
some kind of assurance to the recipient that the 
certificate is not an alleged malefactor. It would also 
throw suspicion on the good faith of the signers of 
the presented certificate. 
8) Check that the validity date on the certificate 
has not expired.  An expired certificate doesn’t 
disprove the identity of its presenter but it does raise 
doubts about the usefulness of the photo and about 
whether the presenter has had difficulties finding 
trustable third parties to sign a current certificate for 
that party. 
To mitigate security issues related to 
misbehaviour of a trader, a distributed reputation 
system that employs a sanction-backed mechanism 
will be used as a means to facilitate trust 
development among traders [3]. An exclusion 
mechanism [2] that is based on collaborative decision 
making by a sufficiently large number of forum 
members is recommended for use to sanction traders 
that misbehave or have a poor reputation. This will 
be a strong incentive for traders to behave 
appropriately especially in fulfilling their transaction 
agreement and providing truthful deal evaluations 
and testimonials as they will be open to the risk of 
being excluded from a trading forum’s membership if 
other traders receive complaint about their 
misbehaviour and also an exclusion proposal. A 
trader’s public key and a transaction contract that is 
digitally signed by both parties involved in the 
transactions, which are included in the deal 
evaluations will establish a tight binding between a 
trading party’s identity and its reputation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
With this work, we introduce a novel form of 
support for ad hoc m-commerce that aims to create a 
sufficient degree of confidence among traders to 
participate in such a casual local wireless trading, as 
well as to serve as a basis for establishing an m-
commerce domain in a totally self-organizing and 
P2P manner. In the design of a security and trust 
service for such trading systems, we have identified 
and discussed three main categories of threats and 
attacks that have significant affects on its security. 
We contend that by addressing these three main 
categories of threats and attacks, an environment that 
is sufficiently secure and trusted can be created for 
traders to communicate, collaborate and carry out 
transactions. We also contend that by providing 
robust identification support, such security threats 
and attacks can be prevented or at least mitigated.  
We have also discussed the notion of online 
identity in the context of online trading. We propose 
a mechanism that allows participating parties of an ad 
hoc m-commerce trading system to establish their 
online identity in a fully self-organizing manner 
using a trading pseudonym and a photograph as their 
identity credentials in a PGP certificate. It also allows 
collaboration among those parties to control the 
attestation process of such PGP certificates without 
relying on any trusted certification authority. We 
discussed the steps that can be performed by a 
recipient of such a PGP certificate in our approach to 
resist security attacks against online identity. 
However, as the attestation process is done totally in 
a P2P manner among traders without involving any 
higher certification authority and is based on each 
attestor’s knowledge, identity credentials presented in 
a PGP certificate that is acceptable to some parties 
may not be found acceptable to every other party in 
the trading forum. It will depend solely on the level 
of trust that the recipients have in the parties that 
attest the PGP certificate.  
We intend that this work together with our 
proposed group membership service [2] and a 
reputation system [3] will be able to support security 
for an ad hoc m-commerce trading system to a 
sufficient degree for trade to be viable using it. A 
limitation of this approach is that no implementation 
has yet been attempted to evaluate its effectiveness. 
Our future work will attempt to validate our proposed 
security and trust service with some experimental 
results using real life scenarios and security expert 
reviews. 
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